Jagiellonian University

English abstract: In his work titled Natur der Sache als juristishe Denkform, Gustav Radbruch develops his account of the nature of things as an objective essence of social reality, which serves as a foundation for the construction of legal institutions. The main objective of this paper is to refute two serious objections against the account, namely, the alleged contradiction between the account of the nature of things and the 1) assumption of relativism of values as well as the 2) assumption of the ontological is-ought dichotomy. To show that Radbruch’s account is consistent with those two assumptions of legal positivism, firstly, I invoke the conceptual distinction between ontological and epistemological objectivity. Secondly, I specify the understanding of the term ’nature‘ not as implying natural origin, but rather an object’s having an essence in ontological terms. With those conceptual distinctions, it is possible to understand Radbruch’s theory as a version of essentialism towards social artifacts (those important form the legal point of view), which does not imply any iusnaturalistic commitments.

Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Nature of Things, Legal Construction, Legal ontology, Legal institution, Law as Artifact

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(29)/2021, pp.45-57

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.4.45

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