Prof. US dr hab. Olgierd Bogucki
University of Szczecin
English abstract: The article presents and analyses a certain theory of values and their role in legal interpretation. The article calls it a ‘componential’ theory of values. According to the theory, values in law create structures based on global assessments: comprehensive axiological judgements that consider all the relevant values and degrees of their realization. The basic theorem of the theory is the theorem on isomorphy between the global assessment and the content of the legal norm. This ‘componential’ theory is the basis of the normative model of legal interpretation. According to this model, the interpreter should reconstruct the global assessment and choose the one possible result of interpretation – the one norm of conduct – which will be the most consistent with this judgement. In order to reconstruct the aforementioned global assessment, the interpreter should consider the legal text, case law and legal literature, legislative materials and interpretative presumption.
The article reconstructs the philosophical presumptions behind the aforementioned theory and model. The article points out that the fundamental value behind the normative model is the intersubjectivity of legal interpretation as an element of the rule of law. The article also indicates that the theory and model described above are based on legal positivism, but with significant connections with legal hermeneutics, Dworkin’s theory of law, and argumentative approaches to law. In addition, the theory seems to presume weak commensurability of values.
Keywords: legal interpretation, theory of law, philosophy of law, axiology, ‘componential’ theory of values
Language: Polish
Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 96-108.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.96
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