Dr hab. Wioletta Jedlecka, prof. UWr

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The aim of this article is an attempt to conceptualize Jerzy Wroblewski’s theory of legal interpretation in the context of examining the influence of Marxism on interpretative practices. One of the legal theorists who undertook the task of demonstrating that Jerzy Wroblewski’s theory of interpretation is characterized by a philosophical stance rooted in the adoption of Marxist premises as the foundational philosophical assumptions underlying theoretical activities in legal science is Zbigniew Pulka. This article discusses three topics: (1) the Marxist philosophical stance – Marxist axiology, (2) people’s legal interpretation, (3) the clarificatory concept of interpretation.

Keywords: interpretation, Marxism, communism, J. Wróblewski, clarificatory concept of interpretation

Language: English

Published: Number 3(44)/2025, pp. 7-19.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.3.7

Download: Download

Number of downloads: 145

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

University of Silesia, Katowice

English abstract: The aim is to illustrate the complexity of the process of judicial updating of the meaning of a  legal text in changing circumstances (e.g. developments in technology and science, social  changes) and to answer the question of the role of courts and the legislator in making updates.  On the basis of an analysis of literature, legislation and judicial practice, the basic problems of  updating a legal text and their selected solutions were presented. The topic has been widely  discussed in the context of the Constitution, while the literature on updating statutes is still  relatively rare. Meanwhile, the dynamics of diverse external changes is intense. It has become  urgent to develop a theoretical framework for this issue. Courts, when updating, must ask themselves three questions. First, has there been a change? Second, what is the impact of the  change on the meaning? Third, is the judiciary allowed to update? Within each of them, the  question arises as to who is entitled to make a binding conclusion: the courts or the legislature.  Ad 1. The determination of a change is often not difficult, but in doubtful cases where there is  no general agreement that circumstances have changed, the courts would be well advised not to  update on their own, but to rely on the legislature’s assessment of the extent in dispute. Ad 2. Courts determine the updated meaning, primarily guided by the purpose of the regulation.  However, even when updating the same provisions, two different courts may come to different  conclusions. Ad 3. Courts update, inter alia, when they conclude that the failure to update is an  omission on the part of the legislature and consider themselves entitled to correct this error.  Significantly, in some countries, the ability of the courts to update arises from legislation: the  Irish and Spanish provisions governing the issue is set out in the text. 

Key words: Interpretation, construction in changing circumstanceseparation of powers, courts, dynamic interpretation, lawmaker.

Language: Polish

Published: no. 1(42)/2025, pp. 40-59.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.40

Download: Download

Number of downloads: 262

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The article aims to compare the process of interpreting law with that of interpreting the Holy Scripture. The study focuses on the issue of the interpretative approach adopted for interpretation in both above-mentioned branches of study. An appropriate interpretative approach determines the meaning of the text, which presupposes its correct interpretation. As part of the study, an analysis is undertaken of the interpretative assumptions, expounded in legal scholarship, which assumptions underlie the process of legal interpretation. The concept of interpretation of the sacred text that is recognized in biblical hermeneutics is presented. It turns out that despite the fact that law and the Bible are obviously different from each other, both legal theory and biblical hermeneutics were developed and largely based on the same concept of interpretation – intentionalism – identifying the meaning of utterances with meaning intended by the author of the statement. The conducted analysis enables formulating a general conclusion that only intentionalism makes it possible to discover the full and proper sense of the analyzed utterance.

Keywords: interpretation, statutory interpretation, exegesis, Holy Scripture, intentionalism, textualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 98-110

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.98

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 307

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

“Rerum Socialium” Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of Social Sciences,
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun

English abstract: The intention of the legislature, as a constitutive concept for intentionalism, is understood very differently by representatives of this trend and not only by them. The aim of this study is to familiarize the Polish reader with how intentions are understood by five authors: Stanley Fish, Larry Alexander, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Richard Ekins, and Victoria Nourse, as well as to conduct a comparative analysis of their views. This involves the use of a theoretical method consisting in the description of concepts and an attempt to compare them. In the light of the findings, it should be emphasized that Victoria Nourse’s views are more in line with the assumptions of purposivism than intentionalism. Stanley Fish and Larry Alexander represent a radical variety of intentionalism, on whose basis, due to radical ontological assumptions, it is not possible to build any methods of interpretation capable of practical application. Not so with Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Richard Ekins, who assume that the legislature acts in accordance with “simple common sense”.

