Research article

Trzy modele regulacji instrumentów pochodnych. Kilka uwag o powiązaniach pomiędzy teorią ekonomiczną a ewolucją prawa

Autorzy artykułu
  1. Mariusz J. Golecki

Three Models of Derivatives’ Regulation. Some Thoughts on the Entanglement between Economic Theory and the Evolution of Law

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(4)/2012, s. 5-22

polski

Abstrakt

Celem tekstu jest analiza czy ewolucja opcji, kontaktów terminowych i innych instrumentów pochodnych jest efektem szerszego wpływu rozwoju rynków finansowych i teorii ekonomicznych na system prawny. Stanowi to część szerszego zagadnienia, tj. stosunku prawa do ryzyka, niepewności i spekulacji. Stąd istotnym jest zbadanie, czy ostatnie regulacje dotyczące rynków finansowych i zwolnienie takich transakcji jak opcje, kontrakty terminowe lub tzw. kontrakty swap, dokonane poprzez ich wyłączenie z istniejących regulacji antyspekulacyjnych (lub zniesienie większości z tych regulacji) może mieć szerszy wpływ na pojęcie ryzyka w prawie i teorii regulacji.

Słowa kluczowe

  • teoria ekonomiczna
  • ekonomiczna analiza prawa
  • instrumenty pochodne
  • ewolucja prawa
  • rynek finansowy

angielski

Abstract

The paper aims at analysing whether the evolution of options, futures and other derivatives is an effect of a wider impact of the evolution of financial market and economic theories upon legal system. This constitutes, however, a part of a wider topic, namely the legal approach to risk, uncertainty and speculation. Thus it is crucial to examine whether recent regulation of financial markets and exempting such transactions as options, futures or swaps, performed by set-off from the existing anti-speculative regulation (or abolishing of the majority of anti-speculative rules) may have a wider impact on the notion of risk in law and theory of regulation.

Keywords

  • economic theory of law
  • law and economics
  • derivative
  • evolution of law
  • financial market
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Bibliografia

66 pozycji bibliograficznych

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Informacje o publikacji

Autor i afiliacja

Mariusz J. Golecki

University of Łódź

Dane wydania

Numer nr 1(4)/2012

Strony
5-22
Opublikowano
DostępOpen LicencjaCC BY 4.0 ↗

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Format AFPiFS

M. J. Golecki, Trzy modele regulacji instrumentów pochodnych. Kilka uwag o powiązaniach pomiędzy teorią ekonomiczną a ewolucją prawa, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(4)/2012, s. 5–22, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2012.1.5