Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Rule of law, public philosophy and moral responsibility of scientists

Paweł Skuczyński — Thu, 20 Sep 2018 20:23:49 +0000

Prof. dr hab. Lech Morawski

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

English abstract: The paper discusses some relationships between the rule of law and the public philosophy. It is unquestionable that nowadays the scientism has become one of the dominant ideologies of industrial and post-industrial societies. Scientists and researchers take an active part in public life, are advisors to governments and corporations, comment in the media important public events. Thus, the problem arises of their moral and legal responsibility for what they say and do in public life. In my opinion, we may distinguish two different models of responsibility, which I call a model of scientist as an ordinary citizen and model of scientist always on duty. To put it another way, we may ask, whether the scientist in public life like an ordinary citizen can act in accordance with his political, economic or religious sympathies and preferences or just like a judge, priest or a physician is always „on duty” and always must follow all the rules of his profession. I defend the view that the adoption of the second model is one of the necessary preconditions of the existence of informed and rational public opinion and thus, the informed and rational rule of law.

Keywords: rule of law, moral responsibility, legal responsibility, public philosophy

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 85-94

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Number of downloads: 330

David J. Luban’s legal ethics: moral evaluations of acts, subjectivity, responsibility

Redakcja — Thu, 12 Jul 2018 09:49:33 +0000

Dr hab. Przemysław Kaczmarek

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present the theory of legal ethics by David J. Luban. The reading of this American philosopher’s project I would like to propose focuses around the three pillars mentioned in the title: the moral evaluation of acts, subjectivity, and moral responsibility. Luban’s theory postulates maintaining the autonomy of an individual performing a lawyer’s role in relation to the institutional structure. Therefore, a lawyer’s activity should be characterised by anxiety and questions ‘what should I do?’ The main axis of Luban’s project is criticism of the standard view supporting the principle that institutional morality is independent of social or individual morality. The principle of neutrality assumes that the morality of a professional role should be limited to the institutional dimension. Such an approach is supposed to prevent (especially in case of an attorney) any individual assessments of the client’s behaviour, or – in a broader sense – performing the professional role at one’s own discretion.

Keywords: legal culture, legal ethics, professional role, subjectivity/structure, moral responsibility

Language: Polish

Received: 06.06.2017
Accepted: 16.08.2017

Published: Number 1(16)/2018, pp. 21-33.

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Number of downloads: 422