justice

On Gustav Radbruch’s Notion of Antinomies of the Idea of Law

Bartosz Szyler

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The main purpose of the paper is to analyse the notion of antinomies of the idea of law developed in Gustav Radbruch’s philosophy. In the first part of the paper, I analyse the most detailed explication of the notion of antinomy contained in part of Radbruch’s Philosophy of Law. I emphasize which elements, according to Radbruch, constitute the idea of law and what are the sources of their antinomianism. I indicate what elements constitute, in Radbruch’s opinion, the idea of law and what, in his opinion, the sources of their antinomianism are. In the second part of the paper, I focus on a general reconstruction of the notion of antinomy. I refer to the use of this notion in the history of philosophy and logic, in particular to one of the most important philosophical uses of antinomy in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis carried out allows me to recognize the specificity of the notion of antinomy used by Radbruch and to see its distinctiveness in comparison with Kantian antinomies. Looking at the antinomies of the idea of law from a broader philosophical perspective allows me to criticize the inadequacy of the conceptual net adopted by Radbruch, and to justify their reinterpretation independently of what has been discussed in the literature so far.

Keywords: Radbruch, Kant, philosophy of law, antinomies, justice

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(29)/2021, pp.82-90

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.4.82

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Number of downloads: 89

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

The Systematization of Legal Values around Justice

Prof. M. Isabel Garrido Gómez

University of Alcalá

English abstract: This article underlines the centrality of justice when understanding it as an overarching value that globalizes and systematizes all the others. In particular, it analyzes what happens with legal security as a formal enshrinement of justice, and freedom and equality as its material manifestations. From this point of view, it becomes clear that the resulting systematization depends on the type of State currently in force. This is joined the diverse ways of understanding justice and the evaluation of the validity-justice relationship depending on the different ways of understanding it. Likewise, the ways of understanding the justice-law connection are linked to the concept of the Law that we uphold. Finally, it is concluded that legal operators are called to administer justice in a complementary regime, with legal security serving to reinforce freedom, as is the case with regard to equality.

Keywords: Systematization, legal values, justice, complementarity of values, legal operators

Language: English

Published: Number 3(28)/2021, pp. 39-53

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.3.39

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Number of downloads: 54

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Between Justice and Mercy: Comparison of American and Russian Versions of 12 Angry Men

Dr Paweł Jabłoński

University of Wrocław

Abstract: The aim of the article is to thematize two different types of attitudes to the law – which, referring to works by Marek Jan Siemek and Lon Luvois Fuller, I call the “Eastern attitude” and the “Western attitude”. This task is realized by a comparative interpretation of two famous films: 12 Angry Men, directed by Sidney Lumet, and Nikita Mikhalkov’s Russian-language remake of Lumet’s movie, titled 12. I try to show that although these two films tell similar stories, there are significant differences between them in regard to the perception of the law. In the American version, the law is a system of mechanisms that really work and are taken seriously. In the Russian version, the law is, to a large extent, only an appearance, which in reality must be replaced by ethics.

Keywords: law, respect for law, ethics, “West”, “East”, justice, mercy

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(26)/2021, s. 45-61.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.1.45

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Number of downloads: 136

Aitia – Aristotelian guilt. Definitional issues (part 2)

Dr Waldemar Gontarski

European School of Law and Administration

English abstract: When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to mental capabilities of the actor in respect to a particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between the actor’s behavior and the resulting damage). Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and the related subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Keywords: Aristotle, the triad of causes, the triad of consequences, justice

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(6)/2013, pp. 68-92.

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Number of downloads: 116

The cultural grounds of Japanese criminal law in action

Prof. dr hab. Jacek Izydorczyk

University of Łódź

English abstract: The author describes the Japanese way of criminal justice in practice (law in action). But he shows the Japanese law in action as a ‘product’ of a quite different culture then the culture of Western World. First, presents in a glance history and religion of Japan. Next, shows development of new laws for Japan during XIX century when Japanese decided to ‘escape from Asia’ and join the Western World. Third part of the paper, explains the criminal justice system in contemporary Japan. The main part of the article focuses on Japanese criminal law as an everyday law in action (the law in action quite often very difficult to understand for Westerners). According to the author there are five main examples of those cultural grounds of Japanese criminal law in action. First – the Japanese way of preventing crimes; second – the Japanese idea what is (and what for actually is) criminal law; third – problem of so-called the opportunism principle which really dominates the criminal procedure in Japan; fourth – phenomenon of Boryokudan (Yakuza) in Japan; and last (fifth) – question what actually means the principle of fair trial (i.e. protection of defendants rights) in Japan in real life. The author’s conclusion is simple: law in action always depends from the culture of a country. That is why – when we talk on Japan – much more important is to understand such cultural grounds than just to know the legal system described by official ‘paper laws’.

Keywords: Japanese criminal law, justice, legal culture, prevention

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(15)/2012, pp. 77-91.

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Number of downloads: 95

Aitia – Aristotlelian guilt. Definitional issues

Dr Waldemar Gontarski

European School of Law and Administration

English abstract: When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to the mental capabilities of the actor in respect to the particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between actor’s behavior and the resulting damage. Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and related to it subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Keywords: Aristotle, the triad of causes, the triad of consequences, justice

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(15)/2012, pp. 51-66.

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Number of downloads: 100