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Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Legal Reasoning as Practical Reasoning in John M. Finnis’ New Natural Law Theory

Mgr Michał Sopiński

University of Warsaw

English abstract: This paper presents practical reasoning in the light of John M. Finnis’ new natural law theory. Finnis’ views were shaped by Aquinas’ thoughts on natural law but he was also strongly inspired by Germain Grisez’ new approach, so his theory could be named a new natural law theory. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of legal reasoning as practical reasoning, which Finnis intended mainly as a strong critique of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning based on the concept of the one right answer. According to the author of this paper, Finnis’ critical approach to Dworkin leads to a gradual extension of the former’s concept of legal reasoning to include positivistic aspects (rapprochement with Joseph Raz’ views) and institutional aspects (rapprochement with Neil MacCormick’s views). Therefore, Finnis’ theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the rapprochement between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary philosophy of law.

Keywords: John M. Finnis, natural law, legal reasoning, practical reasoning, Ronald Dworkin, one right answer

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(21)/2020, pp. 84-98.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.84

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Number of downloads: 101

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: John M. Finnis, legal reasoning, natural law, one right answer, practical reasoning, Ronald Dworkin

Neil McCormick’s Theory of Legal Reasoning and Its Evolution

Mgr Michał Sopiński

University of Warsaw

Abstract: This paper traces, examines, and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views were shaped gradually so his theory could be divided into two main stages. Therefore, the use of the diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is an examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to an extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of the MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.

Keywords: legal reasoning, MacCormick, legal syllogism, rhetoric, rule of law

Language: Original printed in Polish, English online translation

Received: 20.02.2018
Accepted:
19.05.2018

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 63-78

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.63ENG

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Number of downloads: 20

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: legal reasoning, legal syllogism, MacCormick, Michał Sopiński, rhetoric, rule of law

Coherence Model of Legal Reasoning

Dr Michał Araszkiewicz

Jagiellonian University


English abstract:
The aim of the article is to present a model of legal reasoning based of the concept of coherence, as this concept is understood in recent developments of cognitive science. More precisely, the model, hereafter referred to as CMLR (Coherence Model of Legal Reasoning) is based on the constraint satisfaction theory of coherence, elaborated and defended by Paul Thagard. The claim of the author is that CMLR appears very satisfactory when assessed against criteria typically employed for evaluation of legal-theoretical models of argumentation. It is able to represent legal reasoning either as a neural network or, more traditionally, as a formal dialogue game. In consequence, CMLR offers a plausible “third road” between traditional deductive and non-deductive models of legal thinking.

Keywords: legal argumentation, legal reasoning, coherence, cohesion

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 19-38.

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Number of downloads:
111

References:

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  2. Alexy R., A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, Oxford 1989.
  3. Alexy R., On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison, „Ratio Juris“ 2003/4.
  4. Alexy R., A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford 2002.
  5. Alexy R., The Weight Formula, w: J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, W. Załuski (red.), Studies in the Philosophy of Law 3, Kraków 2007.
  6. Amayi A., Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology, „Artificial Intelligence and Law” 2007/15.
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  10. Brożek B., Defeasibility of Legal Reasoning, Kraków 2004.
  11. Brożek B., Kilka uwag o logice norm, w: J. Stelmach (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2001.
  12. Brożek B., Rationality and Discourse. Towards a Normative Model of Applying Law, Warszawa 2007.
  13. Daniels N., Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice, Cambridge 1996.
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  15. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Zasady i reguły prawne, “Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
  16. Grabowski A., Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics. A Study on the Extension of the Theory of Legal Argumentation, Kraków 1999.
  17. Hage J., Reasoning with rules, Dordrecht 1997.
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  19. Jørgensen J., Imperatives and Logic, „Erkenntnis“ 1937–1938/7.
  20. MacCormick N., Summers R., Interpreting Statutes. A comparative study, Dartmouth 1991.
  21. MacCormick N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford 1978.
  22. Lehrer K., Theory of Knowledge, London 1990.
  23. Malinowski A., Nowak L., Problemy modelowania w teorii prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1972/2.
  24. Marciszewski W. (red.), Mała encyklopedia logiki, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1970.
  25. Płeszka K., Uzasadnianie decyzji interpretacyjnych przez ich konsekwencje, Kraków 1996.
  26. Prakken H., Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument. Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law, Dordrecht 1997.
  27. Prakken H., Sartor G., A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conficting Arguments in Legal Reasoning, „Artificial Intelligence and Law” 1996/4.
  28. Putnam H., Reason, truth and history, Cambridge 1981.
  29. Rescher N., Dialectics. A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, Albany 1977.
  30. Rescher N., The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973.
  31. Stelmach J., Naturalistyczny i antynaturalistyczny model teorii prawa, “Studia Prawnicze” 1984/3–4.
  32. Stelmach J., Brożek B., Metody prawnicze, Kraków 2006.
  33. Tarski A., O pojęciu wynikania logicznego, „Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1936/39.
  34. Thagard P., Ethical Coherence, „Philosophical Psychology“ 1998/4.
  35. Thagard P., Coherence in Thought and Action, Cambridge-London 2000.
  36. Thagard P., Explanatory Coherence, „Behavioral and Brain Sciences” 1989/12.
  37. Thagard P., Mind. An Introduction to Cognitive Science, Cambridge-London 2005.
  38. Thagard P., Verbeurgt K., Coherence as constraint satisfaction, „Cognitive Science“ 1998/22.
  39. Volpe G., A Minimalist Solution to Jørgensen’s Dillemma, „Ratio Juris” 1999/12.
  40. Woleński J., Epistemologia. Poznanie, prawda, wiedza, realizm, Warszawa 2005.
  41. Woleński J., Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace prawnicze” 92.
  42. Wróblewski J., Sądowe stosowanie prawa, Warszawa 1988.

