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	<title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej</title>
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		<title>„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/1971/are-we-all-feminists-now-wyzwania-ze-strony-feministycznej-jurysprudencji-wobec-tradycyjnej-teorii-prawa/</link>
					<comments>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/1971/are-we-all-feminists-now-wyzwania-ze-strony-feministycznej-jurysprudencji-wobec-tradycyjnej-teorii-prawa/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paweł Skuczyński]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Sep 2018 19:49:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Artykuły]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jurysprudencja feministyczna]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[obiektywizm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[subiektywizm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tradycyjna teoria prawa]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=1971</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Dr Lidia Rodak Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The potential of Feminist Jurisprudence is mainly built on its criticism of Traditional Jurisprudence. Through the deconstruction of the latter’s main categories such as objectivity,justice, equality, and rationality, Feminist Jurisprudence aims to demonstrate that Traditional Jurisprudence tends to mask inequality, exclusion and lack of [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Dr Lidia Rodak</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach</span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Abstrakt w języku angielskim:</strong> The potential of Feminist Jurisprudence is mainly built on its criticism of Traditional Jurisprudence. Through the deconstruction of the latter’s main categories such as objectivity,justice, equality, and rationality, Feminist Jurisprudence aims to demonstrate that Traditional Jurisprudence tends to mask inequality, exclusion and lack of recognition rather than beingable to bring about change or provide the values under research. What is more, FJ indicates a wide range of topics that are not explored by Traditional Jurisprudence and thus have nochance to be dealt with using traditional tools. As a result, Feminist Jurisprudence provides a separate language, a different epistemology and methodological tools that can broadenaccess to justice including all subjects by giving them recognition. What follows from thesetwo approaches to jurisprudence and two distinct sets of epistemological assumptions isa different understanding of the subject and a different vision of social relations. As Feminist Jurisprudence convincingly shows, traditional law, with its inclination for objectivity defendslegal norms as part of the legal and social order rather than an individual autonomy andintegrity of subjects. In this paper I would like to suggest a middle-way solution going beyondthe dualistic categories of objectivity and subjectivity. The proposal calls for a deep structuralchange of the legal discourse as the only one that really matters from the feminist point of view.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Słowa kluczowe: </strong>jurysprudencja feministyczna, tradycyjna teoria prawa, obiektywizm, subiektywizm</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Język artykułu:</strong> polski</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Opublikowano:</strong> Numer 1(8)/2014, s. 67-76</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Ściągnij plik:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=1946" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-1946 ext-pdf">Download</a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Liczba ściągnięć: </strong>411</p>
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