University of Wrocław

English abstract: There is no agreement as to whether academic freedom is a variation (perhaps a subset) of freedom of speech – which is individual in its character and which governs a person’s relations with other persons and with the state – or a cluster of rules unlike freedom of speech, which has a different origin and which is enjoyed by the academic community as a whole. Irrespective of which of these claims is true, some concepts that originated in US case law on the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may well be imported to the discourse on the scope of academic freedom held within the civil law tradition. In light of both the functionalist and natural law positions on the nature of freedom of speech, this article argues three points about the normative environment of academia: first, academic freedom (freedom of research, freedom of teaching) is rooted in natural human curiosity and urge to communicate; second, the error-correcting features of the scientific method are consistent with self-correcting features observed in static normative systems such as systems of professional ethics in professions of public trust; third, any normative environment of the academia must conform with the notions of content neutrality and a marketplace of ideas. These points suggest that academic freedom cannot be subject to limitations, whether external (relating to law, scoring systems or funding) or internal (relating to non-merit based themes of discourse).

Key words: freedom of speech, academic freedom, content neutrality, marketplace of ideas, ethics

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 112–124.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.112

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University of Wrocław

English abstract: Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: Ronald Dworkin, academic freedom, freedom of speech, academic teacher, culture of independence

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.96

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University of Wrocław

English abstract:Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: academic freedom, freedom of expression, culture wars, Stanley Fish, university teacher

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 77–95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.77

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Social Sciences University of Ankara

Dr. Olcay Karacan

Cukurova University

English abstract: The question of freedom of expression involves more than just the ability to voice an idea; it also encompasses the broader context in which such expression emerges. Nevertheless, in legal discussions the focus is often narrowed to the boundaries of what may or may not be said. These discussions frequently remain confined within a binary framework of restriction versus protection, primarily through legal instruments, and seldom move beyond this limited perspective. In line with Schauer’s view, the legal approach tends to classify and reach definitive judgments “by its very nature”. Yet, as Schauer himself underlines, this does not mean that freedom of expression and/or academic freedom is valuable solely for its own sake. Schauer’s framework, therefore, offers a way to move past the confines of strictly legalistic debates. He provides not only a legal but also a philosophical basis for examining how expression is either restricted or protected.

This article does not attempt to explore the entirety of Schauer’s arguments on freedom of expression. Instead, it concentrates on evaluating how the Turkish administrative judiciary approaches academic freedom of expression, particularly from the point of view of the tension between restriction and protection. The central question it addresses is: What are the protective and restraining dynamics shaping academic freedom of expression in the case law of Turkish administrative courts, especially in the context of the Academics for Peace? Drawing on Schauer’s analysis of the instrumental function of expression and the institutional limits placed on academic freedom, the article argues that the core issue lies not only within the judiciary but also in structural constraints, such as universities and academic hierarchies, that may foster self-censorship.

Keywords:freedom of expression, academic freedom, Frederick Schauer, Turkish administrative judiciary, Academics for Peace, self-censorship

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 46–57.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.46

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Jagiellonian University

English abstract: The results show that students relatively commonly demand that such persons be dismissed from the university or banned from academic activities: application of the harshest consequences was proposed at least once by 38% of respondents. The survey also showed that the respondents’ worldview had a key influence on their decisions: when it was in line with the worldview described in the story, respondents were much more accepting. Meanwhile, neither gender, age, nor the declared value attributed to freedom of speech were significant predictors of acceptance. The obtained results significantly contribute to the discussion about contemporary trends in freedom of speech restriction in academia. They should be taken into account when planning actions aiming at safeguarding academic freedoms. They can also help better understand the sources of academic punitiveness and draw attention to the risks associated with its subjective nature.

Keywords: academic debate, freedom of speech, academic freedom, cancel culture, punitiveness, worldview

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 21–45.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.21

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University of Wrocław

English abstract: In presenting this special issue of the “Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej. Journal of the Polish Section of IVR”, we would like not only to briefly introduce the contents of the individual articles that make up this volume but also to attempt to outline the field of research we are entering. We pursue these tasks in the following order. In the introductory section (1) we present the reasons why it is important and necessary today to address the titular issue. Next, we clarify the notion of the “academic teacher” (2). We then discuss the relationship between “freedom of speech” and “academic freedom”, noting that the relation is far less obvious than it might initially appear (3). Subsequently, we propose a division of the spheres of academic expression into three complementary areas, while emphasizing the preliminary and provisional nature of this distinction (4). In the next section (5) we outline one of the core disputes in the field of academic freedom, namely the opposition between activism and passivism. The final section (6) reviews the content of the articles included in this volume.

Keywords: freedom of speech, academic teacher, academic freedom

Language: English

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 5–20.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.5

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University of Wrocław

English abstract: Today, academic freedom is increasingly contested amid intensifying culture wars and political polarisation, both within and beyond university walls. Traditional liberal and critical defences of academic freedom—grounded in universal rights, public good, or transformative critique – appear conceptually fragile and normatively overstretched. This paper reconstructs and critically evaluates Stanley Fish’s deflationary and professionalist conception of academic freedom, as developed in Versions of Academic Freedom. Drawing on Fish’s neopragmatist and anti-foundationalist framework, the paper argues that academic freedom cannot be defended by appealing to abstract ideals or external social functions, but only by reference to the immanent logic of disciplinary practice. Fish’s model posits that academic freedom is the limited freedom to perform professional tasks – teaching and research – according to internal standards of scholarly rigour, not a licence for personal expression or political activism. While his approach offers a coherent and context-sensitive alternative to foundationalist accounts, the paper argues that it is insufficient to address the ethical and political challenges of contemporary academia. The paper proposes that defending academic freedom today requires both Fish’s realism about professional constraints and a critical awareness of the political forces shaping knowledge production – an uncomfortable balancing act on the tightrope of post-foundational thought.

Keywords: academic freedom, professionalism, neopragmatism.

Language: English

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 136-153.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.136

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