Pomeranian University in Słupsk

English abstract: The article aims to present and discuss two different views on the evolutionary sources of social norms. The views under study were delivered by famous nineteenth-century philosophers, Herbert Spencer and Peter Kropotkin. The former is usually linked with so-called social Darwinism, and the considerations in the article show why this label can be misleading. The latter represents so-called Russian evolutionism, whose distinctive trait is stressing animals’ cooperative behaviours rather than their competition. In the article, I assert that Charles Darwin’s thoughts should be considered a reference point for any discussion concerning the evolutionary sources of morality. Thus, a brief presentation of Darwin’s views precedes considerations devoted to Spencer and Kropotkin. The analysis in the article shows crucial similarities and differences between Spencer and Kropotkin in terms of their views on evolution and their social views. Spencer appears as a Lamarckian advocate of a minimal state, who sees competition and rivalry as natural to society. Kropotkin subscribes to the Darwinian approach and, being a fierce critic of the state, believes that abandoning it will reveal humans’ natural goodness.

Key words: origins of morality, evolutionary approach, survival of the fittest, mutual aid, social Darwinism, Lamarckism

Language: english

Published: Number 1(46)/2026, pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.96

Number of downloads: 42

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Jagiellonian University

English abstract: In this article, I analyse Legislative Theatre from a socio-legal perspective, for the first time in reflections on this topic. By analysing the context of participatory processes, I outline the background for Legislative Theatre, where participation or its manifestations play a significant role. In the article, I both present the origins of Legislative Theatre – as a process used to generate ideas for legal amendments or their implementation – and compare the original assumptions with contemporary challenges or contexts important for legal scholarship. The article focuses on an analysis of the original assumptions of Legislative Theatre, confronting and comparing them, where necessary, with the contemporary approach. At the same time, I claim that Legislative Theatre, despite its name, should be understood in terms of participation, rather than legislation, in particular the ambition to influence the legislative process (initiative). These considerations are one of the first attempts to look at Legislative Theatre as a potentially important theme for both academics and practitioners, for both actors and audiences (if any) of legal systems. At the same time, they are an attempt to embed Legislative Theatre as a theme for a wider reflection of legal scholars, including Polish ones.

Key words: socially engaged theatre, participation, Legislative Theatre, legislation, law

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(46)/2026, pp. 77–95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.77

Number of downloads: 61

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University of Łódź

District Court in Brzeziny

English abstract: In Western political tradition, judges are guardians of the rule of law. But they also may be subject to mistakes or corruption. A well-balanced system of government needs both means to guard judicial independence and means to control the judiciary, such as removal from office. Judges of senior courts (in the UK) and federal judges (in the USA) are secured in their independence by the ‘good behaviour’ clause, which makes removing them possible only if a specific action is taken by the legislature. In the UK it is an address of both Houses to the Monarch, in the USA – an impeachment. This article deals with historical roots of the ‘good behaviour’ clause and its current understanding. It stresses that in the process of the interpretation and through certain precedents, the scope of the legislature’s power to remove a judge was highly restricted. Such a restriction, however, was obtained rather due to a political culture of the analysed countries rather than the contents of the ‘good behaviour’ clause, which always carries with it the danger of political interference with the judiciary.

Key words: judiciary, removal from office, judges, UK, USA

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(46)/2026, pp. 60–76.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.60

Liczba pobrań: 53

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The Academy of Justice

English abstract: Adoption dissolution is a complex and demanding process that is based not only on legal regulations, but also on aspects related to other fields, such as psychology, pedagogy, sociology, and morality. This process requires special attention to the child, his or her difficult situation and needs. Any actions must be conducted with great precision, caution, and even delicacy. Therefore, the article focuses on the judicial practice of dissolving adoption. The study covered the files of cases conducted by district courts of Warsaw in 2006–2018. The aim of this research was to analyse and assess the role of information influencing the courts’ decision-making processes, including the assessment of the child’s best interests and the qualification of ‘important reasons’. These activities allowed us to better understand the adoption resolution process, showing that behind every legal decision there are deep emotional, psychological and social issues, while opinions and analyses from various fields are not separate elements, but an integral part of a complex decision-making process. The research was qualitative in character, the research strategy was that of a multiple case study, and coding was adopted as the basic research tool of the method of analysing court files. The article emphasizes that in cases concerning adoption dissolution, a multi-faceted approach is necessary, because it allows for a detailed understanding of the factual situation of the child and balancing the legal criteria with the specific circumstances of each case. Moreover, the article indicates that grouping information in three time categories – past, present and future – enables an assessment of the child’s best interests and a qualification of ‘important reasons’. It is a valuable addition to the existing perspectives and provides a basis for further research in this area.

