Archiwum
Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVR
  • General info
  • Aim & scope
  • News
  • Issues
    • Current Issue
    • Past Issues
  • Editorial board
    • Board Members
    • Reviewers
  • For authors / Ethics
  • Contact
  • Polski

Removing a Spell by Spell? Some Remarks Regarding Rafał Mańko’s Monograph on the Critical Philosophy of Adjudication

Mgr Mateusz Wojtanowski

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The reviewer claims that Rafał Mańko’s monograph ‘Towards a critical philosophy of adjudication. The political, ethics, legitimacy’ (Łódź, 2018) should be connected with the so called essentialist wing of postmodernism, which deals with the issues of traditional philosophy under the veil of cognitive skepticism. The review attempts to convince a reader that the author’s authoritative metaphysical statements translate into too radical program in the field of adjudication. The reviewer do not deny the necessity to ‘open’ the traditional legal domain to external arguments, however, he claim that the proposal presented in this regard by Rafał Mańko is too far-reaching.

Keywords: adjudication, legal interpretation, political, ideology, CLS, postmodernism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(25)/2020, pp. 118-126.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.4.118

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 31

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: adjudication, CLS, ideology, legal interpretation, political, postmodernism

The Role of Values in Legal Interpretation: The Normative Approach

Prof. US dr hab. Olgierd Bogucki

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The article presents and analyses a certain theory of values and their role in legal interpretation. The article calls it a ‘componential’ theory of values. According to the theory, values in law create structures based on global assessments: comprehensive axiological judgements that consider all the relevant values and degrees of their realization. The basic theorem of the theory is the theorem on isomorphy between the global assessment and the content of the legal norm. This ‘componential’ theory is the basis of the normative model of legal interpretation. According to this model, the interpreter should reconstruct the global assessment and choose the one possible result of interpretation – the one norm of conduct – which will be the most consistent with this judgement. In order to reconstruct the aforementioned global assessment, the interpreter should consider the legal text, case law and legal literature, legislative materials and interpretative presumption.

The article reconstructs the philosophical presumptions behind the aforementioned theory and model. The article points out that the fundamental value behind the normative model is the intersubjectivity of legal interpretation as an element of the rule of law. The article also indicates that the theory and model described above are based on legal positivism, but with significant connections with legal hermeneutics, Dworkin’s theory of law, and argumentative approaches to law. In addition, the theory seems to presume weak commensurability of values.

Keywords: legal interpretation, theory of law, philosophy of law, axiology, ‘componential’ theory of values

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 96-108.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.96

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 75

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: ‘componential’ theory of values, axiology, legal interpretation, philosophy of law, theory of law

The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege as a Source for Search for the Limits of Linguistic Interpretation in Criminal Law?

Prof. UŚ dr hab. Sławomir Tkacz

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is nowadays recognized as the standard of the rule of law. This doctrine prohibits the use of analogies and extensive interpretation of legal provisions to the disadvantage of the perpetrator. The starting point of these considerations is that texts of criminal provisions vary in nature. Therefore a question should be asked about the nature of these prohibitions in relation to various provisions. A separate problem is to distinguish inference by analogy from legal interpretation. The presented considerations are aimed at answering the question whether the nullum crimen sine lege principle allows determining the linguistic limits for the interpretation of criminal law. The analyses are illustrated by examples from the field of criminal case law. The article aims to provide reflection on the acceptable limits of interpretation of criminal law, if such limits can be defined. The considerations end with general conclusions.

Keywords: nullum crimen sine lege, limits of legal interpretation, legal interpretation, criminal law, theory of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 81-95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.81

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 70

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: criminal law, legal interpretation, limits of legal interpretation, nullum crimen sine lege, theory of law

Dialogical Concept of Legal Interpretation

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, mgr Konrad Kobyliński

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The purpose of this text is to present an outline of the dialogical concept of legal interpretation. It involves the need to establish the relationship between the legislature and courts. In the normative dimension, this concept includes an analysis of assumptions about the mutual roles of the legislature and courts in determining the substance of the law. In the descriptive dimension, the authors present tools that enable communication between the legislature and courts in order to improve the interpretation process. The authors describe the requirements for communication between courts and the legislature, and refer to existing solutions in Poland and the United States. In the text the importance of this issue is only signaled, but the authors believe that it is worth further research.

