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Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Remarks on Lay Judges in Polish Criminal Process Passing Moral Judgements

Dr Paweł Mazur

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The article addresses the issue of the participation of lay judges in passing moral judgements during the stage of adjudication. It attempts to realize the postulate of external integration of jurisprudence by combining the achievements of legal studies and moral philosophy as well as public philosophy in research work.

The basic theses of the article are as follows: lay judges-citizens have the moral competence to pass moral judgements during the process of adjudication. There is no reason to consider a professional judge better prepared to pass moral judgements than a lay one. A broadening of the court panels to include citizens can be seen as a remedy for issues such as: conformism, ignorance, intellectual errors in the judicial discourse. Furthermore, citizens are capable of supplementing the judicial process of application of law with Aristotelian category of reasonableness. The article presents also the threats resulting from lay judges’ participation in the process of passing morel assessments in the criminal process.

Keywords: moral competence, professional judges, lay judges, moral reasoning

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(33)/2022, pp. 86-97

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.4.86

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Number of downloads: 276

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: lay judges, moral competence, moral reasoning, professional judges

The Method of Reflective Equilibrium in Moral Reasoning

Prof. dr hab. Marek Smolak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The paper analyses the nature of moral reasoning when balancing constitutional rights. The fundamental assumption is the idea that adequate moral reasoning based on the Weight Formula should demonstrate the reasons for adopting specific principles. This demonstration should be rational. Rationality can be achieved by applying J. Rawls’s methods of reflective equilibrium. The above method consists of background theory/approach. I propose to consider two background theories/approaches, namely Dworkin’s idea of integrity and the concept of the rule of law formulated by O. Raban. My aim is to argue that the latter is more accurate for moral reasoning when balancing constitutional rights than the former because it helps us to rationalize the broadly understood process of taking judicial decisions.

Keywords: Weight Formula, reflective equilibrium, moral reasoning, Ofer Raban

Language: English

Published: Number 1(10)/2015, pp. 89-96

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2015.1.89

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Number of downloads:
618

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: moral reasoning, Ofer Raban, reflective equilibrium, Weight Formula

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Keywords

Rudolf von Jhering constituent power government strict scrutiny test civil rights reducing pensions of communist officials normative standard Hegel unconditional basic income intermediate scrutiny test one right answer Oxford philosophers resentment Leon Festinger Konrad Kobyliński Jedwabne debate exploitation narrative legal practice patient's rights judicial review (of constitutionality of statutes) MacCormick essentially contested concepts Mariola Żak state of exception ethics of never again extermination order effectiveness of law distrust legal axiology transitional justice weighing the rightness Maksymilian Hau Paul Grice popular constitutionalism interpretation Anscombe legal certainty institutional theory Summa iniuria judicial opinion cooperative morality social ethics dialogue legal multicentrism constitutional awareness michał peno The Separation Thesis Constitutional Tribunal

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