Opole University of Technology

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 120–124.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.120

Number of downloads: 21

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 117–119.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.117

Number of downloads: 29

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

Dr Mateusz Pękala

Ignatianum University in Cracow

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 112–116.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.112

Number of downloads: 24

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

The current issue includes articles on Pascal’s reflections on law and justice, determinism and free will in the doctrine of criminal law, Stanisław Brzozowski’s philosophy of labour, the nomos of global taxes, heuristic reasoning in judicial practice, and the risks of behavioural interventions without adequate empirical grounding.

We invite you to read the issue.

University of Silesia

English abstract: Nudge interventions have risen to prominence as ostensibly evidence-based regulatory tools, predicated on empirical insights into human decision-making. In theory, successful nudges require rigorous preparation, including carefully designed randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and pilot studies, to ensure they achieve their anticipated effects. In practice, however, many nudges fail to deliver the intended outcomes. This article explores the key determinants of such failures, with particular attention to issues in trial design and quality, the frequent reliance on ad hoc “copy-and-paste” approaches, and even absence of preparatory research. Consequently, this suboptimal implementation invites a range of objections regarding the legitimacy of behavioural regulation. Critics contend that nudges may be misused as technocratic exercises of power, provide a façade of government action without meaningfully addressing regulatory challenges, or function as instruments wielded by unqualified authorities. These flawed implementations give rise to a host of adverse consequences, such as side-effects of the regulation or unintended counter-effects. By dissecting these systemic shortcomings, this article offers a critical assessment of the relationship between approaches based on behavioural economics insights and regulatory practice, urging renewed scrutiny of nudge implementation processes to safeguard their credibility and efficacy.

Key words: nudge, RCTs, behavioural intervention, evidence-based regulation, implementation, abuse of power

Language: english

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 92–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.92

Number of downloads: 28

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Heuristic reasoning means abbreviated and simplified reasoning. As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have proved, judgement heuristics are relatively frequently present in human thinking, despite the risk that they may lead to certain cognitive errors. That is why it is highly likely that these heuristics may be present also in the thinking of judges when they apply the law and make judicial decisions. Therefore, the article departs from the statement that it is possible to encounter heuristic thinking also in judicial activity of Polish courts. The purpose of these reflections is to verify the statement thus posed by means of empirical identification of cases decided in a heuristic way, as well as to explain the consequences of deciding them in such a way. The article is systematized as follows. The first section presents heuristic thinking, in order to articulate the general characteristics that should be identified in specific judicial decisions issued by Polish courts in order to determine if this kind of reasoning is present. The second section of the article analyses selected judgments that may be perceived in terms of heuristic thinking as testimony of its presence in the practice of applying Polish law. Meanwhile, the next section of the article deals with some consequences of the analysed decisions having a heuristic character for the subject matter in which they were issued. Finally, in the last section, the conducted analysis leads to the formulation of a few reflections on general admissibility and usefulness of heuristic reasoning in the practice of judicial application of the law.

Key words: Heuristics, Kahneman, Tversky, reasoning, judgement heuristics, judicial application of the law, piercing the corporate veil, adjudication

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 75–91.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.75

Number of downloads: 29

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Kozminski University

English abstract: In the past few decades there were many proposals to introduce global tax. The conceptual background of this idea has been laid out as well and the availability of the necessary IT tools ensured. The idea now awaits political decisions. Unfortunately, as in the case of domestic taxes, it is the practical side of the proposals that dominates the discourse to the detriment of the necessary establishment of the basic principles of the philosophy of global taxes. Due to the specifics of their application, the philosophical aspect of global taxes is critically important to ensure the universality and justice of norms to form their final shape. This article is aimed at initiating discussion on the basic philosophical principles of global taxes. To be sufficiently universal, the foundations of its philosophical system must be rooted in our common legal and civilizational heritage, of which the Greek nomos is an important, though neglected, element. However, it may be the case that – in some areas – nomos will better reflect the essence of the global law phenomena than the traditional Latin formula ius and lex.

Key words: nomos, global tax order, global taxes, tax sovereignty

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 59–74.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.59

Number of downloads: 25

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The Polish constitutional model is founded on the principle of sovereign power vested in the Nation, as expressed in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. However, such an unequivocal designation of the sovereign proves problematic in practice and has been subject to criticism by a significant portion of legal scholarship. The aim of this article is to propose a revision of the Polish concept of sovereignty of the Nation, said revision based on the philosophy of labour developed by Stanisław Brzozowski. Through an analysis of Brzozowski’s philosophical writings, the article puts forward ways of incorporating the core value of his thought – human labour – into the system of government. A test for legal regulations is proposed, enabling an assessment of these legal regulations in terms of their relationship to the sovereign as understood through the lens of the philosophy of labour, that is, their relationship to the producer or the worker. The sovereign is one whose life does not depend on natural conditions, who is capable of imposing their will upon the world – i.e. the producer. In Brzozowski’s writings, this category is defined in an exceptionally broad manner, setting it apart from the notion of the worker in Marxist theory. This broader definition allows for the inclusion of the self-employed, public-sector employees, and individuals employed in roles not directly linked to production, thus significantly expanding the group of those who may be considered as wielding sovereign power, according to the framework developed based on Brzozowski’s essays. The article offers an original interpretation of Brzozowski’s philosophy of labour, proposing its application in political science and legal theory – fields which have previously been rarely discussed in the context of this philosophy.

Key words: Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878–1911), philosophy of labour, principle of national sovereignty, sovereign

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 41–58.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.41

Number of downloads: 27

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Kutnik, Kalinowski and Partners, Attorneys-at-Law

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the positions, found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law, regarding determinism and free will. It appears that the predominant approach in the doctrine is both incompatibilist and libertarian. In contrast, this article adopts a compatibilist position, inspired by M.S. Moore’s concept outlined in his book Mechanical Choices. In the article, I defend the thesis that criminal responsibility can be maintained regardless of whether determinism is true or false. Defending this thesis required addressing specific arguments found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law. On this basis, I identify the main positions held by legal scholars, namely: (1) the position that determinism renders criminal law meaningless; (2) the position that there exists a “good” moderate determinism and a “bad” extreme determinism; (3) the position that determinism is not justified in light of common sense; (4) the position that indeterminism, more than determinism, is acceptable in judicial rulings; (5) the position that describes determinism in the context of free will without making value judgments. I conclude that a reconstruction of the foundations of criminal responsibility would by no means be necessary, even if it were acknowledged that the world is deterministic, while positions (1)–(4), upon closer analysis, can be weakened – if not outright rejected.

Key words: determinism, free will, compatibilism, criminal law

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 22–40.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.22

Number of downloads: 33

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

University of Kalisz

English abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse the possibility of the existence of a perfect state in the light of Blaise Pascal’s reflections on justice and law. The work juxtaposes utopian visions of ideal states, based on the moral perfection of citizens, as well as modern concepts derived from natural law or the social contract, with Pascal’s critical perspective, which emphasized the sinful human nature and the inevitable link between law and force or coercion. The analysis is based on seventeenth-century philosophical and political literature as well as on interpretations of Pascal’s texts. The main focus is on his reflections on the limitations of human justice and the need for law to maintain order and ensure security. The article argues that a perfect state in the earthly sense is impossible, and that true justice belongs only to the divine sphere. The originality of the study lies in presenting Pascal as a critic of rationalist utopias, one who showed that the state cannot be perfect, even though its existence ultimately has its source in God.

Key words: state, law, justice, order, reason

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 7–21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.7

Number of downloads: 30

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.