Archiwum Filozofii Prawai Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVRwww.ivr.org.pl

Search Results for: social obligation Language: Polish

Private Property and Its Social Dimension in the Views of Rudolf von Jhering and Otto von Gierke

Dr Paweł LESIŃSKI

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin

English abstract: The article is an attempt to analyse the views of Rudolf von Jhering and Otto von Gierke views on the question of social dimension of private property. These two German lawyers formulated their ideas during the period of search for the solutions to socio-economic problems regarding private property and its scope. They both represented essentially identical views on the importance of private property in the context of its existence in the community. In order to fulfill the research task described above, the article firstly analyses the historical and ideological background for solutions to the problems of private property in Germany in 19th century. Secondly, the article examines the question of the individual’s position within the community in the thought of Jhering and Gierke. The third part of the article analyses the views of these scholars on the essence of the legal order in the context of private property. The last part of the article refers to their views on private property perceived as a  phenomenon which by definition includes limitations and results in both rights and obligations for the owner.

Keywords:  private property, Rudolf von Jhering, Otto von Gierke, community, social obligation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(34)/2023, pp.46-57

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280//AFPiFS.2023.1.46

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Number of downloads: 374

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Social Reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland versus Constitutional Axiology and Constitutional Social Ontology

Dr Paweł Skuczyński

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The paper aims to propose a social reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as an alternative to liberal and republican interpretations. It was developed with the use of an interdisciplinary methodology, including the use of societal constitutionalism as its theoretical basis, as well as its formal-dogmatic justification and its characterisation in the perspective of the theory of law as relating to the social ontology expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. A thesis is put forward that the social reading of the Constitution consists in recognizing some social entities as constitutional entities, next to individuals and the State. Consequently, the norms concerning them should be interpreted as obliging the state authorities to ensure their influence on public policies and the law-making, and to take into account the bottom-up creation of norms and broadly understood self-regulation. Four arguments for the social reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are presented, which are based on: 1) the scope of the constitutional regulation (extensive regulation in Chapter 1 of social and public entities such as local and professional self-government bodies, trade unions, and employers’ organizations, civil society organisations, churches, and religious unions); 2) the way they are regulated (despite the identity of the designatum, regulating these entities alongside the concept of a sovereign nation and imposing certain obligations on the State authorities towards them); 3) the historical context of the making of the Polish Constitution (building the autonomy of society in relation to the state as a strategy of resistance from the 1970s); 4) the work on drafting the Polish Constitution (the gradual addition of provisions on social entities, often due to pressure exerted by, which was an expression of far-reaching self-constitutionalisation).

Keywords: societal constitutionalism, social ontology, constitutional values

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(30)/2022, pp. 100-112

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.1.100

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Number of downloads: 470

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Religious-Only Marriages in the Case Law of Ordinary Courts in Poland. Qualitative Content Analysis of Judgment Justifications Published Online

Mgr Anna JUZASZEK

Doctoral School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University in Kraków

English abstract: In some Western European countries, for a few years now there has been an intense debate concerning the phenomenon of religious-only marriages, solemnized through a religious ceremony. From the perspective of state law, such religious spouses are treated as cohabitees, which places certain limitations on their rights and obligations compared to married couples recognized by state law. In Poland, there is no ongoing discussion on this matter. Furthermore, there are no data regarding the frequency of such relationships, if any. The main objective of this article is to partially address this gap and initiate a discussion. To achieve this, exploratory research was conducted by analysing judgment justifications available online, focusing on cases where the couples were in exclusively religious marriages. Selected justifications underwent qualitative content analysis using MAXQDA software to gain insights into how judges and other participants in the proceedings approach this type of relationship. Another aim of the article is to highlight the legal challenges that religiously married spouses might encounter and to explore potential solutions in this regard. The research indicates that the marriages in question generally did not elicit consternation or negative attitudes in the analysed cases. On the contrary, both judges and participants in the proceedings typically did not question the significance, depth, and permanent character of family bonds formed through religious-only marriages. However, this approach is not reflected in current legislation, which differentiates the rights and obligations of individuals in intimate relationships based on whether a civil marriage has been contracted, often disregarding the actual nature of the relationship.

