‘Tacit’ Declarations of Intent: Considerations in the Context of the Normative Concept of Omission

Keywords: declaration of will, omission, conventional act in law, philosophy of action

English abstract: From the point of view of the problems of dogmatics of civil law, this article aims to present a certain philosophical concept of omission and apply it to the development of the basic aspects of making declarations of will by omission. From the perspective of the general theory of law, this article is a part of a broader project aiming at theoretical elaboration of the problem of making conventional acts by omission using the achievements of the philosophy of action. This article proposes a way to conceptualize the declarations of will made by omission. The normative conception of omissions in the version proposed by Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman within the philosophy of action has been chosen for this task. Using the above conception allows putting in order, to some extent, the problem of making declarations of will by omission. It should be noted that some elements included in the normative concept of omission have been present in reflections on declarations of will made by omission for a long time. It is primarily about the role of the context of omission and the “should and could have spoken” argument used in the doctrine and the case law in the context of identifying declarations of will made by way of omission.

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