Search Results for: statutory interpretation Language: Polish

Intentional Character of the Interpretation of the Holy Scripture and the Interpretation of Law

Mgr Paweł T. SKOCZYKŁODA

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The article aims to compare the process of interpreting law with that of interpreting the Holy Scripture. The study focuses on the issue of the interpretative approach adopted for interpretation in both above-mentioned branches of study. An appropriate interpretative approach determines the meaning of the text, which presupposes its correct interpretation. As part of the study, an analysis is undertaken of the interpretative assumptions, expounded in legal scholarship, which assumptions underlie the process of legal interpretation. The concept of interpretation of the sacred text that is recognized in biblical hermeneutics is presented. It turns out that despite the fact that law and the Bible are obviously different from each other, both legal theory and biblical hermeneutics were developed and largely based on the same concept of interpretation – intentionalism – identifying the meaning of utterances with meaning intended by the author of the statement. The conducted analysis enables formulating a general conclusion that only intentionalism makes it possible to discover the full and proper sense of the analyzed utterance.

Keywords: interpretation, statutory interpretation, exegesis, Holy Scripture, intentionalism, textualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 98-110

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.98

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Number of downloads: 380

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Linguistic Corpora as a Tool of Statutory Interpretation: American Theory and Practice

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, dr Mateusz Zeifert

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: In American adjudicating practice and theory of statutory interpretation, great attention is paid to the notion of ordinary meaning of legal text. In order to determine the ordinary meaning, judges usually refer to their own linguistic intuition or dictionaries – both these methods give rise to a number of reservations that have been expressed in legal literature for years. In the last few years, courts have also started using linguistic corpora for this purpose. Linguistic corpora are electronic collections of authentic texts in a given language which can be analyzed using IT tools (e.g. searches, frequency lists, concordances, collocations). Corpus research requires considerable linguistic knowledge and technical skills, and in return it offers statistical data that can reveal a lot about the semantic layer of language. The use of corpora by judges – first in state courts, later also in the federal Supreme Court – sparked lively academic discussion. In Polish literature, this issue has not been discussed so far, which is why the article is essentially of a reporting nature. First, an outline of corpus linguistics is presented. Then the history of the use of linguistic corpora by US courts is reconstructed. Finally, the legal discussion about corpora in the US is presented, with particular emphasis on voices approving their use and on critical voices.

Keywords: statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics, linguistic corpora, US case law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(25)/2020, pp. 80-90.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.4.80

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Number of downloads: 645

Legislative Materials in the Light of Polish and Spanish Law, Judicial Practice and Theoretical Literature

Mgr Paulina Konca

University of Silesia

Abstract: The purpose of the paper is to present a comparative analysis of the use of legislative materials in the process of statutory interpretation in Poland and Spain, by referring to statutes, theoretical literature and case law. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part shows that in difficult cases, when the text is not clear enough as an evidence of the legislator’s intention, other evidence should be sought, including the legislative materials. The second part delivers an analysis of the term ‘legislative materials’, followed by a study of particular examples of legislative materials, including bills and their justifications. It focuses especially on the issue of the Spanish exposiciones de motivos. Moreover, there is a reference to interpretative guidance contained in the legal regulations and to the ways in which legislative materials are used in case law. The third part of the paper responds, on the basis of Polish and Spanish theoretical literature, to some of the objections against the use of legislative materials, underlining its importance for the interpreting the law.

