University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw

English abstract: The article analyses the constitutional norm on gender equality referred to in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 and the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija) of 1992. The author tries to answer the question of how the principle of gender equality is enshrined in the two most important normative acts for both countries, which have the highest legal force in the system of legal sources. The scope of research interests therefore includes the issue of constitutional regulations and their impact on the participation of women in the governments of both surveyed countries, their national parliaments, and the European Parliament. The current democratic deficit can be viewed from the point of view of underrepresentation of women in political structures. The participation of women increases the legitimacy of democratic institutions and contributes to reducing gender inequalities in public life. Building awareness of the role of public institutions in the field of equal opportunities regardless of gender corresponds to the principle of social justice, according to which women and men should have equal access to high offices, including the national and European parliaments. Equality and justice are the core values and essence of democracy. A feature of particular importance is gender equality. A reliable basis for defining it is provided by the constitution, therefore the article presents how its provisions may have an impact on women’s participation in the political sphere.

Keywords: constitution, the principle of gender equality, political participation of women, underrepresentation, government, parliament

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(31)/2022, pp. 70-83.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.2.70

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Number of downloads: 335

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University of Warsaw

English abstract: The time of changes taking place in the constitutional order, both constitutional and fait accompli changes, is undoubtedly an interesting opportunity for in-depth analyses. These analyses can be made from various perspectives. The authors focus on three basic perspectives – that of law, philosophy and political science – in order to investigate what they refer to as constitutional fidelity. The limited framework of the paper only permits providing an introduction to the subject. In this text, the authors indicate the basic categories of constitutional fidelity, reflect on the dimensions of this fidelity, and try to propose a solution to the puzzle of the future of Polish constitutionalism. The entire analysis repeatedly refers to sociological and, to some extent, psychological categories, because constitutional fidelity is, first of all, a proper civic attitude and a relationship, the awareness of which is often only discovered at a moment of crisis.

Keywords: constitution, constitutionalism, fidelity to the constitution, constitutional crisis, legal interpretation, civic society

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(30)/2022, pp. 17-32

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.1.17

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Number of downloads: 383

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University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: Animal protection as an emerging field of legislation needs to be constitutionalized as well as comprehensively expounded by legal scholars. As it is a growing body of regulation and accompanying legal theories, it needs to develop a solid conceptual and axiological framework, in particular a set of basic values and principles on which detailed rules are to be founded. Lacking these, the domain of animal law is still in the pre-paradigm stage and remains an assemblage of dispersed ideas, concepts and regulatory measures. It yet has to develop into a coherent whole that may grow to be a mature regulatory and doctrinal domain of the law. In order to reach this stage, it should be founded on clear theoretical and constitutional grounds. Lacking those, its further development, and effective operation may be seriously impeded. There seem to be two basic approaches that may serve as the possible foundations for a viable model of animal protection law. The first may be referred to as the “dignity” approach and the other, as the “sentientist” approach. According to the first of those two approaches, animal protection law should rely on the concept of animal dignity as its philosophical foundation. The second approach rejects the idea that the concept of animal dignity as the basis for the relevant legislation as philosophically dubious and entailing objectionable normative consequences for the scope and content of legal protections of animals. Thus, it aims rather at legal norms and policies being based directly on scientifically informed theories of sentience, evolutionarily developed nervous structures underlying cognitive and emotional capabilities or species-typical biological and psychological needs that condition the subjective well-being of a given creature. The aim of this paper is to analyse and discuss both these approaches and to argue that the former is philosophically, conceptually and practically flawed. The second approach, even despite some serious disadvantages, is therefore deemed to be preferable and more promising.

Keywords: animals, dignity, rights, law, constitution, ethics

Language: English

Published: Number 2(27)/2021, pp. 69-82.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.69

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Number of downloads: 497

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University of Łódź

English abstract: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.

Keywords: American jurisprudence, legal interpretation, rules of interpretation, Constitution

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 125-133

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Number of downloads: 337