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<front><journal-meta><journal-title-group><journal-title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Spolecznej</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn>2082-3304</issn></journal-meta><article-meta><title-group><article-title>Judicial Disobedience, Justice Lemuel Shaw and Commonwealth v. Aves</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Jerzy Zajadło</surname></name></contrib></contrib-group><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.3.103</article-id><volume>32</volume><issue>3</issue><pub-date><year>2022</year></pub-date><fpage>103</fpage><lpage>113</lpage><abstract><p>The main purpose of this paper is the analysis of the notion &quot;judicial disobedience”. The author describes two aspects (individual and institutional) and compare them with civil disobedience. The problem is presented in a paradigmatic manner upon the example of case law of American courts relating to slavery in the period of half of the century preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. Based on this, the author constructs a typology assuming four possible opinions of an adjudicating judge based on provisions of law, which are contrary to the judge’s conscience and morality. In this paper the problem is described upon the example of Justice Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1830 to 1860. However special attention is paid to his judgment in case Commonwealth v. Aves., but his another verdicts have been mentioned as well.</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>judicial disobedience</kwd><kwd>slavery</kwd><kwd>American courts</kwd><kwd>Lemuel Shaw</kwd><kwd>Commonwealth v. Aves Language: English</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body /></article>