Key words: adoption dissolution, child’s best interest, important reasons, assessment of the child’s factual situation

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(46)/2026, pp. 42–59.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.42

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University of Szczecin

dr Michał Krotoszyński

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present an interpretative procedure that enables reconstructing from legislative acts the constitutive rules of legal conventional acts using interpretive directives adopted in the derivational theory of legal interpretation. Using the example of pardon, we show how this process can proceed in each of the three phases distinguished in the derivational theory. For the purpose of this article, we treat the process of reconstructing constitutive rules of legal conventional acts from legislative acts as separate from the process of reconstructing legal norms. We consider the study of the problem to be particularly important in the context of the ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland. This is because many of the fundamental constitutional questions which now arise in Poland in the public sphere – including the one whether it is possible to grant a pardon to a person who has not yet been found guilty by a final verdict – are in fact questions about the constitutive rules which govern the validity of legal conventional acts.

Key words: constitutive rules, legal conventional acts, derivational theory of legal interpretation, constitutional crisis

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(46)/2026, pp. 22–41.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.22.

Liczba ściągnięć: 114

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University of Silesia in Katowice

Zygmunt Tobor

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The case whereby the President of the Republic of Poland applied the right of pardon towards individuals who had not been validly convicted has revived ongoing discussions regarding whether such an action is consistent with the Constitution. The problematic aspect in this regard is not only the admissibility of so-called individual abolition but also the very manner of granting pardon while bypassing the procedure provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the contentious nature of the issue arises from ambiguities in the Constitution’s text, this study’s research objective is to present useful tools outside of this text that may assist in its interpretation. To achieve this, an analysis of legislative materials from sessions of the National Assembly’s Constitutional Commission is conducted, and the established practice (constitutional custom) concerning the problematic issues is discussed. The research conclusions warrant the thesis that these extratextual arguments provide strong justifications for specific interpretative hypotheses. Regarding the first issue, the hypothesis is that the right of pardon does not encompass individual abolition. The hypothesis concerning the second issue is the inadmissibility of a procedure that bypasses the Code of Criminal Procedure regulations.

Key words: power of pardon, legislative materials, established practice, legal text interpretation

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(2026), pp. 5–21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.5

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University of Wrocław

English abstract: There is no agreement as to whether academic freedom is a variation (perhaps a subset) of freedom of speech – which is individual in its character and which governs a person’s relations with other persons and with the state – or a cluster of rules unlike freedom of speech, which has a different origin and which is enjoyed by the academic community as a whole. Irrespective of which of these claims is true, some concepts that originated in US case law on the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may well be imported to the discourse on the scope of academic freedom held within the civil law tradition. In light of both the functionalist and natural law positions on the nature of freedom of speech, this article argues three points about the normative environment of academia: first, academic freedom (freedom of research, freedom of teaching) is rooted in natural human curiosity and urge to communicate; second, the error-correcting features of the scientific method are consistent with self-correcting features observed in static normative systems such as systems of professional ethics in professions of public trust; third, any normative environment of the academia must conform with the notions of content neutrality and a marketplace of ideas. These points suggest that academic freedom cannot be subject to limitations, whether external (relating to law, scoring systems or funding) or internal (relating to non-merit based themes of discourse).

Key words: freedom of speech, academic freedom, content neutrality, marketplace of ideas, ethics

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 112–124.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.112

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University of Wrocław

English abstract: Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: Ronald Dworkin, academic freedom, freedom of speech, academic teacher, culture of independence

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.96

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Number of downloads: 181,265

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University of Wrocław

English abstract:Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: academic freedom, freedom of expression, culture wars, Stanley Fish, university teacher

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 77–95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.77

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Number of downloads: 181,265

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University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: One of the most important issues recently addressed in the literature is the threat to democracy and the rule of law. It is pointed out that the necessity of verifying the role and tasks of key political institutions, primarily the state, is determined by the nature and dynamics of changes occurring in the modern world. The issue of threats to democracy and the crisis of the rule of law has frequently been discussed in Polish theoretical and doctrinal legal works produced after 1926. Authors such as Sz. Rundstein and Sz. Starzewski often raised concerns about the dangers associated with phenomena referred to as “anti-constitutional tendencies.” Their published studies addressed both internal threats and the dangers arising from the formation of fascist states and the Soviet state. The findings made at that time remain highly relevant today. Therefore, in the context of the challenges faced by legal practice and legal science today, it seems justified to recall the conclusions formulated nearly 100 years ago.

Key words: Fascism, democracy, rule of law, total state, authoritarianism, civil rights, Nazi and Soviet totalism

Language: polish

Published:Number 4(2025), pp. 58–76.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.58

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Number of downloads: 181,265

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