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<front><journal-meta><journal-title-group><journal-title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Spolecznej</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2082-3304</issn></journal-meta><article-meta><title-group><article-title>Norms and Novelty: Reflections on Legal Knowledge, Norms and Evolutionary Systems</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Giovanni Tuzet</surname></name></contrib></contrib-group><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.108</article-id><volume>27</volume><issue>2</issue><pub-date><year>2021</year></pub-date><fpage>108</fpage><lpage>122</lpage><abstract><p>The paper has three sub-topics: legal knowledge, legal norms, and evolutionary systems. The three are interconnected. A reflection on the nature of legal knowledge throws light on the nature of legal norms. Legal knowledge is largely a posteriori and it is so because norms are largely contingent. Being a realm of continual change, law has novelty as a fundamental feature. The process of legal change is not driven by chance but by the attempt to face ever new problems and changing circumstances. This supports a view of legal systems as adaptive and evolutionary, as classical pragmatism suggested. However, inference can give some a priori legal knowledge.</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>inference</kwd><kwd>legal knowledge</kwd><kwd>legal norms</kwd><kwd>novelty</kwd><kwd>pragmatism Language: English</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body /></article>