Keywords: legislative materials, legislative history, interpretation, intention, Spanish law, Polish law, ratio legis

Language: Original printed in Polish, English online translation

Received: 13.01.2018
Accepted: 19.04.2018

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 38-50

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.38ENG

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Number of downloads: 380

Legislative Materials as a Tool for Solving Grammatical Problems in Statutory Interpretation

Dr hab. Agnieszka Bielska Brodziak, Dr Mateusz Zeifert

University of Silesia

Abstract: The article begins with a presentation of an interpretative tool in the form of materials from the legislative process (legislative materials, legislative history), including arguments offered in the theory of law in favour and against their use for interpretation purposes. These matters are then discussed with references to a specific type of interpretive problems, namely problems that stem from the grammatical constructions of the provisions of the law. The authors analyse five cases in which Polish courts reach for legislative materials in order to resolve doubts caused by sentence syntax, conjunctions or punctuation. The decisions issued vary – in their use of legislative materials courts deploy various other tools and values (e.g. vocabularies, formal logic, the ratio legis behind a provision or the rules of legislative procedure). The outcomes of such a confrontation are varied. Thus, the judgments presented here are a good illustration of the diversity of issues connected with the theoretical and practical aspects of the use of legislative materials in the process of interpreting the law.

Keywords: legislative history, legislative materials, statutory interpretation, grammatical problems

Language: English

Received: 02.10.2017
Accepted: 15.12.2017

Published: Number 2(17)/2018, pp. 18-34.

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Number of downloads: 551

Does American jurisprudence have any rules of interpretation of Constitution?

Dr Anna Tomza

University of Łódź

English abstract: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.

Keywords: American jurisprudence, legal interpretation, rules of interpretation, Constitution

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 125-133

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Number of downloads: 370

Legality as Compliance with the Intention of the Legislator. The Understanding of Legality in Józef Nowacki’s Works

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt TOBOR

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The issue of legality is one of the most important threads in the scientific achievements of Professor Józef Nowacki. He distinguished two ways of understanding legality: a stronger one, which boils down to determining the compliance of behaviour with the contents of a duly enacted provision, and a weaker one, when the only legal basis is an obligation to employ a specific kind of evaluation. In the author’s opinion, Nowacki’s idea does not adequately take into account the fundamental problems with determining the meaning of a legal provision, i.e., problems of interpretation. The proposition that legality means compliance with the contents of a provision transfers the burden of making findings in this respect onto the subject interpreting it. The author discusses two approaches to statutory interpretation, i.e., the eclectic approach, in which there is no universal criterion for the correctness of interpretation, and the categorical approach, in which it is assumed that such a criterion exists. He points out that only a categorical approach can be reconciled with the idea of the rule of law and the role of judges as faithful agents of the legislator. Therefore, he proposes that compliance with the intention of the legislator should be taken as a criterion for the correctness of the interpretation. When legality is approached this way, the need to distinguish its stronger and weaker versions disappears. The qualification of a behaviour as legal or illegal will be based on the criterion of compliance with the intention of the legislator.

Keywords: legality, rule of law, statutory interpretation, intention of the legislator

Language: Polish

Published: Number 3(36)/2023, s. 34-43.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.3.34

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Number of downloads: 326

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A Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union from the Perspective of Cognitive Theory of Prototypes: A Case Study

Dr Mateusz Zeifert

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: Interpretative doubts in the application of law are usually born of discrepancies between the statutory language and the non-linguistic reality. Therefore, they pose the problem of categorization. The theory of law and legal practice have for centuries been dominated by the classical theory of categorization, according to which conceptual categories can be described by a set of sufficient and necessary features. In the 1970s, an American researcher Eleanor Rosch conducted a series of psychological experiments that led her to question the classical theory and lay the foundations for an alternative one, known as the prototype theory. According to this approach, conceptual categories are organized around the most typical exemplars (prototypes), and membership of a category is measured by similarity to the prototype. Some of the consequences of such view are that category membership is a gradable feature and that the borderlines of categories are fuzzy. The article presents an outline of the prototype theory in the version used in cognitive linguistics. Its usefulness for the theory and practice of statutory interpretation is tested on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the concept of beer. In this judgment, the CJEU refused to define the concept of beer by setting requirements as to its raw material composition and ruled that beer is a product that has organoleptic characteristics of beer. This definition on the basis of classical theory appears to be tautological, however, it finds theoretical justification in the prototype theory. In conclusions, the author indicates research problems that must be taken up in order for the prototype theory to be reliably used in jurisprudence.

