Jagiellonian University, Kraków

English abstract: One of the most eminent contemporary legal philosophers, Joseph Raz, made significant contributions not only to the aforementioned discipline, but also to political philosophy and moral philosophy, the three branches of which, in his view, contribute to practical philosophy. J. Raz’s achievements in the latter two areas are less familiar to the Polish reader than his concepts in the field of jurisprudence, all the more so because none of his works, which are part of the aforementioned, more general fields, has been translated into Polish. The present essay is devoted to the key threads of the thinker’s inquiries in the field of moral philosophy. The reconstruction made of J. Raz’s views takes into account the following ideas: his original version of ethical pluralism, the concept of constitutive incommensurability, a specific understanding of the universality of values, the thesis of their social dependence and the concepts of personal sense and personal attachment. The interpretation of the Oxford philosopher’s reflections is enriched by two digressions, referring in turn – to Charles Taylor’s critique of the instrumental way of life and to Ronald Dworkin’s underlying jurisprudence of ethical monism. This is because arguments can be derived from the reflections of the protagonist of the essay, which call into question the theses of the two aforementioned thinkers.

The presentation and analysis of the key themes of J. Raz’s moral philosophy is complemented by the author’s reminiscences of her meetings and conversations with the Oxford scholar.

Key words: Joseph Raz, ethical pluralism, constitutive incommensurability, social dependence thesis, personal meaning, personal attachment, universality of values.

Language: Polish

Published: no. 1(42)/2025, pp. 60-76.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.60

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