Search Results for: juridical form

The Question of the Autonomy of Law in the Light of E.B. Pašukanis’s Hylomorphic Theory

Dr hab. Rafał Mańko

Central European University, Democracy Institute (Budapest, Hungary)

English abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the position of Evgeny B. Pašukanis regarding the problem of autonomy of law. The source material for the research is his monograph entitled The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1924), in which he laid down the framework of his hylomorphic theory of law, also described as materialist or realist. The article begins with a reconstruction of the basic assumptions of Pašukanis’s hylomorphic theory of law and then moves on to the key issue of his views on the genesis of juridical form. In the light of the analysis, the article shows that the essence of law in J Pašukanis’s view is that it is a form that shapes and makes possible the relations of economic exchange that constitute its proper matter. Against this background, the article addresses the issue of the autonomy of law, indicating that it should be considered in two dimensions: the internal autonomy of law, i.e. the autonomy of juridical form in relation to its content, and the external autonomy of law, i.e. the autonomy of law in relation to the state, politics and ideology. When it comes to the internal autonomy of law, the paper points out that the relationship of the form of law to its matter is – in Pašukanis’s view – of a dialectical nature, which results in his rejection of Marx’s conception of law as a ‘superstructure’ reflecting economic relations in the ‘base.’ When it comes to the external autonomy of law, Pašukanis is firmly on the side of a hard ontology of law, based on its hylemorphic substance (the composite of the matter of acts of exchange and its legal form), which makes law primary vis-à-vis the state and politics and essentially distinct from ideology. This does not, of course, exclude the ideological nature of law, but – again contrary to Marxists – Pašukanis does not allow for the recognition of law as an essentially ideological phenomenon.

Keywords: autonomy of law, ideology, hylomorphism, juriscentrism, juridical form, legal form, Pašukanis

Language: Polish

Published: nr 4(41)/2024, pp. 91-103

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.91

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Number of downloads: 294

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Legal Sciences and the Problem of the Political: The Perspective of Critical Jurisprudence

Dr Rafał Mańko

University of Amsterdam

Abstract: The growing interest in the connections between legal phenomena and the political (das Politische, le politique) justifies an analysis of the problem of the relationship of legal sciences towards the political. The article focuses on two juridical sub-disciplines: analytical legal theory and legal dogmatics, and the analysis is conducted from the perspective of critical jurisprudence, a juristic application of critical theory. Towards this end, first the concept of ‘the political’ is defined, along the lines of Chantal Mouffe, as a dimension of antagonism, which lies at the foundation of any society. The political, understood in this way, must be differentiated both from ‘politics’ and from ‘policies’. As far as analytical legal theory is concerned, the article claims that it is programmatically (yet tacitly) political, as it affirms the juridical form as such, abstracting from its concrete content. As far as legal dogmatics is concerned, the article claims, following Sawa Frydman, that the dogmatician, despite his declared apoliticality, when performing a doctrinal interpretation of law, makes in fact decisions which are not only interpretive, but also political ones, setting subsequent stages in the antagonistic struggles within society.

Keywords: legal science, the political, antagonism, analytical legal theory, legal dogmatics, critical legal theory

Language: Polish

Received: 13.06.2018
Accepted: 04.09.2018

Published: Number 3(18)/2018, pp. 38-50.

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Number of downloads: 519

Reconstruction of the Concept of Interpretative Juristic Presumption

mgr Kaja Ptak

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

English abstract: Juridical presumptions, including interpretative juridical presumptions, have not been elaborated on in detail in theoretical and legal terms, although they are an interpretative tool often used in jurisdiction and literature. Recently there has been a revival of the discussion on the presumption of constitutionality (conformity with the constitution) of laws (statutes). Another example of an interpretative juridical presumption is the presumption of rationality of the legislator, based on the assumption of rationality of the legislator elaborated in the 1970s by Leszek Nowak and Jerzy Wróblewski. A comparative analysis of interpretative juridical presumptions with institutions such as legal presumptions and legal fictions allows to reconstruct the most important features of the former in terms of their structure and functions, and this in turn will allow to claim that interpretative juridical presumptions are directly referred to by the authorities applying the law in difficult cases in which it is impossible to complete the interpretation process without taking into account the basic values of the legal system, not directly expressed in this system or only sketched at the level of constitutional standards. Due to the special role that interpretative juridical presumptions play in the process of interpretation, their law-making function may be also discussed.

Keywords: legal presumption, juristic presumption, interpretative juristic presumption, legal interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(38)/2024, pp. 34-43

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.34

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Number of downloads: 277

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

The Rule of Law in Immanuel Kant’s Political Philosophy: Two Interpretations

Mgr Michał Wieczorkowski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Abstrakt w języku polskim: The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept.

Keywords: Kant, juridical state, rule of law, liberalism, authoritarianism

Language: Polish

Received: 04.12.2018
Accepted: 05.03.2019

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 108-124

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.108

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Number of downloads: 893