Keywords: marriages, religious-only marriages, qualitative content analysis, judgment justifications

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 54-67.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.54

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Number of downloads: 347

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Recognizing, Overlooking, Ignoring: On the Legislator’s Attitudes Towards Actual Closeness

Mgr Marlena Drapalska-Grochowicz

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The text considers why certain types of close relationships are “invisible” in the legal system. Visibility can mean public recognition, status recognition, social acceptance. What is “visible to the law” is the closeness that the law recognizes, accepts, supports, and with which it links certain obligations and rights, e.g. marriage. However, the main subject of this study will be those close relationships that are invisible in the legal system (obscurus). Two people, remaining in an actually close relationship, may not be recognized as such in the legal system. The purpose of this paper is to understand why these kinds of differences arise between law and life, and, more specifically, what the “invisibility” of individual close relationships in the legal system results from. In my reflection, I will use references to the film Call Me by Your Name.

Keywords: close relationships, law and emotions, the attitudes of the legislator

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(26)/2021, pp. 112-127.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.1.112

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Number of downloads: 484

Truth Revelation Procedures as a Rights-based Alternative to the Politics of (Non-)Memory

Mgr Emilia Kowalewska

Polish Academy of Sciences

English abstract: This article offers a socio-legal reflection on the relation between law, state obligation, and attempts to institutionalize collective memory. As the question of memory institutionalization becomes most pertinent in the context of regime change that imposes on an incumbent government certain expectations for addressing the past, the article considers this research problem from the perspective of transitional justice theory. The transitional justice paradigm allows for an interdisciplinary consideration of the topic. Special attention is paid to legal norms and mechanisms directed towards establishing authoritative knowledge about the past. The emerging principle of the right to truth is presented as an integrating and rights-based perspective from which to approach societal demands for acknowledging injustices of the past. Measured against the fundamental rights that lie at the heart of transitional justice theory, three types of truth revelation procedures are presented. The article shows that the relationship between law and memory – which is often reduced to one of political instrumentalization – should, in accordance with the values of a liberal democracy, be reframed from the perspective of individual and collective rights. The article seeks to contribute to the field of memory studies in the social sciences by exposing functions of legal norms and mechanisms that are often overlooked when discussed from the perspective of the politics of memory.

Keywords: collective memory, truth revelation procedures, transitional justice, right to truth, politics of memory, post-communist Poland

Language: English

Published: Number 3(21)/2019, pp. 51-66.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.3.51

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Number of downloads: 646

The law as a border in life of a man and states

Dr Dawid Bunikowski

WSB University in Toruń


English abstract: The law as a border concerns both acts of man and the power and a territory of a state. The law as a border is a social institution more sophisticated than it seems to be in traditional concept of legal positivism and Austin’s point of view. In the state law there are many borders (in criminal law, civil law, administrative law, procedural law relating to terms, freedoms and rights, obligations, going to court, and on the other hand, competences/authorities of public offices etc.). In a narrow sense the law as a border is the state law, which establishes borders of human act and behavior through the sphere of legally allowed, forbidden and ordered acts creating institutionalized legal sanctions for the break of the border and non-respect for legal norms. In a wide sense the law as a border is also mine – „my” law, “internal” law (Petrazycki’s psychological theory of law), making one’s the rules of behavior and relating to the state law (the law as a border in a narrow sense) in many ways. Customary law (also religious law) and international law are very specific branches of the law. I maintain that the law as a border must be supported by other normative systems such as morality, religion etc.

Keywords: law as a border, state law, normative systems

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(3)/2011, pp. 20-33.