Keywords: interpretation, intention, intentionalism, purposivism, originalism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 15-26.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.15

Download: Download
Number of downloads: 254

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

University of Silesia

Abstract: The purpose of the paper is to present a comparative analysis of the use of legislative materials in the process of statutory interpretation in Poland and Spain, by referring to statutes, theoretical literature and case law. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part shows that in difficult cases, when the text is not clear enough as an evidence of the legislator’s intention, other evidence should be sought, including the legislative materials. The second part delivers an analysis of the term ‘legislative materials’, followed by a study of particular examples of legislative materials, including bills and their justifications. It focuses especially on the issue of the Spanish exposiciones de motivos. Moreover, there is a reference to interpretative guidance contained in the legal regulations and to the ways in which legislative materials are used in case law. The third part of the paper responds, on the basis of Polish and Spanish theoretical literature, to some of the objections against the use of legislative materials, underlining its importance for the interpreting the law.

Keywords: legislative materials, legislative history, interpretation, intention, Spanish law, Polish law, ratio legis

Language: Original printed in Polish, English online translation

Received: 13.01.2018
Accepted: 19.04.2018

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 38-50

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.38ENG

Download file: Download
Number of downloads: 327

University of Wrocław

Abstract: In this paper, I analyse the political character of the interpretation of law and the political nature of the theory of legal interpretation from Stanley Fish’s neo-pragmatist perspective. In the first part of the text, I define the concept of politics and the political, borrowing from Chantal Mouffe. I clearly distinguish between the political, politics, and policy; this article uses the first concept (the political). In the second part of the article, I characterize hermeneutic universalism as one of the approaches to the problem of legal interpretation.

In the third part, following the characteristics of the concepts of interpretive communities as defined by Stanley Fish, I draw conclusions about the political nature of the interpretation of law and the theory of the interpretation of law. In conclusion, I analyse the possibilities of building a theory of legal interpretation that internalises the inherently political character of knowledge by analyzing the concept of post-analytical philosophy proposed in literature by Andrzej Bator.

Keywords: jurisprudence, the political, neopragmatism, interpretive community, hermeneutic universalism, interpretation

Language: Polish

Received: 13.06.2018
Accepted: 13.08.2018

Published: Number 3(18)/2018, pp. 24-37.

Download file: Download
Number of downloads: 546

University of Łódź

English abstract: The paper is the proposal of the discussion upon the utility of the cognitive linguistics’ tools for legal application, especially within the field of legal interpretation and legal reasoning. Cognitive linguistics is the school of linguistics and cognitive science, developing from 1970s of the XX century, researching on language and mind and their intersection. The analysis of the instances originating in the Polish law in force, made by the means of different concepts of cognitive linguistics (prototypes, radial categories, idealized cognitive models, conceptual metaphors) is here the basis to formulate some postulates concerning the way of understanding and differentiation between extensive interpretation and analogy. The instances and postulates simultaneously let one distinguish those linguistic changes, which inevitably occur in time, and which should be recognised as the domain of linguistic interpretation.

Keywords: cognitive linguistics, interpretation, extensive interpretation, legal reasoning, analogy

Language: Polish

Received: 29.09.2016
Accepted: 31.10.2016

Published: Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 125-140.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads: 540

Jagiellonian University

English abstract In the present paper, I attempt to answer three questions. First, whether the classical Gricean version of the implicature theory can be applied to describe legal discourse. Second, I provide an outline of one of the most popular theories of the pragmatics of legal language. Namely, Andrei Marmor’s theory of strategic speech. Strategic speech occurs mostly in indeterminate contexts, which contain elements that license even contradictory pragmatic inferences. Next, I attempt to flesh out the problematic points of this account. Third, I attempt to formulate a descriptive model of the strategic selectivity of pragmatic elements in the law, that could face the objections to Marmor’s ideas.

Keywords: conversational implicature, Paul Grice, pragmatics, interpretation, strategic speech

Language: Polish

Received: 06.10.2016
Accepted: 10.12.2016

Published: Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 115-124.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads: 444