The University of Wrocław

English abstract: This article aims to theoretically expose the claim that the choice between framing the activity of courts in hard cases as “purely political” or “purely juridical” activity is a false choice. I achieve this goal in the following way. First, I introduce the notion of an epistemic account of the internal point of view, which is linked to the conditions of legal cognition. Then I propose a distinction between a strong and weak account of the internal point of view so understood. Such criteria as the autonomy of the law, the relevance of the subject factor in the application of the law, or the arguability of the content of the law play a fundamental role here. Next, I provide a more detailed characterization of the strong view of the internal point of view and the weak one. I try to show that a sharp line between what is legal and what is political is possible only with the adoption of a strong account of the internal point of view. At the same time, I give reasons why such an account of the internal point of view should be rejected. In the concluding section, I briefly summarize the most important findings.

Keywords: internal point of view, legal cognition, Hart

Language: Polish

Published: nr 4(41)/2024, pp. 19-35.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.19

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