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	<title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej</title>
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		<title>Around Selected Themes in the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Part II</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/7161/around-selected-themes-in-the-moral-philosophy-of-joseph-raz-part-ii/</link>
					<comments>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/7161/around-selected-themes-in-the-moral-philosophy-of-joseph-raz-part-ii/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja (Mateusz Pękala)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 11:11:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethical monism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[group rights as a category]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joseph Raz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perfectionist liberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[personal autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political conception of human rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ronald Dworkin]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=7161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska Jagiellonian University in Kraków English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska</h3>
<h4>Jagiellonian University in Kraków</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>English abstract: </strong>Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Keywords: </strong>Joseph Raz, perfectionist liberalism, personal autonomy, group rights as a category, political conception of human rights, Ronald Dworkin, ethical monism</p>
<p><strong>Language: </strong>Polish</p>
<p><strong>Published:</strong> Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 42-57.</p>
<p><strong>DOI: </strong>https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.42</p>
<p><strong>Download:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=7241" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-7241 ext-pdf">Download</a></p>
<p><strong>Number of downloads:</strong> 133</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><span lang="en-US">This text is licensed under a <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</a>.</span></p>
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