Keywords: legal interpretation, strategies of interpretation, communication theory of legal interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 35-48.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.35

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 70

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: communication theory of legal interpretation, legal interpretation, strategies of interpretation

Regarding Justification of Interpretive Claims

Prof. US dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń, prof. dr hab. Maciej Zieliński

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The duty to provide justification for claims is the realization of the postulate of criticism in the academia. Decisions regarding legal interpretation (regardless of whether they are formulated in the process of applying the law or outside this process) are made in the form of claims about a binding legal norm with a certain content. Validation of such claims requires their justification, just like in the academia. And in the academia, a claim remains theoretical until someone presents an inter-subjectively verified justification for it. The aim of this article is precisely that: to indicate the necessity to justify interpretive claims (both partial and final) in the process of interpretation. As a starting point in the process of demonstrating the need to formulate such a justification, we choose the derivative conception of legal interpretation, which provides for the duty to justify interpretive claims for methodological reasons (and which is an intrinsic element of the content of legal directives in this conception, at least implicitly). We present and discuss the types of justifications for interpretive claims and their variants (weak and strong). Furthermore, we analyse the difference between justifying ordinary and interpretive claims. Finally, we also identify the consequences of failure to provide such justifications.

Keywords: justification of interpretive claim, legal interpretation, postulate of criticism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 7-18.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.7

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 91

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: justification of interpretive claim, legal interpretation, postulate of criticism

Should a Court Be Understanding for the Legislator? On Legislative Error from the Perspective of the Theory of Legal Interpretation

Mgr Marek Suska

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: In the actual legislative processes, errors are often made: the legislator’s intentions are not always properly expressed in the legal provisions or there is insufficient clarity. The discrepancy between what the legislator said and what they meant to say poses a serious challenge to the theory and practice of legal interpretation. In this paper, the author analyses two possible reactions to a legislative error: correcting it or applying the provision in its literal meaning. The considerations are based on two decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, because in criminal law the protection of the prima facie understanding of the text is a very important value. In the final part of the paper, the author indicates factors which can affect the court’s attitude towards a legislative error in a specific case.

Keywords: legislative error, scrivener’s error, legal interpretation, law-making

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 99-110.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.99

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 80

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: lawmaking, legal interpretation, legislative error, scrivener’s error

On Possible Applications of Paul Ricoeur’s Thought in Legal Theory

Dr Marcin Pieniążek

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University

English abstract: The paradigm of legal positivism, historically the most important attempt at turning law into science, has been subject to thorough criticism in past decades. The criticism has concerned the most important features of legal positivism, and especially the assumption of separation of law and morality, the dogma of statue being the only source of law, and the linguistic methods of interpreting legal texts. With a crisis of the positive paradigms, the demand for new, humanistic grounds for analysing philosophical and legal questions is intensifying. This is the reason for this article’s attempt to point to the application of Paul Ricoeur’s achievements to the key questions of the philosophy of law. It must be emphasised that his works, and especially Soimême comme un autre, may serve as a foundation for a philosophy of law rejecting the problematic claims about the dualism of being and obligation, the distinction of descriptive and prescriptive languages, and also the separation of law and morality. Thanks to this, the legal topos pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) finds a reinforcement in the ontology of the subject applying law and can be understood as an ethically significant pattern of identity of the self. Equally fruitful seems the possibility of combining the questions of the ontology of the subject applying law with the question of a legal text and its interpretation. The assumption of Ricoeur’s perspective leads to a reduction in the distance between the legal text and its addressee, emphasised by the critics of legal positivism. This rapprochement becomes possible thanks to the connection of the question of the narrative that a legal text is with the question of narrativisation of the subject (i.e. the interpreter of a legal text), being itself in the ipse sense, i.e. applying the law.

Keywords: Paul Ricoeur, legal positivism, legal interpretation

Language: English

Published: Number 1(10)/2015, pp. 79-88

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2015.1.79

Download: Download
Number of downloads:
98

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: legal interpretation, legal positivism, Paul Ricoeur

Does American jurisprudence have any rules of interpretation of Constitution?

Dr Anna Tomza

University of Łódź

English abstract: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.

