Prof. dr José Manuel Aroso Linhares
University of Coimbra
English abstract: In the paper I would like to allude to the possibilities that at last seem recognisable (and can be explored) when, expressly refuting the scission postulate (either in its luminous positive version or in its deconstructive aporetic reproduction), an internally relevant thesis for methodological unity between evidentiary adjudication and adjudication tout court (between judicial reasoning with proof and adjudicative reasoning as the realisation of Law) is advocated – with the certainty that the defence of this claim does not deny (or dilute) the specificity of the evidence problem, but instead provides this specificity with new opportunities for being understood and experienced in direct connection with the (increasing!) need to identify law’s specific project and its autonomous practical world as an unmistakable cultural acquisition. To condense the argument, I would say that methodological unity has to do with the priority of controversy – as a specific practical structure demanding judgment and the constitutive entrance of the comparing Third – whereas the specificity of evidential judgment corresponds to the irradiance of the referential claim and the narrative intelligibility that identifies it.
Keywords: law of evidence, Piyel Haldar, judicial reasoning, realisation of Law
Translated by: Bartosz Wojciechowski
Published: Number 1(6)/2013, pp. 5-20.
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