Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Załuski
Jagiellonian University in Kraków
Abstract: The paper examines the concept of social rights from both the analytical and philosophical perspective. In the first part of the paper a distinction is made between social rights in the strict sense (called in the paper “Type 1 social rights”), which can be decomposed into the Hohfeldian incidents, and social rights which resemble norm-goals and therefore cannot be decomposed into the Hohfeldian incidents (these rights are called in the paper “Type 2 social rights”). It is argued that even though Type 1 social rights are rights in the strict sense, they exhibit certain idiosyncrasies distinguishing them from “classical” rights, among which the most striking idiosyncrasy is their double correlation to duties. The second, philosophical part presents various ways in which social rights can be justified. A special emphasis is laid on the justification appealing to the concept of autonomy. Some standard criticisms of social rights are also evaluated.
Language: English
Keywords: social rights, Hohfeldian incidents, autonomy, paternalism, subsidiarity principle
Published: Number 2(13)/2016, pp. 76-84.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2016.2.76
Download file: Download
Number of downloads: 426