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	<title>Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej</title>
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	<description>Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)</description>
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		<title>Intentional Character of the Interpretation of the Holy Scripture and the Interpretation of Law</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/6330/intentional-character-of-the-interpretation-of-the-holy-scripture-and-the-interpretation-of-law/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja (Mateusz Pękala)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 16:51:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[exegesis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Holy Scripture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intentionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[textualism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=6330</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Mgr Paweł T. SKOCZYKŁODA University of Silesia in Katowice English abstract: The article aims to compare the process of interpreting law with that of interpreting the Holy Scripture. The study focuses on the issue of the interpretative approach adopted for interpretation in both above-mentioned branches of study. An appropriate interpretative approach determines the meaning of the [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Mgr Paweł T. SKOCZYKŁODA</strong></h3>
<h4>University of Silesia in Katowice</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>English abstract: </strong>The article aims to compare the process of interpreting law with that of interpreting the Holy Scripture. The study focuses on the issue of the interpretative approach adopted for interpretation in both above-mentioned branches of study. An appropriate interpretative approach determines the meaning of the text, which presupposes its correct interpretation. As part of the study, an analysis is undertaken of the interpretative assumptions, expounded in legal scholarship, which assumptions underlie the process of legal interpretation. The concept of interpretation of the sacred text that is recognized in biblical hermeneutics is presented. It turns out that despite the fact that law and the Bible are obviously different from each other, both legal theory and biblical hermeneutics were developed and largely based on the same concept of interpretation – intentionalism – identifying the meaning of utterances with meaning intended by the author of the statement. The conducted analysis enables formulating a general conclusion that only intentionalism makes it possible to discover the full and proper sense of the analyzed utterance.</p>
<p><strong>Keywords: </strong>interpretation, statutory interpretation, exegesis, Holy Scripture, intentionalism, textualism</p>
<p><strong>Language: </strong>Polish</p>
<p><strong>Published:</strong> Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 98-110</p>
<p><strong>DOI: </strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.98">https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.98</a></p>
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<strong>Number of downloads:</strong> 307</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><span lang="en-US">This text is licensed under a </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"><span lang="en-US">Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License</span></a><span lang="en-US">.</span></p>
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		<title>Legality as Compliance with the Intention of the Legislator. The Understanding of Legality in Józef Nowacki’s Works</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/6199/legality-as-compliance-with-the-intention-of-the-legislator-the-understanding-of-legality-in-jozef-nowackis-works/</link>
					<comments>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/6199/legality-as-compliance-with-the-intention-of-the-legislator-the-understanding-of-legality-in-jozef-nowackis-works/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja (Mateusz Pękala)]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Oct 2023 10:38:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intention of the legislator]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rule of law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory interpretation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=6199</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt TOBOR University of Silesia in Katowice English abstract: The issue of legality is one of the most important threads in the scientific achievements of Professor Józef Nowacki. He distinguished two ways of understanding legality: a stronger one, which boils down to determining the compliance of behaviour with the contents of a duly [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt TOBOR</strong></h3>
<h4>University of Silesia in Katowice</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>English abstract: </strong>The issue of legality is one of the most important threads in the scientific achievements of Professor Józef Nowacki. He distinguished two ways of understanding legality: a stronger one, which boils down to determining the compliance of behaviour with the contents of a duly enacted provision, and a weaker one, when the only legal basis is an obligation to employ a specific kind of evaluation. In the author’s opinion, Nowacki’s idea does not adequately take into account the fundamental problems with determining the meaning of a legal provision, i.e., problems of interpretation. The proposition that legality means compliance with the contents of a provision transfers the burden of making findings in this respect onto the subject interpreting it. The author discusses two approaches to statutory interpretation, i.e., the eclectic approach, in which there is no universal criterion for the correctness of interpretation, and the categorical approach, in which it is assumed that such a criterion exists. He points out that only a categorical approach can be reconciled with the idea of the rule of law and the role of judges as faithful agents of the legislator. Therefore, he proposes that compliance with the intention of the legislator should be taken as a criterion for the correctness of the interpretation. When legality is approached this way, the need to distinguish its stronger and weaker versions disappears. The qualification of a behaviour as legal or illegal will be based on the criterion of compliance with the intention of the legislator.</p>
<p><strong>Keywords: </strong>legality, rule of law, statutory interpretation, intention of the legislator</p>
<p><strong>Language: </strong>Polish</p>
<p><strong>Published:</strong> Number 3(36)/2023, s. 34-43.</p>
<p><strong>DOI: </strong>https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.3.34</p>
<p><strong>Download:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=6239" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-6239 ext-pdf">Download</a><br />
<strong>Number of downloads:</strong> 263</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><span lang="en-US">This text is licensed under a </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"><span lang="en-US">Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License</span></a><span lang="en-US">.</span></p>
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		<title>Linguistic Corpora as a Tool of Statutory Interpretation: American Theory and Practice</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/3962/linguistic-corpora-as-a-tool-of-statutory-interpretation-american-theory-and-practice/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Dec 2020 20:12:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corpus linguistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[linguistic corpora]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US case law]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=3962</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, dr Mateusz Zeifert University of Silesia in Katowice English abstract: In American adjudicating practice and theory of statutory interpretation, great attention is paid to the notion of ordinary meaning of legal text. In order to determine the ordinary meaning, judges usually refer to their own linguistic intuition or dictionaries &#8211; both [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, dr Mateusz Zeifert</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">University of Silesia in Katowice</span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>English abstract:</strong> In American adjudicating practice and theory of statutory interpretation, great attention is paid to the notion of ordinary meaning of legal text. In order to determine the ordinary meaning, judges usually refer to their own linguistic intuition or dictionaries &#8211; both these methods give rise to a number of reservations that have been expressed in legal literature for years. In the last few years, courts have also started using linguistic corpora for this purpose. Linguistic corpora are electronic collections of authentic texts in a given language which can be analyzed using IT tools (e.g. searches, frequency lists, concordances, collocations). Corpus research requires considerable linguistic knowledge and technical skills, and in return it offers statistical data that can reveal a lot about the semantic layer of language. The use of corpora by judges – first in state courts, later also in the federal Supreme Court – sparked lively academic discussion. In Polish literature, this issue has not been discussed so far, which is why the article is essentially of a reporting nature. First, an outline of corpus linguistics is presented. Then the history of the use of linguistic corpora by US courts is reconstructed. Finally, the legal discussion about corpora in the US is presented, with particular emphasis on voices approving their use and on critical voices.