Philosophy of Right for Lay Judges. Hegel’s and Fichte’s Perspective

Mikołaj Ryśkiewicz — Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:40:15 +0000

Prof. dr hab. Ewa Nowak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The article, following an outline of the historical context, designs a normative justification of citizens’ participation in the public administration of justice on the basis of the philosophy of right of Georg W.F. Hegel and Johann G. Fichte. Their complementary philosophies of right provide solid foundations for a modern philosophy of right for lay judges (also called honorary judges). It is further argued that Hegel’s concept of the honorary judge as a subject who realizes their right to political and legal self-awareness and is integral to the administration of justice has greater and more topical potential than its equivalent in Fichte’s writings. Fichtean honorary judges act outside the legal framework, by virtue of a civic contract on reciprocal judicial support in emergency. All inquiries, documented with sources, due to the novelty of the issue, lead to the following conclusions: 1) lay judges’ activism according to Fichte “invalidates” a wrongful, defective or unjust law. In this way Fichte anticipates Radbruch’s Formula; 2) Hegelian honorary judges have impact on the real transformation of modern, atomistic society of idiotes (individuals with private interests) into a society of polites (as in the ancient Greek politeia or Roman res publica), transform institutions into public bodies in the strong sense of this term; finally, they prevent the alienation of society and law.

Keywords: participatory judiciary, lay judge, honorary judge, Hegel, Fichte, Radbruch, political transformation of society and public institutions, alienation of law and society

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(33)/2022, pp. 52-69

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.4.52

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Number of downloads: 322

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Hegel’s Critics on Legal Profession

Redakcja (Mateusz Mońka) — Tue, 05 Oct 2021 14:38:11 +0000

Mgr Maksymilian Hau

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of the article is a question about the actuality of the Hegelian concept of law, presented in the Principles of the philosophy of law. For Hegel, the law is the most important element in the structure of a capitalist society, because it funds the mutual recognition of individuals, which gives social relationships a foundation not in the dialectic of rule and servitude, but in the submission of all authorities to general legal norms. The analysis of selected contemporary practices that allow for the choice of jurisdiction calls into question the Hegelian concept, since these practices show that the general principle is broken – abstract norms of law no longer have to apply to everyone. The second part of the article is devoted to the analysis of criticism of legal profession to which Hegel accused the responsibility for alienating the law from society and thus blurring the relationship between law and freedom. The question will be asked whether Hegel’s criticism can be applied to contemporary problems in the relationship between law and society. Whether the law continues to be, as Hegel wanted it to be, a rational means of meeting the needs of individuals, or whether, on the contrary, it is increasingly becoming a source of exploitation.

Keywords: Hegel, Principles of philosophy of law, recognition, exploitation, legal profession

Language: Polish

Published: Number 3(28)/2021, pp. 69-81

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.3.69

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Number of downloads: 286