The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege as a Source for Search for the Limits of Linguistic Interpretation in Criminal Law?

Redakcja — Wed, 17 Jun 2020 09:37:01 +0000

Prof. UŚ dr hab. Sławomir Tkacz

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is nowadays recognized as the standard of the rule of law. This doctrine prohibits the use of analogies and extensive interpretation of legal provisions to the disadvantage of the perpetrator. The starting point of these considerations is that texts of criminal provisions vary in nature. Therefore a question should be asked about the nature of these prohibitions in relation to various provisions. A separate problem is to distinguish inference by analogy from legal interpretation. The presented considerations are aimed at answering the question whether the nullum crimen sine lege principle allows determining the linguistic limits for the interpretation of criminal law. The analyses are illustrated by examples from the field of criminal case law. The article aims to provide reflection on the acceptable limits of interpretation of criminal law, if such limits can be defined. The considerations end with general conclusions.

Keywords: nullum crimen sine lege, limits of legal interpretation, legal interpretation, criminal law, theory of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 81-95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.81

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Limits of Interpretive Disagreements in Jurisprudence

Redakcja — Wed, 17 Jun 2020 09:14:17 +0000

Dr hab. Adam Dyrda, prof. dr hab. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Does legal interpretation have borders? Are these borders conventionally established? What makes the given ‘legal reasons’, set forth by certain normative theories of legal interpretation, acceptable in legal discourse (even if the reasons are wrong)? In the present paper, we argue that the notion of the borders of legal interpretation is linked to the general notion of the borders of law. We indicate the scope of ‘interpretive theoretical disagreements’ in law, as discussed by certain new, ‘institutional’ versions of legal positivism. Interpretive borders are not fully determined by the given ‘institutional’ framework. In our view, these borders are also more generally determined inter alia by certain truistic (platitudinous) beliefs related to law and interpretation.

Keywords: interpretive methodology, limits of legal interpretation, legal positivism, second-order rules of legal interpretation, normative theories of legal interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 19-34.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.19