Keywords: categorization, semantics, prototype theory, statutory interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 109-120.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.109

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Number of downloads: 644

Are we facing a crisis of law? Reflections in reference to the so-called claim to correctness problem

Dr Paweł Skuczyński

University of Warsaw

English abstract: What is usually acknowledged as a topicality indication of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy is the theoretical interest in and practical application of his ideas – known as the Radbruch’s formula – on abominable law, statutory non-law and the refusal to apply it by public authorities, the judiciary in particular. The article main argument is that we can point to other than Radbruch’s formula elements in his philosophy of law which are still applicable and present in the recent discussion on the concept of law itself, its validity and application. What this means is basic to Radbruch’s thought the distinction between the concept of law (Rechtsbegriff), the idea of law (Rechtsidee) and the relationship between the two. The solution accepted by Radbruch in this matter is very broadly applied by the representatives of the nonpositivist concept of law. However, the solution may be ascribed a more general meaning, which manifests itself in the ‘claim to correctness problem’ (Anspruch auf Richtigkeit). Such a claim has to be an element not only of law itself but also of all legal statements including acts of applying the law. The point I endeavour to defend is that out of the three interpretations of the claim to correctness problem, the one which refers not only to the correctness of legal order and law application acts, but also to lawyers’ professional obligations and responsibility is the best justified. This is because such a view most fully addresses the challenges of modern law, which has become increasingly professional in character, but on the other hand more prone to factors typical to fully professionalised walks of life – to critical factors especially. The question of how much the interpretation is compatible with Radbruch’s perspective, is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, some arguments suggesting higher degree of concordance will be presented.

Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch’s formula, nonpositivist concept of law, claim to correctness, abominable law, statutory lawlessness, legal ethics

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(3)/2011, pp. 61-75.

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Number of downloads: 439

References:

Alexy R., Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, München 2002
Alexy R., Theorie der juristichen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung, Frankfurt am Main 1991
Alexy R., W obronie niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1993/11–12
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Apel K.-O., Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral, Frankfurt am Main 1988
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Cern K., Wojciechowski B., O koniecznych związkach między dyskursem prawnym a moralnym, w: Zajadło J. (red.), Dziedzictwo i przyszłość. Problemy współczesnej niemieckiej filozofii prawa, Gdańsk 2010
Chauvin T., Sprawiedliwość: między celowością a bezpieczeństwem prawnym. Ewolucja poglądów Gustawa Radbrucha, „Studia Iuridica” 1999/37
Dreier R., Paulson S.L., Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs, w: Dreier R., Paulson S.L. (red.), Radbruch G., Rechtsphilosophie. Studienausgabe, Heidelberg 2003
Dreier R., Recht und Moral, w: Recht-Moral-Ideologie. Studien zur Rechtstheorie, Frankfurt am Main 1981
Gizbert-Studnicki T., Grabowski A., Kilka uwag o niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, w: Bogucka I., Tobor Z. (red.), Prawo a wartości. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Józefa Nowackiego, Kraków 2003
Grabowski A., Prawnicze pojęcie obowiązywania prawa stanowionego. Krytyka niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, Kraków 2009
Kosielińska-Grabowska U.A., Idea sprawiedliwości u Gustawa Radbrucha, w: Wojciechowski B., Golecki M.J. (red.), Rozdroża sprawiedliwości we współczesnej myśli filozoficznoprawnej, Toruń 2008
Paulson S.L., On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch’s Post-War Papers, „Oxford Journal of Legal Studies”, 2006/17
Peczenik A., Non-Positivist Conception of Law, w: Teoria prawa. Filozofia prawa. Współczesne prawo i prawoznawstwo, Toruń 1998
Radbruch G., Filozofia prawa, Warszawa 2009
Rüthers B., Recht und Juristen unter dem Sog und Druck wechselnder politicher Systeme, w: 125 Jahre Rechtsanwaltskammer Frankfurt am Main, Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, Rechtspflege, Frankfurt am Main 2004
Scheider K., Der deutsche Jurist als Bürokrat – Zur Beziehung zwischen der sozialen Role des deutschen Juristen und der Entwicklung der staatlichen Bürokratie, w: Kaupen W., Werle R. (red.), Soziologische Probleme juristischer Berufe, Göttingen 1974
Sekuła J. (red.), Idea etyczności globalnej, Siedlce 1999
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Monografia Marcina Matczaka „Summa iniuria. O błędzie formalizmu w stosowaniu prawa”

