Słowa kluczowe: rozum, emocje, bezstronność, decyzja sędziowska
Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Traditional philosophical tension between a reason and emotions has been a subject of increasing objections. As a result emotions are defended by pointing their connections with beliefs, value judgments to name just a few strategies. This paper also takes up an attempt of this sort showing that traditional definition of emotions with features of the process of application of law makes a threat from the emotions for the impartiality of a judge much less warranted than it might seem. What is more, an attempt is taken up to argue that feeling can be a chance for impartiality conceived as argumentative openness.
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M. Wojciechowski (2013) Rehabilitacja namiętności? Emocje a postulat bezstronności. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2013, nr 2(7), 71-77. https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/1989/rehabilitacja-namietnosci-emocje-a-postulat-bezstronnosci/.
