University of Gdańsk

Abstract: The article analyses the film Inherit the Wind, directed by Stanley Kramer in 1960, according to a screenplay inspired by events of the so-called Scopes monkey trial, which took place in 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee (US). The filmmakers recreated fairly freely the motive of the controversial ‘trial of the century’, offering the viewers an allegory of political events of the 1950s instead of historical accuracy. At the same time, it was a universal essay on the consequences of institutionalization of ideological and religious fundamentalism. The timeless appeal of Kramer’s motion picture can also be seen in the context of his positive commitment to legal ethics. The plot of the film is a clash of legal professionals, whose personalities are similar to two outstanding lawyers who actually participated in the monkey trial: William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow. Kramer’s film presents a positive role model of a lawyer, that is, defence counsel Drummond, contrasting him with the antihero: a lawyer and politician supporting the prosecution, called Brady. The film personalities of Drummond and Brady are reconstructed from the point of view of virtue ethics, using exemplarist moral theory by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, which enables giving a fuller picture of the created personages than in case of a deontic assessment of the moral validity of their individual acts.

Keywords: exemplarism, virtue ethics, legal ethics, virtue jurisprudence, monkey trial

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(26)/2021, s. 33-44.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.1.33

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Number of downloads: 520

Voronezh State University

Abstract: Unfortunately, today there is little Russian (and Polish) research dedicated to the analysis of the professional legal ethics in the Russian Federation and in the Republic of Poland. Nevertheless, this area of scientific research could be very useful for both countries because of the common history of these states. The article examines the existing research on the advocate’s independence in Russia and Poland, while providing an attempt to compare the methods of legal regulation of qualified legal assistance introduced at the present stage.

Keywords: comparative law, the bar, qualified legal assistance, legal guarantees of advocates’ activity, legal ethics, independence of advocates’ activity

Language: English

Received: 20.01.2017
Accepted: 16.12.2017

Published: Number 2(17)/2018, pp. 112-119.

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Number of downloads: 354

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University

English abstract: In this article, the problems of institutional aspects of lawyers’ legal ethics are discussed. On the theoretical plane, the concept of lawyers’ self-government institutions is reinterpreted in the perspective of ‘little ethics’ outlined by Paul Ricoeur’s in his work Oneself as Another. This approach is cognitively justified because, in the light of the assumptions adopted by the philosopher, the ethical aspiration of an entity can be fully realised only in ‘just institutions’. In the first place, the text discusses the fundamental importance of the institution, taking into consideration the achievements of legal meta-ethics. The point of reference for the analyses undertaken by the author is the role played by the concept in question in the ethical and professional codifications of the self-governments of attorneys and legal advisors in Poland. In the key part of the discussion, Ricoeur’s concept of ethics is adopted as the basis for systematizing and reinterpreting the issues relating to institutions of self-government of the legal professions of public trust. Ultimately, the theory of professional ethics, referring to the philosopher’s work, enables characterising in a comprehensive way the ethical aspirations of a lawyer at the internal, interpersonal and institutional levels.

Keywords: institutions, lawyers’ professional self-government, legal ethics, ‘little ethics’, Paul Ricoeur

Language: Polish

Received: 06.06.2017
Accepted: 08.09.2017

Published: Number 1(16)/2018, pp. 54-68.

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Number of downloads: 355

University of Warsaw

English abstract: In Neil MacCormick’s social ontology, the most important concept is ‘institution’. It is characterised by the notion of the institution’s normative core, which distinguishes the given institution from other institutions of social life. The normative core of an institution consists of a collection of values realised by it and a set of social practices. An analysis of professional ethics according to Neil MacCormick’s social ontology allows us to distinguish the normative core of this institution, which may be cognitively promising for several reasons. First of all, the institutional perspective may be helpful in solving the problems with justifying a lawyer’s power, which is based on formalized ethical codes. Secondly, establishing a central set of professional values and practices will make it easier for participants of the given practice to choose the right course of action. Thirdly, identifying the normative core of legal professions will allow us to determine the extent of interference in the self-government of legal professions.

