Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Abstract: What is the relationship between general legal theories and legal narratives? In this paper we aim to problematise this relationship in the context of different legal disagreements. As we see it, the Dworkinean category of “theoretical disagreement”, which basically refers to the phenomenon of disagreement “about the grounds of law” (between different general legal theories) is not sufficient to cover all substantial disagreements that appear in legal practice. Thus, we propose a category of “narrative disagreement” which has a wider scope. Eventually, we discuss the thesis of a possible equality of legal theories, as well as legal narratives, which we understand as an inevitable consequence of the relationship between legal theories/narratives and a special type of evidence on which they both rely: truisms about the law that laymen and/or legal professionals generally share.

Keywords: general legal theories, legal disagreement, theoretical disagreement, narrative disagreement, legal narrative, legal truisms

Language: English

Received: 26.12.2017
Accepted: 26.01.2018

Published: Number 2(17)/2018, pp. 47-59.

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