University of Gdańsk

Abstract: The article analyses the film Inherit the Wind, directed by Stanley Kramer in 1960, according to a screenplay inspired by events of the so-called Scopes monkey trial, which took place in 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee (US). The filmmakers recreated fairly freely the motive of the controversial ‘trial of the century’, offering the viewers an allegory of political events of the 1950s instead of historical accuracy. At the same time, it was a universal essay on the consequences of institutionalization of ideological and religious fundamentalism. The timeless appeal of Kramer’s motion picture can also be seen in the context of his positive commitment to legal ethics. The plot of the film is a clash of legal professionals, whose personalities are similar to two outstanding lawyers who actually participated in the monkey trial: William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow. Kramer’s film presents a positive role model of a lawyer, that is, defence counsel Drummond, contrasting him with the antihero: a lawyer and politician supporting the prosecution, called Brady. The film personalities of Drummond and Brady are reconstructed from the point of view of virtue ethics, using exemplarist moral theory by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, which enables giving a fuller picture of the created personages than in case of a deontic assessment of the moral validity of their individual acts.

Keywords: exemplarism, virtue ethics, legal ethics, virtue jurisprudence, monkey trial

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(26)/2021, s. 33-44.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.1.33

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University of Gdańsk

Abstract: This article focuses on the issue of applicability of virtue theory to legal theory in civil-law (statutory) jurisdictions and suggests research areas and problems in that respect. The author starts with an assumption that the notion of “virtue” and virtue ethics should be used for the purposes of legal theory starting from references to judicial ethics and normative theory of judicial decision-making. This approach looks especially promising for the purpose of systematizing the chaotic moral language that is being currently used in Poland in reference to judges, their skills, and qualities of their character, which in turn may lead to formulating an explanatory and normative theory of the judicial role that better addresses the observable deficiencies of legal deontology. The author suggests research that could proceed from interpretatively uncovering what are believed to be specific judicial virtues and vices, considering different aspects of the wider Polish and European legal culture of civil law countries (included but not limited to legal and ethical standards, public discourse, legal and other literature, historical and fictional examples, and role models). With respect to judicial ethics, existing virtue theories, including non-eudaimonistic ones, may be examined for the purpose of identifying the model of virtue best suited to the particular nature of the judicial profession. The aretaic (rather than deontological or consequentialist) perspective may enable legal scholarship to take a new path in the debate on the status and qualities of the judiciary, including the problems relating to judicial independence and the selection of candidates for judicial offices.

Keywords: virtue, virtue ethics, aretaic theory, judicial virtues, juristic virtues, virtue jurisprudence, judicial character

Language: English

Received: 31.05.2019
Accepted: 02.12.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 51-62.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.51

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Number of downloads: 755

University of Gdańsk

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 108-110.

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Number of downloads: 297

University of Gdańsk

Abstract: During his academic career Ronald Dworkin did not show much interest in the fundamental philosophical questions on international legal issues. This had changed towards the end of his life when he wrote an article titled „A New Philosophy for International Law” published posthumously. The aim of this article is to summarise the key arguments of Dworkin’s approach, address some of its critics as well as to suggest the possibility of further development of this discussion in the context of current global constitutionalism. In the first part, three thesis of Dworkin’s approach are reconstructed. The first one claims that international law requires interpretative understanding which should be grounded in the political morality of the international community. The second thesis can be formulated as follows: the legitimacy of political power at the national and international levels is uniform. The third thesis demands the implementation of the principle of salience in international law as the basic structural principle. After discussing critically Dworkin’s theory, in second part the article proposes a constitutional interpretation of the new philosophy for international law. Two conditions of global constitutionalism have to be satisfied by the theory in order to consider it as a constitutionalist approach. The first condition is the primacy of individual rights and second is the primacy of constitutional norms within the system. The conclusion is that the conditions are satisfied for Dworkin’s new philosophy of international law and his principle of salience is in fact a deeply constitutional arrangement based on moral justification. Dworkin’s proposal constitutes only a rough sketch, however there is a potential for developments. Lawyers and philosophers have at least an intellectual responsibility for building new viable theoretical models for international law.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, international law, international society, principle of salience, global constitutionalism, constitutionalization of international law, international legal theory, global law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 64-77.

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Number of downloads: 490