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Number of downloads: 395

References:

  1. Allard L.C. i in., Cross-Border Relocation Law, Canada 2002 
  2. Austin J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, w: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1998 
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  4. Bunikowski D., Podstawowe kontrowersje dotyczące ingerencji prawa w sferę moralności, Toruń 2010. 
  5. Dellapenna W., Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History, Durham, North Carolina 2006 
  6. Johnson D.R., Post D.G., Law And Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stanford Law Review 1996/1367 
  7. Kępiński J. (red. tomu), Kepiński M. (red. serii), Klafkowska-Waśniowska K., Sikorski R., Granice prawa autorskiego, Warszawa 2010 
  8. Lang W., Wróblewski J., Zawadzki S., Teoria państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1986 
  9. Pałecki K., Społeczne opinie o prawie i jego sądowym stosowaniu w dziedzinie stosunków rodzinnych, w: M. Borucka-Arctowa (red.), Poglądy społeczeństwa polskiego na stosowanie prawa, Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa–Gdańsk 1978 
  10. Pałecki K., Uwagi o koncepcji „granica prawa” Roscoe Pounda, „Zeszyty Naukowe UJ” 1984/20 
  11. Pałecki K., Uwagi o koncepcji granic prawa, w: Idee–Państwo–Prawo, J. Majchrowski (red.),”Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace z Nauk Politycznych” 1991/28 
  12. Pałecki K., Warianty oddziaływania prawem na stosunki rodzinne, w: J. Kurczewski (red.), Prawo w społeczeństwie, Warszawa 1975 
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W poszukiwaniu Świętego Graala. Andrzej Grabowski o prawniczym pojęciu obowiązywaniu prawa

Dr Tomasz Pietrzykowski

University of Silesia


Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, s. 64-77.

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Number of downloads: 442

References:

  1. Biccieri C., The Grammar of Society. The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge 2006.
  2. Brown D., When Strangers Cooperate. Using Social Conventions to Govern Ourselves, New York 1995.
  3. Czepita S., Reguły konstytutywne a zagadnienia prawoznawstwa, Szczecin 1996.
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  7. Grabowski A., Prawnicze pojęcie obowiązywania prawa stanowionego. Krytyka niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, Kraków 2009.
  8. Hoerster N., Was ist Recht?, München 2006.
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On the structure of normative intuitions: universal moral grammar

Mgr Maciej Próchnicki

Jagiellonian University


English abstract: The aim of the article is to critically characterize the new, interdisciplinary research program on morality: universal moral grammar, and to describe its meaning for jurisprudence. Its proponents, such as John Mikhail and Marc Hauser, refer to John Rawls’ linguistic analogy, i.e. comparison of morality to language and suggestion to study it similarly to Noam Chomsky’s generative linguistics paradigm.

According to moral grammarians morality, like language, settles on innate, universal cognitive capacities, common to all people. Some evidence supporting these claim, come from various scientific disciplines, such as developmental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology or logic, but they are criticised as weak and inconclusive.

The article tries to assess to what extent the linguistic analogy is accurate and useful, analyzing some of the most important N. Chomsky’s claims and their adaptations to the systems of social norms, such as morality and law. The first argument is so called poverty of the stimulus, assuming that the classic learning mechanisms cannot explain the phenomenon of acquisition of language and morals. Other elements of N. Chomsky’s theories adapted to analyze morality include characterizing morality as a system of principles and parameters, divisions between I-morality/E-morality and competence/performance, and also an assumption that the specialized mental module for it exists.

Research conducted in universal moral grammar program may have substantial influence on jurisprudence. Firstly, assumptions made by moral grammarians can be seen as a construction of a modern, naturalized theory of natural law, based on empirical study. Moreover, the goal of the program is to fully describe concepts such as guilt, act, obligation or damage, and as an effect to schematize it as an advanced deontic logic, and also to discover sources of intuitions regarding them not only through research on their biopsychological foundations, but also through legal anthropology and comparative legal studies.

Keywords ethics, legal philosophy, generative linguistics, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, Noam Chomsky

Language: Polish

Received: 02.10.2016
Accepted: 28.11.2016

Published: Numer 1(14)/2017, pp. 102-114.

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Number of downloads: 430

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