Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The aim of the paper is to establish a theoretical elaboration of objectivity in law which would conform exiting linguistic practices in the legal field. It starts from a brief characterization of legal practice in this respect which allows for an exposure of semantic complexity of the term ‘objectivity’ in law. The term is said to take two basic meanings: objectivity as a fact and objectivity as a moral ideal. On this ground requirements towards a reliable theory of legal objectivity are defined: such a theory should not only make o room for both distinct meanings of legal objectivity, but also should consider their mutual relations. These requirements stemming from existing linguistic practice serve as criteria for examination of up to date theoretical concepts of objectivity. The paper discusses realistic, conventionalist, and idealistic theories of objectivity in law subsequently and exposes shortcomings of each of these. Eventually, key assumptions of an institutional theory of objectivity are presented which is claimed to offer a plausible understanding of objectivity in law in both its factual and ideal aspects.

Słowa kluczowe: obiektywność, teoria instytucjonalna, realizm, konwencjonalizm, idealizm

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 108-124

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Liczba ściągnięć: 21