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords: </strong>statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics, linguistic corpora, US case law</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Language:</strong> Polish</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Published:</strong> Number 4(25)/2020, pp. 80-90.<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>DOI:</strong> <a href="https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.4.80">https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.4.80</a><strong><br />
</strong></span></p>
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<span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Number of downloads:</strong> 577</span></p>
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		<title>A Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union from the Perspective of Cognitive Theory of Prototypes: A Case Study</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/3513/a-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-from-the-perspective-of-cognitive-theory-of-prototypes-a-case-study/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2020 09:49:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[categorization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prototype theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[semantics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory interpretation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=3513</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Dr Mateusz Zeifert University of Silesia in Katowice English abstract: Interpretative doubts in the application of law are usually born of discrepancies between the statutory language and the non-linguistic reality. Therefore, they pose the problem of categorization. The theory of law and legal practice have for centuries been dominated by the classical theory of categorization, [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Dr Mateusz Zeifert</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">University of Silesia in Katowice</span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>English abstract:</strong> Interpretative doubts in the application of law are usually born of discrepancies between the statutory language and the non-linguistic reality. Therefore, they pose the problem of categorization. The theory of law and legal practice have for centuries been dominated by the classical theory of categorization, according to which conceptual categories can be described by a set of sufficient and necessary features. In the 1970s, an American researcher Eleanor Rosch conducted a series of psychological experiments that led her to question the classical theory and lay the foundations for an alternative one, known as the prototype theory. According to this approach, conceptual categories are organized around the most typical exemplars (prototypes), and membership of a category is measured by similarity to the prototype. Some of the consequences of such view are that category membership is a gradable feature and that the borderlines of categories are fuzzy. The article presents an outline of the prototype theory in the version used in cognitive linguistics. Its usefulness for the theory and practice of statutory interpretation is tested on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the concept of beer. In this judgment, the CJEU refused to define the concept of beer by setting requirements as to its raw material composition and ruled that beer is a product that has organoleptic characteristics of beer. This definition on the basis of classical theory appears to be tautological, however, it finds theoretical justification in the prototype theory. In conclusions, the author indicates research problems that must be taken up in order for the prototype theory to be reliably used in jurisprudence.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Keywords: </strong>categorization, semantics, prototype theory, statutory interpretation</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Language:</strong> Polish</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Published:</strong> Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 109-120.<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><strong>DOI: </strong><a href="https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.109">https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.109</a></span></p>
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<span style="color: #000000;"><strong>Number of downloads:</strong> 593</span></p>
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		<title>Legislative Materials as a Tool for Solving Grammatical Problems in Statutory Interpretation</title>
		<link>https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/2442/legislative-materials-as-a-tool-for-solving-grammatical-problems-in-statutory-interpretation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Redakcja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jan 2019 17:45:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[grammatical problems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legislative history]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legislative materials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mateusz Zeifert]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statutory interpretation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?p=2442</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Dr hab. Agnieszka Bielska Brodziak, Dr Mateusz Zeifert University of Silesia Abstract: The article begins with a presentation of an interpretative tool in the form of materials from the legislative process (legislative materials, legislative history), including arguments offered in the theory of law in favour and against their use for interpretation purposes. These matters are [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Dr hab. Agnieszka Bielska Brodziak, Dr Mateusz Zeifert<br />
</strong></h3>
<h4><span style="color: #808080;">University of Silesia </span></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Abstract: </strong>The article begins with a presentation of an interpretative tool in the form of materials from the legislative process (legislative materials, legislative history), including arguments offered in the theory of law in favour and against their use for interpretation purposes. These matters are then discussed with references to a specific type of interpretive problems, namely problems that stem from the grammatical constructions of the provisions of the law. The authors analyse five cases in which Polish courts reach for legislative materials in order to resolve doubts caused by sentence syntax, conjunctions or punctuation. The decisions issued vary – in their use of legislative materials courts deploy various other tools and values (e.g. vocabularies, formal logic, the ratio legis behind a provision or the rules of legislative procedure). The outcomes of such a confrontation are varied. Thus, the judgments presented here are a good illustration of the diversity of issues connected with the theoretical and practical aspects of the use of legislative materials in the process of interpreting the law. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Keywords:</strong> legislative history, legislative materials, statutory interpretation, grammatical problems<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Language:</strong> English<br />
</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Received:</strong> 02.10.2017<br />
<strong>Accepted:</strong> 15.12.2017</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Published:</strong> Number 2(17)/2018, pp. 18-34.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Download file:</strong> <a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/?ddownload=2437" title="Download" rel="nofollow" class="ddownload-link id-2437 ext-pdf">Download</a></span><br />
<span style="color: #333333;"><strong>Number of downloads: </strong>505</span></p>
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