Search Results for: Ronald Dworkin

On Academic Freedom. Commentary on Ronald Dworkin’s Approach

Dr Paweł Jabłoński

University of Wrocław

English abstract: Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: Ronald Dworkin, academic freedom, freedom of speech, academic teacher, culture of independence

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.96

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William David Ross’s prima facie duties vis-à-vis Ronald Dworkin’s principles of law

Dr hab. Milena Korycka-Zirk, prof. UMK

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: prima facie duties, principles of law, hard case, collision of principles, pluralism, individualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 22-41.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.22

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Number of downloads: 235

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Ronald Dworkin’s Philosophy of International Law

Dr Tomasz Widłak

University of Gdańsk

Abstract: During his academic career Ronald Dworkin did not show much interest in the fundamental philosophical questions on international legal issues. This had changed towards the end of his life when he wrote an article titled „A New Philosophy for International Law” published posthumously. The aim of this article is to summarise the key arguments of Dworkin’s approach, address some of its critics as well as to suggest the possibility of further development of this discussion in the context of current global constitutionalism. In the first part, three thesis of Dworkin’s approach are reconstructed. The first one claims that international law requires interpretative understanding which should be grounded in the political morality of the international community. The second thesis can be formulated as follows: the legitimacy of political power at the national and international levels is uniform. The third thesis demands the implementation of the principle of salience in international law as the basic structural principle. After discussing critically Dworkin’s theory, in second part the article proposes a constitutional interpretation of the new philosophy for international law. Two conditions of global constitutionalism have to be satisfied by the theory in order to consider it as a constitutionalist approach. The first condition is the primacy of individual rights and second is the primacy of constitutional norms within the system. The conclusion is that the conditions are satisfied for Dworkin’s new philosophy of international law and his principle of salience is in fact a deeply constitutional arrangement based on moral justification. Dworkin’s proposal constitutes only a rough sketch, however there is a potential for developments. Lawyers and philosophers have at least an intellectual responsibility for building new viable theoretical models for international law.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, international law, international society, principle of salience, global constitutionalism, constitutionalization of international law, international legal theory, global law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 64-77.

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A Prequel to Hart’s ‘Postscript’ – the Missing Link in the Hart-Dworkin Debate

Dr hab. Andrzej Grabowski

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: In his translator’s note to the H.L.A Hart’s paper New Challenge to Legal Positivism, Andrzej Grabowski describes the historical details of Hart’s Madrid lecture and the changes of the original Spanish text, introduced in the translation. He argues that Hart’s paper can be regarded as the prequel to the ‘Postscript’ from 1994, since the lecture deals with the criticism of Dworkin against the Hartian version of legal positivism and some important parts of them (from Section II) were in extenso included in the ‘Postscript’. The translator also emphasises the importance of Hart’s lecture as a text-source of information, which can be used in the contemporary debate on the inclusive legal positivism and for the critical reconstruction of Hart’s theoretical position.

Keywords: Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, legal positivism, Hart-Dworkin debate

Language: Polish

Published: Numer 2(9)/2014, pp. 21-25

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Fish – Dworkin debate as an example of dispute about practice of interpretation of law

Dr Michał Pełka

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.

Keywords: legal interpretation, meaning, Stanley Fish, Ronald Dworkin, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(11)/2015, p. 86-105.

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Herbert L.A. Hart

Herbert L.A. Hart (1907–1992) – British legal philosopher, the leading representative of twentieth-century legal positivism and author of The Concept of Law (1961). He understood law as a union of primary and secondary rules, with the rule of recognition at its foundation.

Texts in the „Archive”

New Challenge to Legal Positivism

Herbert L.A. Hart (translation) · Issue 2(9)/2014

A lecture delivered at the Autonomous University of Madrid on 29 October 1979, in which Hart replies to the challenge posed to positivism by Ronald Dworkin.

A Prequel to Hart’s ‘Postscript’ – the Missing Link in the Hart-Dworkin Debate

Andrzej Grabowski · Issue 2(9)/2014

The translator’s note to the lecture above: Grabowski sets out the circumstances of the Madrid address and its place in the debate with Dworkin.

The Rule of Recognition – a Remedy for the External Uncertainty of Law?

Urszula Anna Kosielińska-Grabowska · Issue 1(4)/2012

Hart’s rule of recognition was meant to remedy the uncertainty of primary rules. The article asks how far it succeeds.

See also the Legal Positivism collection.

Principles of Law

A thematic collection of the “Archive of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy”. Texts on the principles of law – the ways this notion is understood and the role principles play in the legal system and in legal argument. All articles are available free of charge in open access.

