Uniwersytet Gdański

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Traditional philosophical tension between a reason and emotions has been a subject of increasing objections. As a result emotions are defended by pointing their connections with beliefs, value judgments to name just a few strategies. This paper also takes up an attempt of this sort showing that traditional definition of emotions with features of the process of application of law makes a threat from the emotions for the impartiality of a judge much less warranted than it might seem. What is more, an attempt is taken up to argue that feeling can be a chance for impartiality conceived as argumentative openness.

Słowa kluczowe: rozum, emocje, bezstronność, decyzja sędziowska

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(7)/2013, s. 71-77

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