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	<title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej</title>
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		<title>Metaphysical realism in the face of challenges from contextualism and nonfactualism – considerations against the background of Michael Moore’s natural law theory</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/820/metaphysical-realism-in-the-face-of-challenges-from-contextualism-and-nonfactualism-considerations-against-the-background-of-michael-moores-natural-law-theory/</link>
					<comments>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/820/metaphysical-realism-in-the-face-of-challenges-from-contextualism-and-nonfactualism-considerations-against-the-background-of-michael-moores-natural-law-theory/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Jul 2017 21:06:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contextualism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metaphysical realism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michael Moore]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michał Pełka]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nonfactualism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saul Kripke]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=820</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Dr Michał Pełka University of Warsaw English abstract The article tackles with the problem of truth-conditional theory of meaning for sentences, which are usually connected with the doctrine of metaphysical realism. It consists basically of two parts. The first part describes several arguments aimed at rejecting realism. The conclusion of this part is a claim [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Dr Michał Pełka</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">University of Warsaw</span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><br />
<span style="color: #333333;">English abstract</span></strong><span style="color: #333333;"> The article tackles with the problem of truth-conditional theory of meaning for sentences, which are usually connected with the doctrine of metaphysical realism. It consists basically of two parts. The first part describes several arguments aimed at rejecting realism. The conclusion of this part is a claim that even if Moore’s defense in this regard is successful there are two additional attempts to undermine his theory, namely the argument from contextualism and the argument from nonfactualism that are described and developed in the second part of the paper.<br />
</span><br />
<span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Keywords:</strong> contextualism, Saul Kripke, metaphysical realism, Michael Moore, nonfactualism, Ludwig Wittgenstein</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Language:</strong> Polish<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Received:</strong>  25.10.2016<br />
<strong>Accepted:</strong> 08.02.2017<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Published:</strong> Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 74-89.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Download file:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=777" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-777 ext-pdf">Download</a><br />
<strong><br />
Number of downloads: </strong>432</span></p>
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		<title>Fish – Dworkin debate as an example of dispute about practice of interpretation of law</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/569/fish-dworkin-debate-as-an-example-of-dispute-about-practice-of-interpretation-of-law/</link>
					<comments>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/569/fish-dworkin-debate-as-an-example-of-dispute-about-practice-of-interpretation-of-law/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2016 23:08:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legal interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meaning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michał Pełka]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stanley Fish]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=569</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Dr Michał Pełka University of Warsaw English abstract: The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Dr Michał Pełka</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">University of Warsaw</span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><br />
<span style="color: #333333;">English abstract:</span></strong><span style="color: #333333;"> The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Keywords:</strong> legal interpretation, meaning, Stanley Fish, Ronald Dworkin, Ludwig Wittgenstein</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Language:</strong> Polish</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Published:</strong> Number 2(11)/2015, p. 86-105.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Download file:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=565" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-565 ext-pdf">Download</a><br />
<strong><br />
Number of downloads: </strong>599</span></p>
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