Disputes over the notion of a legal principle

The contemporary debate on legal principles was opened by Ronald Dworkin, who contrasted principles with rules in his polemic against positivism, and was developed by Robert Alexy, who understood principles as optimisation requirements to be weighed in cases of collision. Polish legal theory, however, has followed its own path. In the classic study by Sławomira Wronkowska, Maciej Zieliński and Zygmunt Ziembiński (Zasady prawa. Zagadnienia podstawowe, 1974), principles are not a separate kind of norm opposed to rules, but norms of particular importance or of a high degree of generality; a distinction is drawn between the directival sense, in which a principle is a norm, and the descriptive sense, in which it is a statement about the characteristic features of a given body of regulation. The very notion of a legal principle thus remains contested, and different branches of legal scholarship understand it differently.

Selected texts

William David Ross’s prima facie duties vis-à-vis Ronald Dworkin’s principles of law – Milena Korycka-Zirk, No. 2(43)/2025 (in English)
Remarks About the Axiological Dimension of the Polish Constitution of 1997 and Its Interpretation – Sławomir Tkacz, Zygmunt Tobor, No. 1(30)/2022
Law and Values Other Than Moral. On Searching for Tropes in Józef Nowacki’s Works – Kamil Zeidler, No. 3(36)/2023
Robert Alexy’s Theory of Legal Principles – Milena Korycka, No. 1(1)/2010 (in English)
The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege as a Source for the Search for the Limits of Linguistic Interpretation in Criminal Law? – Sławomir Tkacz, No. 2(23)/2020

For authors

The “Archive” publishes articles in legal theory and philosophy – including work on legal principles and constitutional argument – in Polish and English, in open access with no publication charges and with double-blind peer review. The journal is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and ERIH PLUS (100 points on the Polish ministerial list). See the guidelines for authors.

An editorial collection. Last updated: July 2026.

Legal Positivism

Legal positivism holds that the validity of law depends on its social sources, not on its moral merits. Yet that single label covers deeply different positions – from Austin and Kelsen to Hart and Joseph Raz’s exclusive positivism – as well as a lasting argument with the tradition’s critics. This collection gathers texts on positivism and on that debate. Every article is free to read in open access.

Hans Kelsen and the Pure Theory of Law

Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) is among the most influential legal theorists of the twentieth century. His Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre, 1934; 2nd ed. 1960) is a programme for a science of law purified of sociological, psychological and moral elements: law is a hierarchical order of norms (Stufenbau, a conception developed with Adolf Julius Merkl) whose unity is grounded in the basic norm (Grundnorm). Kelsen co-drafted the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and fathered the European model of centralised constitutional review.

The “Archive” published – in Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki’s translation – a text by Stanley L. Paulson, the leading contemporary Kelsen scholar: Kelsen jako odmieniec. The Polish reception of Kelsen is documented by Monika Zalewska’s reconstruction of his discussion with Jerzy Wróblewski.

Disputes within legal positivism

Legal positivists share the conviction that the validity of law depends on its social sources rather than its moral merits (the separation thesis). Beneath that common label lie deeply different positions: Austin’s naturalistic positivism, Kelsen’s anti-naturalistic normativism, Hart’s rule of recognition, and contemporary inclusive, exclusive and conventionalist variants – all documented in the texts below.

Selected texts

Kelsen jako odmieniec. Obrona radykalnej teorii norm – Stanley L. Paulson, No. 4(29)/2021 (in Polish, transl. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki)
Why Legal Conventionalism Fails – Adam Dyrda, No. 1(10)/2015 (in English)
Sedno idei pozytywizmu prawniczego – Stanley L. Paulson, No. 2(15)/2012 (in Polish, transl. Marcin Romanowicz)
Reguła uznania – remedium na zewnętrzną niepewność prawa? – Urszula Anna Kosielińska-Grabowska, No. 1(4)/2012 (in English)
Historia pewnego przypisu. Próba rekonstrukcji dyskusji Hansa Kelsena z Jerzym Wróblewskim – Monika Zalewska, No. 1(2)/2011 (in Polish)

The debate with Dworkin

The most famous dispute in contemporary legal theory – between positivism and Ronald Dworkin’s critique of it.

Nowe wyzwanie dla pozytywizmu prawniczego – Herbert L.A. Hart, No. 2(9)/2014 (in Polish, translation)
Prequel do Hartowskiego Postscriptum – Andrzej Grabowski, No. 2(9)/2014 (in Polish)
Debata Fish – Dworkin – Michał Pełka, No. 2(11)/2015 (in Polish)
Filozofia prawa międzynarodowego Ronalda Dworkina – Tomasz Widłak, No. 1(12)/2016 (in Polish)
O wolności akademickiej – Paweł Jabłoński, No. 4(45)/2025 (in Polish)

For authors

The “Archive” publishes articles in legal theory and philosophy – including work on Kelsen and legal positivism – in Polish and English, in open access with no publication charges and with double-blind peer review. The journal is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and ERIH PLUS (100 points on the Polish ministerial list). See the guidelines for authors.

An editorial collection. Last updated: July 2026.

Classics of Modern Legal Philosophy and Theory

Scholars from Poland and around the world who shaped legal theory and philosophy – and, with each of them, texts published in the journal that concern their thought or closely related themes. All articles are free to read in open access.

