University of Wrocław

English abstract:Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: academic freedom, freedom of expression, culture wars, Stanley Fish, university teacher

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 77–95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.77

Download

Number of downloads: 184,956

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Social Sciences University of Ankara

Dr. Olcay Karacan

Cukurova University

English abstract: The question of freedom of expression involves more than just the ability to voice an idea; it also encompasses the broader context in which such expression emerges. Nevertheless, in legal discussions the focus is often narrowed to the boundaries of what may or may not be said. These discussions frequently remain confined within a binary framework of restriction versus protection, primarily through legal instruments, and seldom move beyond this limited perspective. In line with Schauer’s view, the legal approach tends to classify and reach definitive judgments “by its very nature”. Yet, as Schauer himself underlines, this does not mean that freedom of expression and/or academic freedom is valuable solely for its own sake. Schauer’s framework, therefore, offers a way to move past the confines of strictly legalistic debates. He provides not only a legal but also a philosophical basis for examining how expression is either restricted or protected.

This article does not attempt to explore the entirety of Schauer’s arguments on freedom of expression. Instead, it concentrates on evaluating how the Turkish administrative judiciary approaches academic freedom of expression, particularly from the point of view of the tension between restriction and protection. The central question it addresses is: What are the protective and restraining dynamics shaping academic freedom of expression in the case law of Turkish administrative courts, especially in the context of the Academics for Peace? Drawing on Schauer’s analysis of the instrumental function of expression and the institutional limits placed on academic freedom, the article argues that the core issue lies not only within the judiciary but also in structural constraints, such as universities and academic hierarchies, that may foster self-censorship.

Keywords:freedom of expression, academic freedom, Frederick Schauer, Turkish administrative judiciary, Academics for Peace, self-censorship

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 46–57.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.46

Download

Number of downloads: 184,956

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Vilnius University

English abstract: The paper focuses on the protection of freedom of expression of judges and  prosecutors who exercise this freedom in their professional capacity to promote the rule of  law, but suffer negative consequences as a result. Starting with the ECtHR Kövesi v. Romania judgment, the issues of whether legal remedy, in this context, should necessarily be judicial  and what quality requirements it should meet are analysed. The paper finds that the ECtHR  requires effective remedies in this field, but does not clearly exclude a possibility of non judicial remedies. The EU law, on the other hand, requires judicial remedies unless there are  very limited EU law-based reasons (notably, constitutional identity arguments) that justify  a possibility of a non-judicial remedy. Theoretical arguments based on substantive conception  of the rule of law support the need for a judicial remedy. The study is an addition to the  research into judicial independence in the light of the rule of law. It connects the ECtHR, EU  law and theoretical perspectives.

Keywords: judicial independence, prosecutors, freedom of expression, rule of law, remedy

Language: English

Published: Number 2(31)/2022, pp. 7-21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.2.7

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 331

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.