Mgr Anna Tomza

University of Łódź

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 86-102.

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Number od downloads: 463

References:

Barak A., Purposive Interpretation in Law, Princenton-Oxford 2005.

Bielska-Brodziak A., Interpretacja tekstu prawnego na podstawie orzecznictwa podatkowego, Warszawa 2009.

Brzeziński B., Intencjonalizm jako koncepcja wykładni prawa i jego krytyka w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, w: Dzwonkowski H., Głuchowski J., Pomorska A., Szołno-Koguc J. (red.), W kręgu prawa podatkowego i finansów publicznych. Księga dedykowana profesorowi Cezaremu Kosikowskiemu, Lublin 2005.

Brzeziński B., Poglądy sędziego Antonina Scalii na wykładnię prawa i ich odbiór w amerykańskiej doktrynie prawniczej, w: Pikulski S., Pływaczewski W., Dobkowski J. (red.), Przemiany doktrynalne i systemowe prawa publicznego. Studia dedykowane Profesorowi Wincentemu Bednarkowi, Olsztyn 2002.

Brzeziński B., Wykładnia prawa podatkowego w Zjednoczonym królestwie Wielkiej Brytanii, w Irlandii Północnej oraz w Republice Irlandii, „Kwartalnik Prawa Podatkowego” 2003/1.

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Pikulski S., Pływaczewski W., Dobkowski J. (red.), Przemiany doktrynalne i systemowe prawa publicznego. Studia dedykowane Profesorowi Wincentemu Bednarkowi, Olsztyn 2002.

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The ius et lex distinction in the contemporary legal science

Dr Maciej Pichlak

University of Wroclaw

English abstract: The aim of the paper is to clarify the concepts of ius and lex, as well as to indicate main interpretations of these concepts in the contemporary jurisprudence. For the concepts of ius and lex are not only of historical significance (as used in the legal discourse of the ancient Rome), but they are present in the entire history of the Western legal culture – since ancient times until today. Owing to this rich historical heritage, as well as to the very nature of the discussed concepts, it is impossible to offer classical definitions of ius and/or lex. Therefore, a proper analysis of their meaning will lead to determination of their ‘connotative field’: a map of associations and theories related to these concepts.

In order to realize this task, the paper offers three basic typologies that allow to order mutual relations between existing theoretical standpoints in this field. The first typology concerns a practical function of ius in the legal order. We can distinguish here theories which perceive such a function as mainly negative, positive, or mediating (optimalising). The second typology treats on the sources of binding force of ius. One can indicate positivistic, legalnaturalistic and hermeneutic intepretation of this problem. Finally, the third typology regards mutual relations between ius and lex, which may be described either as hierarchical, or as functionally differentiated. These considerations allow to conclude that the usefulness of such a dualistic way of thinking about the law is ever persisting. Within this perspective the legal order is conceived as containing statutory law (lex) as well as nonwritten binding standards, independent from law–making authorities (ius).

Keywrods: ius et lex, legal culture, law beyond statutory law, dualism of law

Language: Polish

Received: 09.03.2017
Accepted: Załączniki 03.05.2017

Published: Number 2(15)/2017, pp. 49-59.

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Number of downloads: 996