Artykuł naukowy
„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa
Are we all feminists now’’? The Challenge of Feminist Jurisprudence to Traditional Legal Theory
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(8)/2014, s. 67-76
polski
Abstrakt
The potential of Feminist Jurisprudence is mainly built on its criticism of Traditional Jurisprudence. Through the deconstruction of the latter’s main categories such as objectivity,justice, equality, and rationality, Feminist Jurisprudence aims to demonstrate that Traditional Jurisprudence tends to mask inequality, exclusion and lack of recognition rather than beingable to bring about change or provide the values under research. What is more, FJ indicates a wide range of topics that are not explored by Traditional Jurisprudence and thus have nochance to be dealt with using traditional tools. As a result, Feminist Jurisprudence provides a separate language, a different epistemology and methodological tools that can broadenaccess to justice including all subjects by giving them recognition. What follows from thesetwo approaches to jurisprudence and two distinct sets of epistemological assumptions isa different understanding of the subject and a different vision of social relations. As Feminist Jurisprudence convincingly shows, traditional law, with its inclination for objectivity defendslegal norms as part of the legal and social order rather than an individual autonomy andintegrity of subjects. In this paper I would like to suggest a middle-way solution going beyondthe dualistic categories of objectivity and subjectivity. The proposal calls for a deep structuralchange of the legal discourse as the only one that really matters from the feminist point of view.
Słowa kluczowe
- jurysprudencja feministyczna
- tradycyjna teoria prawa
- obiektywizm
- subiektywizm
angielski
Abstract
The potential of Feminist Jurisprudence is mainly built on its criticism of Traditional Jurisprudence. Through the deconstruction of the latter’s main categories such as objectivity, justice, equality, and rationality, Feminist Jurisprudence aims to demonstrate that Traditional Jurisprudence tends to mask inequality, exclusion and lack of recognition rather than beingable to bring about change or provide the values under research. What is more, FJ indicates a wide range of topics that are not explored by Traditional Jurisprudence and thus have nochance to be dealt with using traditional tools. As a result, Feminist Jurisprudence provides a separate language, a different epistemology and methodological tools that can broaden access to justice including all subjects by giving them recognition. What follows from thesetwo approaches to jurisprudence and two distinct sets of epistemological assumptions is a different understanding of the subject and a different vision of social relations. As Feminist Jurisprudence convincingly shows, traditional law, with its inclination for objectivity defends legal norms as part of the legal and social order rather than an individual autonomy and integrity of subjects. In this paper I would like to suggest a middle-way solution going beyondthe dualistic categories of objectivity and subjectivity. The proposal calls for a deep structuralchange of the legal discourse as the only one that really matters from the feminist point of view.
Keywords
- Feminist Jurisprudence
- traditional jurisprudence
- objectivity
- subjectivity
Bibliografia
31 pozycji bibliograficznych
Literatura
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Informacje o publikacji
Dane wydania
Numer nr 1(8)/2014
- Strony
- 67-76
- Opublikowano
Jak cytować
Opis bibliograficzny i zweryfikowane formaty eksportowe.
Format AFPiFS
L. Rodak, „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(8)/2014, s. 67–76, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67
ACM
[1] Lidia Rodak. 2014. „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa. AFPiFS 1(8) (2014), 67–76. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67
ACS
(1) Rodak, L. „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa. AFPiFS 2014, No. 1(8), 67–76. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
APA
Rodak, L. (2014). „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(8), 67–76. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67
ABNT
RODAK, Lidia. „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, n. 1(8), p. 67–76, 2014.
Chicago
Rodak, Lidia. “„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(8) (2014): 67–76. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
Harvard
Rodak, L. (2014) “„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(8), pp. 67–76. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
IEEE
[1] L. Rodak, “„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa,” AFPiFS, no. 1(8), pp. 67–76, 2014, doi: 10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
MLA
Rodak, Lidia. “„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(8), 2014, pp. 67–76, https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
Turabian
Rodak, Lidia. “„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(8) (2014): 67–76. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67.
Vancouver
1. Rodak L. „Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa. AFPiFS. 2014;1(8):67–76. doi:10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67
OSCOLA
Lidia Rodak, ‘„Are we all feminists now”? Wyzwania ze strony Feministycznej Jurysprudencji wobec tradycyjnej teorii prawa’ (2014) 1(8) AFPiFS 67 <https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2014.1.67>.