SGH Warsaw School of Economics

Abstract: Subject of consideration in this article remains the problem of changing direction of interpretation in judicial-administrative jurisprudence, which sometimes produces consequences similar to the effects of a legislative change. Against this background, the authors attempt to formulate a description of the practice of application of law, i.e. to present jurisprudential arguments supporting decision on the scope of application of interpreted legal norm, as well as to reconstruct underlying assumptions. Using an example of two groups of selected judgments, authors consider cases in which argumentation of the temporal scope of impact of a particular interpretative direction appears in the justifications of administrative court decisions. The analysis carried out confirms that although courts generally assume the retrospective impact of interpretation, in a situation where the content of the derived legal norm fundamentally deviates from previous interpretative practice, they seek legitimization of their actions by justifying the intertemporal decision with constitutional values. These values provide an essential interpretive framework reflecting the cultural model prevalent in the native legal communication community. If courts perceive a risk of violating the values underlying the prohibition of retroactivity, such as legal certainty or principle of trust in public authorities, they indicate reasons for limiting the temporal scope of interpretation pro futuro, or on the contrary, for its effect ex tunc. Against this background, the retrospective effect of interpretation appears not as a consequence of interpretation being made, but rather as a kind of interpretative presumption that can be rebutted or confirmed if arguments are made that allow the interpretation to apply only to future states, or that give additional suport for retrospective application of new interpretation.

Keywords: change of interpretation, temporal limits, administrative courts, retrospectivity, legal certainty, principle of trust in public authorities, justification.

Language: polish

Opublikowano: nr 2(39) 2024, s. 5-18.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.5

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Number of downloads: 237

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Masaryk University

English abstract: This paper analyses Robert Alexy’s explicative-existential justification of human rights. The author identifies several problems that are associated with it. An analysis of Alexy’s explicative argument suggests that it cannot cope with the transition from facts to norms. Notably, this argument does not explain why its requirements cannot be overruled by some other moral reason (for example, the utility principle). The answer that Alexy offers in his existential argument is not considered sufficient by the author of this paper. Although this argument complements the necessary normative premises, the existential decision preferred by Alexy is not the only one necessary. It can be admitted that for many people such a decision is attractive. However, even if we accept that explicative-existential justification is credible in some context, it is correct to apply it only to the rights of persons and not to the rights of human beings. In the final part, the author shows that the claim that this theory can justify even the rights of human beings who are not persons is indefensible.

Keywords: human rights, justification, explicative-existential justification, is-ought problem, universality of human rights

Language: English

Published: Number 2(27)/2021, pp. 5-15.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.2.5

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Number of downloads: 420

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.