Keywords: legal ethics, Neil MacCormick, institutions

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(16)/2018, pp. 46-53.

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Number of downloads: 328

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present the theory of legal ethics by David J. Luban. The reading of this American philosopher’s project I would like to propose focuses around the three pillars mentioned in the title: the moral evaluation of acts, subjectivity, and moral responsibility. Luban’s theory postulates maintaining the autonomy of an individual performing a lawyer’s role in relation to the institutional structure. Therefore, a lawyer’s activity should be characterised by anxiety and questions ‘what should I do?’ The main axis of Luban’s project is criticism of the standard view supporting the principle that institutional morality is independent of social or individual morality. The principle of neutrality assumes that the morality of a professional role should be limited to the institutional dimension. Such an approach is supposed to prevent (especially in case of an attorney) any individual assessments of the client’s behaviour, or – in a broader sense – performing the professional role at one’s own discretion.

Keywords: legal culture, legal ethics, professional role, subjectivity/structure, moral responsibility

Language: Polish

Received: 06.06.2017
Accepted: 16.08.2017

Published: Number 1(16)/2018, pp. 21-33.

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Number of downloads: 437

University of Warsaw

English abstract: What is usually acknowledged as a topicality indication of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy is the theoretical interest in and practical application of his ideas – known as the Radbruch’s formula – on abominable law, statutory non-law and the refusal to apply it by public authorities, the judiciary in particular. The article main argument is that we can point to other than Radbruch’s formula elements in his philosophy of law which are still applicable and present in the recent discussion on the concept of law itself, its validity and application. What this means is basic to Radbruch’s thought the distinction between the concept of law (Rechtsbegriff), the idea of law (Rechtsidee) and the relationship between the two. The solution accepted by Radbruch in this matter is very broadly applied by the representatives of the nonpositivist concept of law. However, the solution may be ascribed a more general meaning, which manifests itself in the ‘claim to correctness problem’ (Anspruch auf Richtigkeit). Such a claim has to be an element not only of law itself but also of all legal statements including acts of applying the law. The point I endeavour to defend is that out of the three interpretations of the claim to correctness problem, the one which refers not only to the correctness of legal order and law application acts, but also to lawyers’ professional obligations and responsibility is the best justified. This is because such a view most fully addresses the challenges of modern law, which has become increasingly professional in character, but on the other hand more prone to factors typical to fully professionalised walks of life – to critical factors especially. The question of how much the interpretation is compatible with Radbruch’s perspective, is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, some arguments suggesting higher degree of concordance will be presented.

Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch’s formula, nonpositivist concept of law, claim to correctness, abominable law, statutory lawlessness, legal ethics

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(3)/2011, pp. 61-75.

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Number of downloads: 412

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Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Kraków University

Abstract: Codes of legal ethics encounter constant waves of criticism. It is pointed out that their disadvantage is, on the one hand, the excessive casuistry, limiting the possibility of taking independent decisions in cases of ethical and professional conflicts, and, on the other hand, the exaggerated declarative character of perfectionist ethical and professional virtues. The gap between the abovementioned perspectives, easily perceived in such codes, results in a dysfunctionality of professional ethics in the actions undertaken by members of the legal profession. The article, apart from the critical-comparative part, includes a proposal of reading and interpreting the content of the codes in a way that transgresses the above opposition. The theoretical basis of the presented position is provided by the concept of “little ethics” formulated by Paul Ricoeur in his work Oneself as Another. The ethical theory developed by Ricoeur combines the elements of Aristotelian ethics of virtues with Kantian ethics of duty. For this reason, it sets a uniform perspective for opposing elements, namely: subordination to the norm of the code and pursuit of ethical and professional self-improvement by legal professionals. The proposed solution belongs to the “reflexive” paradigm of the lawyer’s professional ethics proposed on the basis of Ricoeur’s onto-ethical theory.

Language: English

Keywords: legal ethics, codification, reflexivity, Paul Ricoeur, teleological ethics, deontological ethics, “little ethics”

Published: Number 2(13)/2016, pp. 39-50.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2016.2.39

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Number of downloads: 603