World classics of modern legal philosophy and theory

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

English philosopher, jurist and social reformer, the founder of utilitarianism and a forerunner of modern legal positivism. Themes from this current are gathered in the Legal Positivism collection.

John Austin (1790–1859)

English jurist and legal theorist, the founder of analytical positivism and of the conception of law as the command of a sovereign backed by sanction. Stanley L. Paulson writes on this current in his study The Core of the Idea of Legal Positivism.

Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949)

German legal philosopher and politician, author of the famous formula under which statutory lawlessness yields to supra-statutory justice. Bartosz Szyler devotes a study to the antinomies of his idea of law.

Hans Kelsen (1881–1973)

Austrian jurist and legal philosopher, the creator of the pure theory of law and of normativism. Around the pure theory and the basic norm the journal has published a translation of Stanley L. Paulson and a reconstruction of Kelsen’s discussion with Jerzy Wróblewski; see the Legal Positivism collection.

Adolf Reinach (1883–1917)

German philosopher and jurist, a representative of the phenomenology of law, author of the conception of the a priori foundations of civil law and of the theory of social acts.

Alf Ross (1899–1979)

Danish jurist and legal philosopher, a leading representative of Scandinavian realism and of the predictive account of legal validity. A kindred current of sociological jurisprudence is presented by Aleksander Olaf Szpojankowski in his text on Roscoe Pound.

Lon L. Fuller (1902–1978)

American legal philosopher, a representative of the non-positivist current, author of the conception of the inner morality of law and a participant in the famous debate with H.L.A. Hart on the connection between law and morality. These themes are taken up in the Law and Morality collection.

Herbert L.A. Hart (1907–1992)

British legal philosopher, the leading representative of twentieth-century legal positivism, author of the conception of the rule of recognition and of the union of primary and secondary rules. The journal has published a translation of Hart’s lecture, a study by Andrzej Grabowski and an analysis of the rule of recognition.

John Rawls (1921–2002)

American political and social philosopher, author of the theory of justice as fairness. Wojciech Ciszewski analyses his conception in the journal.

Jürgen Habermas (1929–2026)

German philosopher and sociologist, a representative of social philosophy, the creator of the theory of communicative action and of the conception of deliberative democracy.

Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013)

American legal philosopher, the foremost critic of positivism, author of the conception of legal principles, integrity and law as an interpretive practice. Texts in this current are gathered in the Legal Positivism collection.

Joseph Raz (1939–2022)

British legal philosopher of Israeli origin, a representative of exclusive positivism, author of the service conception of legal authority and of the theory of practical reasons. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska analyses his moral philosophy in a two-part series.

John Finnis

Australian legal philosopher, the leading representative of contemporary natural law theory, author of the conception of basic human goods and practical reasonableness. Michał Sopiński analyses his thought in the journal.

Robert Alexy

German legal philosopher, author of the theory of principles as optimisation requirements, of the weighing formula and of a non-positivist account of law. Milena Korycka reconstructs his conception in the journal.

Polish classics of modern legal philosophy and theory

Leon Petrażycki (1867–1931)

Polish and Russian scholar, the creator of the psychological theory of law, of the conception of intuitive law, imperative-attributive emotions and the policy of law. Hanna Dębska devotes a study to his career.

Jerzy Lande (1886–1954)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, a pupil and the most important continuator of Leon Petrażycki, author of works in the theory and sociology of law.

Czesław Znamierowski (1888–1967)

Polish philosopher and legal theorist, the creator of the theory of constructive norms and thetic acts, and a forerunner of the analysis of conventional acts in law.

Czesław Martyniak (1906–1939)

Polish legal philosopher, a representative of Thomistic legal philosophy and of the natural-law critique of Kelsen’s normativism. Murdered by the German occupier in 1939.

Stanisław Ehrlich (1907–1997)

Polish theorist of law and politics, a scholar of pluralism, interest groups and group norms.

Grzegorz Leopold Seidler (1913–2004)

Polish scholar of the theory of state and law and of the history of political and legal doctrines.

Kazimierz Opałek (1918–1995)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, a forerunner of analytical reflection on directives, norms and subjective rights.

Zygmunt Ziembiński (1920–1996)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, the creator of the Poznań school of legal theory, author of works on the logic of norms, the conception of coupled norms and the analysis of legal language.

Józef Nowacki (1923–2005)

Polish legal theorist, a representative of analytical legal theory, a scholar of the rule of law, general clauses and the „appropriate” application of provisions.

Jerzy Wróblewski (1926–1990)

Polish legal theorist, the creator of an original paradigm of legal interpretation and application (the clarificative theory of interpretation); among his continuators is Marek Zirk-Sadowski.

Wiesław Lang (1928–2016)

Polish legal theorist, a scholar of legal validity and of the relation between law and morality. These themes are gathered in the Law and Morality collection.

Maciej Zieliński (1940–2020)

Polish legal theorist, the creator of the derivational conception of legal interpretation (omnia sunt interpretanda). Agnieszka Choduń presents it in the journal.