Keywords: American jurisprudence, legal interpretation, rules of interpretation, Constitution

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 125-133

Download: Download

Number of downloads: 62

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: American jurisprudence, Constitution, legal interpretation, rules of interpretation

The ways of understanding creative (constructive) interpretation

Dr Olgierd Bogucki

University of Szczecin 

English abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the notion of creative interpretation (of any text, especially creative interpretation of a legal text). The author points out that there are two different meanings of the expression “creative interpretation”. The first one can be called “ontological” and the second one – “methodological”. A given interpretation is ontologically creative when it creates a new object (which is a new meaning of some sort) and it is methodologically creative when it is established without applying any rules. Different theoretic approaches to legal interpretation presuppose different relations between ontological creativeness and methodological creativeness. The article explores some of them. The main thesis of the article is that when we say that a given interpretation is ontologically creative, we do not need to say it is methodologically creative (and vice versa).

Keywords: legal interpretation, interpretation ontologically creative, interpretation methodologically creative

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(6)/2013, pp. 21-33.

Download: Download
Number of downloads:
70

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: interpretation methodologically creative, interpretation ontologically creative, legal interpretation

Legal Databases and Their Functions in the Process of Interpreting and Applying the Law

Dr Wiesław Staśkiewicz, Prof. dr hab. Tomasz Stawecki

University of Warsaw

English abstract: This article deals with the implications of the widespread practice of use of legal databases in Polish judicial practice. Apart from the undeniable positive effects of development of an electronic civilization, the article deals with the negative effects of use of databases. This is because a conflict arises between the possibilities offered by the latest technology in the form of easy access to legal texts, commentaries and thousands of judicial rulings, and the unique historical experience of the judiciary in a former communist country, methods of legal interpretation sustained by legal positivism, and domination by a syllogistic model for application of the law. All results in dysfunction of legal databases. A kind of “hybrid interpretation of law” is formed, which is a combination of a legacy, the effects of transformation of the economy and the system, as well as the new rules of law, on the one hand, and the ideology of bound judicial decision on the other. The nature of the “hybrid interpretation of law” is the infinite scope for citing judicial rulings and commentaries available in the databases without taking a broader theoretical view – without supporting arguments, and so the citing of a ruling has become the basis for adjudication. The question of whether the possibilities that electronic databases offer will cause interpretation of this kind to turn into a new form of legal rhetoric, or whether it will remain merely a means of adaptation of the discretionary power of judges to legal positivism doctrine, and thus the sophism of the period of transformation, remains an open one.

Keywords: legal database, legal interpretation, hybrid interpretation of law, legal positivism, syllogistic model for application of the law

Language: English

Published: Number 1(4)/2012, pp. 84-105.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2012.1.84

Download: Download
Number of downloads:
84

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: hybrid interpretation of law, legal database, legal interpretation, legal positivism, syllogistic model for application of the law

Next Page »

Categories

  • Articles
  • Editorial
  • In Memoriam
  • News
  • Reports
  • Reviews and discussions

Keywords

Martin Krygier institutions health care naturalism religious argumentation Michał Stambulski judicial character memory policies freedom of assembly Friedrich A. Hayek the political journalist open society freedom of religion thick properties legal culture indigenous people Republican Party of Minnesota v. White interpretationism CEENJ David DeGrazia agonism critical philosophy of adjudication hybrid interpretation of law legal concepts lawyers’ language crisis Katarzyna Mikołajczyk-Graj Adam Dyrda Michael Moore Russia state law political responsibility Critical Discourse Analysis Georgii Sibirtsev existentialism deontological ethics analytical legal theory Constitution public philosophy Paweł Skuczyński second-order observation collaborative law juristic virtues ombudsman institutions public truths cognitive science individual guilt Hohfeldian incidents Franciszek Strzyszkowski

Copyright © 2021 Polska Sekcja Międzynarodowego Stowarzyszenia Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej IVR | Administrator strony: Dawid Milczarek

Ta strona używa plików cookies. Zakładamy, że wyrażają Państwo na to zgodę, ale mogą Państwo także wyłączyć pliki cookies w Ustawieniach. //
This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish. (Zob. więcej // Read more) Ustawienia // SettingsZGODA // ACCEPT

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.
Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.

Necessary Always Enabled

Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.

Non-necessary

Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the website to function and is used specifically to collect user personal data via analytics, ads, other embedded contents are termed as non-necessary cookies. It is mandatory to procure user consent prior to running these cookies on your website.