Dlaczego konwencjonalizm w prawie zawodzi

Adam Dyrda

doi:10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.14

Research article

Dlaczego konwencjonalizm w prawie zawodzi

Adam Dyrda

Why Legal Conventionalism Fails

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(10)/2015, s. 14-30

DOI 10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.14 ↗

Numer: nr 1(10)/2015
Strony: 14-30
Opublikowano: 2015
Język tekstu: polski

polski

Abstrakt

The term “legal conventionalism” covers a set of broadly discussed legal theories explaining the fact of law’s existence by reference to the “conventional rule of recognition”. Some of them are aspiring to be so-called “fully fledged theories of law” and explain the normativity of law by reference to the same fundamental, conventional fact. The article presents some recently discussed views (including the ideas of E. Lagerspetz, A. Marmor, S. Shapiro) alongside with counter-arguments showing why conventionalism fails. Eventually, the basic points of critique can be shaped in terms of the distinction between instrumental and substantial reason.

Słowa kluczowe

konwencjonalizm w prawie
Andrei Marmor
Scott J. Shapiro
Eemil Lagerspetz

angielski

Abstract

Keywords

legal conventionalism
Andrei Marmor
Scott J. Shapiro
Eemil Lagerspetz

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Bibliografia

21 pozycji bibliograficznych

Literatura

Adorno, T.W., Horkheimer, M. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bratman, M.E. (2011). Reflections on Law, Normativity and Plans. In S. Bertea, G. Pavlacos (Eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Oxford: Hart’s Publishing.
Coleman, J. (1982). Negative and Positive Positivism. Journal of Legal Studies 11/1, 139–164.
Coleman, J. (2001). The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dąmbska, I. (1975). O konwencjach i konwencjonalizmie. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Dickson, J. (2007). Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27/3, 373–402.
Dyrda, A. (2013). Konwencja u podstaw prawa. Kontrowersje pozytywizmu prawniczego. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.
Ebbs, G. (2011). Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention. Mind 478, 193–237.
Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hacker, P.M.S. (1977). Hart’s Philosophy of Law. In P.M.S. Hacker, J. Raz (Eds.), Law, Morality and Society. Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hart, H.L.A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lagerspetz, E. (2011). The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
MacCormick, N. (1994). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Marmor, A. (2009). Social Conventions: From Language to Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quine, W.V. (1960). Carnap and Logical Truth. Synthese 12/4, 350–374.
Perry, S. (2006). Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View. Fordham Law Review 75/3, 1171–1210.
Postema, G. (1982). Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law. Journal of Legal Studies 11/1, 165–204.
Shapiro, S. (2000). Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct. Legal Theory 6/2, 127–170.
Shapiro, S. (2011). Planning Agency and the Law. In S. Bertea, G. Pavlacos (Eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Oxford: Hart’s Publishing.
Smith, M.N. (2006). The Law as a Social Practice: Are Shared Activities at the Foundations of Law? Legal Theory 12/3, 265–292.

Informacje o publikacji

Autor i afiliacja

Adam Dyrda

Jagiellonian University

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3032-8221

Dane wydania

Numer nr 1(10)/2015

Strony: 14-30
Opublikowano: 2015
DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.14
PDF: Pełny tekst PDF

DostępOpen LicencjaCC BY 4.0 ↗

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Format AFPiFS

A. Dyrda, Dlaczego konwencjonalizm w prawie zawodzi, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(10)/2015, s. 14–30, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.14

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[ref-001] Adorno, T.W., Horkheimer, M. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[ref-002] Bratman, M.E. (2011). Reflections on Law, Normativity and Plans. In S. Bertea, G. Pavlacos (Eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Oxford: Hart’s Publishing.

[ref-003] Coleman, J. (1982). Negative and Positive Positivism. Journal of Legal Studies 11/1, 139–164.

[ref-004] Coleman, J. (2001). The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[ref-005] Dąmbska, I. (1975). O konwencjach i konwencjonalizmie. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.

[ref-006] Dickson, J. (2007). Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27/3, 373–402.

[ref-007] Dyrda, A. (2013). Konwencja u podstaw prawa. Kontrowersje pozytywizmu prawniczego. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.

[ref-008] Ebbs, G. (2011). Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention. Mind 478, 193–237.

[ref-009] Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[ref-010] Hacker, P.M.S. (1977). Hart’s Philosophy of Law. In P.M.S. Hacker, J. Raz (Eds.), Law, Morality and Society. Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[ref-011] Hart, H.L.A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[ref-012] Lagerspetz, E. (2011). The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

[ref-013] Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.

[ref-014] MacCormick, N. (1994). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[ref-015] Marmor, A. (2009). Social Conventions: From Language to Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[ref-016] Quine, W.V. (1960). Carnap and Logical Truth. Synthese 12/4, 350–374.

[ref-017] Perry, S. (2006). Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View. Fordham Law Review 75/3, 1171–1210.

[ref-018] Postema, G. (1982). Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law. Journal of Legal Studies 11/1, 165–204.

[ref-019] Shapiro, S. (2000). Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct. Legal Theory 6/2, 127–170.

[ref-020] Shapiro, S. (2011). Planning Agency and the Law. In S. Bertea, G. Pavlacos (Eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Oxford: Hart’s Publishing.

[ref-021] Smith, M.N. (2006). The Law as a Social Practice: Are Shared Activities at the Foundations of Law? Legal Theory 12/3, 265–292.

Dlaczego konwencjonalizm w prawie zawodzi

Abstrakt

Słowa kluczowe

Abstract

Keywords

Bibliografia

Literatura

Informacje o publikacji

Adam Dyrda

Numer nr 1(10)/2015

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