Research article
Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia?
Pojęcie dowodu jako otwarta rana prawa: niezmiennie błędna aporia?
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(6)/2013, s. 5-20
English
Abstract
In the paper I would like to allude to the possibilities that at last seem recognisable (and can be explored) when, expressly refuting the scission postulate (either in its luminous positive version or in its deconstructive aporetic reproduction), an internally relevant thesis for methodological unity between evidentiary adjudication and adjudication tout court (between judicial reasoning with proof and adjudicative reasoning as the realisation of Law ) is advocated – with the certainty that the defence of this claim does not deny (or dilute) the specificity of the evidence problem, but instead provides this specificity with new opportunities for being understood and experienced in direct connection with the (increasing!) need to identify law’s specific project and its autonomous practical world as an unmistakable cultural acquisition. To condense the argument, I would say that methodological unity has to do with the priority of controversy – as a specific practical structure demanding judgment and the constitutive entrance of the comparing Third – whereas the specificity of evidential judgment corresponds to the irradiance of the referential claim and the narrative intelligibility that identifies it.
Keywords
- law of evidence
- Piyel Haldar
- judicial reasoning
- realisation of Law
References
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Publication information
Issue data
Issue nr 1(6)/2013
- Pages
- 5-20
- Published
How to cite
Bibliographic description and verified export formats.
Format AFPiFS
J. M. A. Linhares, Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia?, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(6)/2013, s. 5–20, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5
ACM
[1] José Manuel Aroso Linhares. 2013. Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia? AFPiFS 1(6) (2013), 5–20. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5
ACS
(1) Linhares, J. M. A. Evidence (or Proof?) As Law’s Gaping Wound: A Persistent False Aporia? AFPiFS 2013, No. 1(6), 5–20. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
APA
Linhares, J. M. A. (2013). Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia? Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(6), 5–20. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5
ABNT
LINHARES, José Manuel Aroso. Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia? Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, n. 1(6), p. 5–20, 2013.
Chicago
Linhares, José Manuel Aroso. “Evidence (or Proof?) As Law’s Gaping Wound: A Persistent False Aporia?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6) (2013): 5–20. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
Harvard
Linhares, J.M.A. (2013) “Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia?,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(6), pp. 5–20. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
IEEE
[1] J. M. A. Linhares, “Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia?,” AFPiFS, no. 1(6), pp. 5–20, 2013, doi: 10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
MLA
Linhares, José Manuel Aroso. “Evidence (or Proof?) As Law’s Gaping Wound: A Persistent False Aporia?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6), 2013, pp. 5–20, https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
Turabian
Linhares, José Manuel Aroso. “Evidence (or Proof?) As Law’s Gaping Wound: A Persistent False Aporia?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6) (2013): 5–20. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5.
Vancouver
1. Linhares JMA. Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia? AFPiFS. 2013;1(6):5–20. doi:10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5
OSCOLA
José Manuel Aroso Linhares, ‘Evidence (or proof?) as law’s gaping wound: a persistent false aporia?’ (2013) 1(6) AFPiFS 5 <https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.5>.
