Dr hab. Adam Dyrda, prof. dr hab. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
English abstract: Does legal interpretation have borders? Are these borders conventionally established? What makes the given ‘legal reasons’, set forth by certain normative theories of legal interpretation, acceptable in legal discourse (even if the reasons are wrong)? In the present paper, we argue that the notion of the borders of legal interpretation is linked to the general notion of the borders of law. We indicate the scope of ‘interpretive theoretical disagreements’ in law, as discussed by certain new, ‘institutional’ versions of legal positivism. Interpretive borders are not fully determined by the given ‘institutional’ framework. In our view, these borders are also more generally determined inter alia by certain truistic (platitudinous) beliefs related to law and interpretation.
Keywords: interpretive methodology, limits of legal interpretation, legal positivism, second-order rules of legal interpretation, normative theories of legal interpretation
Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 19-34.
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