Washington University

English abstract: Much in recent discussions on legal positivism suggests that the controversy surrounding the notion turns on the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. As a point of departure in distinguishing them, the separation principle is helpful. The separation principle counts as the contradictory of the morality principle, according to which there is “necessary overlap” between the law and morality. What the legal positivist’s denial of the morality principle comes to can be refined, we are told, by appealing to the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. One can acquire a broader perspective by opening up the field in order to cover not only inclusive and exclusive legal positivism but also non-positivism, represented by the defence of the morality principle, that is the view that there is necessary overlap between the law and morality. Say what you will about inclusive versus exclusive legal positivism – some defend the distinction, others dismiss inclusive legal positivism as a non-starter. In any case, I want to argue that a far more fundamental distinction within the positivist camp lies elsewhere. The distinction I have in mind is that between legal positivism qua naturalism (J. Austin) and legal positivism without naturalism (H. Kelsen). For reasons institutional in nature, legal positivism has largely been discussed in a vacuum, there is a standing presumption to the effect that there are ties between legal positivism and ‘positivism writ large’ in the greater philosophical tradition – or, as it would be put in present-day philosophical circles, ties between legal positivism and naturalism.

Keywords: legal positivism, Hans Kelsen, The Separation Thesis, naturalism, normativism

Language: Polish
Translated by: Marcin Romanowicz

Published: Number 2(15)/2012, pp. 20-35.

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University of Łódź

English abstract: Article is an attempt to provide reconstruction of the discourse between Hans Kelsen and Jerzy Wróblewski. The main motive of the article are three footnotes from Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms where he considers such issues as the meaning of the legal norm, and legal interpretation. Reconstruction leads to conclusion that if one treats H. Kelsen’s argumentation as a critique of Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory, this critique doesn’t have sound basis, because it’s essence is not to point contradictions and weakness of the theory, but it is led from the point of view of pure theory of law which itself at some points suffers from the lack of coherency. Thus the other approach of the interpretation of footnotes is offered, to treat them as an some kind of scientific testimony, and as a tool which has on scope to make improvement in pure theory of law. Additionally it has been pointed out, that Hans Kelsen didn’t put the main interest on Marxist issues which occurred in Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory, but on those elements which have it’s importance and are discussed till present day.

Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Jerzy Wroblewski, legal interpretation, normativism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 75-85.

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Number of downloads: 342

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