University of Wrocław

English abstract: Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: Ronald Dworkin, academic freedom, freedom of speech, academic teacher, culture of independence

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.96

Download

Number of downloads: 181,215

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: Joseph Raz, perfectionist liberalism, personal autonomy, group rights as a category, political conception of human rights, Ronald Dworkin, ethical monism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 42-57.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.42

Download: Download

Number of downloads: 140

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

University of Warsaw

English abstract: This paper presents practical reasoning in the light of John M. Finnis’ new natural law theory. Finnis’ views were shaped by Aquinas’ thoughts on natural law but he was also strongly inspired by Germain Grisez’ new approach, so his theory could be named a new natural law theory. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of legal reasoning as practical reasoning, which Finnis intended mainly as a strong critique of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning based on the concept of the one right answer. According to the author of this paper, Finnis’ critical approach to Dworkin leads to a gradual extension of the former’s concept of legal reasoning to include positivistic aspects (rapprochement with Joseph Raz’ views) and institutional aspects (rapprochement with Neil MacCormick’s views). Therefore, Finnis’ theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the rapprochement between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary philosophy of law.

Keywords: John M. Finnis, natural law, legal reasoning, practical reasoning, Ronald Dworkin, one right answer

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(21)/2020, pp. 84-98.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.84

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 741

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: In his translator’s note to the H.L.A Hart’s paper New Challenge to Legal Positivism, Andrzej Grabowski describes the historical details of Hart’s Madrid lecture and the changes of the original Spanish text, introduced in the translation. He argues that Hart’s paper can be regarded as the prequel to the ‘Postscript’ from 1994, since the lecture deals with the criticism of Dworkin against the Hartian version of legal positivism and some important parts of them (from Section II) were in extenso included in the ‘Postscript’. The translator also emphasises the importance of Hart’s lecture as a text-source of information, which can be used in the contemporary debate on the inclusive legal positivism and for the critical reconstruction of Hart’s theoretical position.

Keywords: Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, legal positivism, Hart-Dworkin debate

Language: Polish

Published: Numer 2(9)/2014, pp. 21-25

Download: Download

Number of downloads: 360

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Ronald Dworkin once criticized legal positivists for that their theories are founded on a mistake called “the semantic sting”, which claims that legal philosophy, as a silent prologue to every decision of law, cannot be only a semantic account to the word ‘law’. The article presents Dworkinean argument (and its most influential critique of Herbert Hart) and examines whether Jerzy Wróblewski’s legal theory (in its descriptive layer similar to the theory of Herbert Hart) is susceptible to “the semantic sting”. Finally, the answer given is based on a particular solution: Jerzy Wróblewski’s concept of rationality of legal decision appliance. The answer is in accoradance with argumentation of soft positivists, such as Herbert Hart or Jules Coleman, and is based on the acceptance that, even if Dworkin’s argument is meaningfull, it still does not apply to the theories presented by the soft positivists. The controversy whether a particular theory is “semantically stung” is de facto a dispute over a proper methodological approach to legal theory and a relation in which such a theory remains to interpretative jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. In this case we can treat Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory as a metatheory, which deals with theoretic disagreement over the grounds of the law, while deciding the case.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, Herbert Hart, Jerzy Wróblewski, semantic sting, legal positivism, rational application of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 39-47.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads: 173

References:

1. Coleman J. (red.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Oxford 2001.
2. Coleman J., Methodology, w: Coleman J., Shapiro S. (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford 2002.
3. Coleman J., The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford 2001.
4. Coleman J., Shapiro S. (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford 2002.
5. Davidson D., Preface, w: LePore E., McLaughlin B.P., Actions and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford 1985.
6. Dworkin R., Imperium prawa, Warszawa 2006.
7. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Zasady i reguły prawne, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
8. Hart H.L.A., Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1953.
9. Hart H.L.A., Pojęcie prawa, Warszawa 1998.
10. LePore E., McLaughlin B.P., Actions and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford 1985.
11. MacCormick N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford 1978.
12. Raz J., Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, w: Coleman J. (red.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Oxford 2001.
13. Shapiro S., What is Law? (And Why Should We Care?), 1st Conference On Philosophy And Law Neutrality And Theory Of Law, Girona, 20-22.05.2010
14. Wróblewski J., Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
15. Wróblewski J., Rozumienie prawa i jego wykładnia, Wrocław 1990.
16. Wróblewski J., Sądowe stosowanie prawa, Warszawa 1972.
17. Wróblewski J., Zagadnienia teorii wykładni prawa ludowego, Warszawa 1959.
18. Zabala S., The hermeneutic nature of analytic philosophy: a study of Ernst Tugendhat, New York 2008.
19. Zirk-Sadowski M., Wprowadzenie, w: Dworkin R., Imperium prawa, Warszawa 2006.
    

University of Gdańsk

Abstract: During his academic career Ronald Dworkin did not show much interest in the fundamental philosophical questions on international legal issues. This had changed towards the end of his life when he wrote an article titled „A New Philosophy for International Law” published posthumously. The aim of this article is to summarise the key arguments of Dworkin’s approach, address some of its critics as well as to suggest the possibility of further development of this discussion in the context of current global constitutionalism. In the first part, three thesis of Dworkin’s approach are reconstructed. The first one claims that international law requires interpretative understanding which should be grounded in the political morality of the international community. The second thesis can be formulated as follows: the legitimacy of political power at the national and international levels is uniform. The third thesis demands the implementation of the principle of salience in international law as the basic structural principle. After discussing critically Dworkin’s theory, in second part the article proposes a constitutional interpretation of the new philosophy for international law. Two conditions of global constitutionalism have to be satisfied by the theory in order to consider it as a constitutionalist approach. The first condition is the primacy of individual rights and second is the primacy of constitutional norms within the system. The conclusion is that the conditions are satisfied for Dworkin’s new philosophy of international law and his principle of salience is in fact a deeply constitutional arrangement based on moral justification. Dworkin’s proposal constitutes only a rough sketch, however there is a potential for developments. Lawyers and philosophers have at least an intellectual responsibility for building new viable theoretical models for international law.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, international law, international society, principle of salience, global constitutionalism, constitutionalization of international law, international legal theory, global law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 64-77.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads: 491

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.

Keywords: legal interpretation, meaning, Stanley Fish, Ronald Dworkin, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(11)/2015, p. 86-105.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads: 599