 

 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: coherence, cohesion, legal argumentation, legal reasoning, Michał Araszkiewicz

A few comments on the formalization of legal reasonings under analogy legis and a contrario

Prof. dr hab. Andrzej Malinowski

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The paper shows some of the problems related to the formalization of legal reasonings under analogia legis and a contrario, and discusses some of the specific proposals in this regard. Built formal models are based on the concept of monotonic logic and nonmonotonic logic. These models are mainly illustrative and have limited explanatory power. Their reliability can only be achieved under certain additional conditions.

Keywords: formalization, legal reasoning, analogia legis, a contrario

Language: Polish

Received: 03.04.2017
Accepted: 22.05.2017

Published: Number 2(15)/2017, pp. 26-37.

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Number of downloads:
61

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: a contrario, analogia legis, Andrzej Malinowski, formalization, legal reasoning

Some remarks about the application of the cognitive linguistics’ tools for the differentiation between extensive interpretation and analogy

Prof. UŁ dr hab. Sylwia Wojtczak

University of Łódź


English abstract:
The paper is the proposal of the discussion upon the utility of the cognitive linguistics’ tools for legal application, especially within the field of legal interpretation and legal reasoning. Cognitive linguistics is the school of linguistics and cognitive science, developing from 1970s of the XX century, researching on language and mind and their intersection. The analysis of the instances originating in the Polish law in force, made by the means of different concepts of cognitive linguistics (prototypes, radial categories, idealized cognitive models, conceptual metaphors) is here the basis to formulate some postulates concerning the way of understanding and differentiation between extensive interpretation and analogy. The instances and postulates simultaneously let one distinguish those linguistic changes, which inevitably occur in time, and which should be recognised as the domain of linguistic interpretation.

Keywords: cognitive linguistics, interpretation, extensive interpretation, legal reasoning, analogy

Language: Polish

Received: 29.09.2016
Accepted: 31.10.2016

Published: Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 125-140.

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Number of downloads:
174

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: analogy, cognitive linguistics, extensive interpretation, interpretation, legal reasoning, Sylwia Wojtczak

Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Account of Analogy Applied to Law: the Proportional Model of Analogical Legal Reasoning

Dr Maciej Koszowski

Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa


English abstract:
In this paper, the author has undertaken an attempt to adjust Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of analogy to the province of law. He thus sketches out a pertinent scheme of legal analogy based upon the similarity of proportions and indulges in a consideration of the merits and demerits of such a proposition. To this aim, as the proportions that are compared in such an account of analogy, the relations between the facts of the cases and their legal outcomes were chosen: one such outcome already known and one tentatively posited. Finally, however, the author’s analyses lead to the conclusion that despite its considerable theoretical attractiveness and some mystical charm, legal analogy consisting of the comparison of two proportions is either quite similar to orthodox approaches to analogical reasoning in law or too obscure for one to employ it credibly in the legal setting. In consequence, until its proponents have elucidated the workings of proportional analogy in more detail, the potential use of such a form of analogy in the province of law does not seem promising and cannot be recommended.

Language: English

Keywords: proportion, proportional, proportionality, analogy, legal, Chaïm Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, account, law, reasoning, approach, logic, apply, analogically

Published: Number 2(13)/2016, pp. 5-13.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2016.2.5

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Number of downloads:
479

 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: analogy, Chaïm Perelman, legal reasoning, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Maciej Koszowski, proportionality

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