Archiwum Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii SpołecznejJournal of the Polish Section of IVR ISSN 2082-3304Logo of the Polish Section of IVRPolish Section of IVR ↗

Research article

The Very Idea of Legal Positivism

Article authors
  1. Stanley L. Paulson

Sedno idei pozytywizmu prawniczego

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 2(5)/2012, s. 20-35

DOI 10.36280/afpifs.2012.2.20 ↗
Issue
nr 2(5)/2012
Pages
20-35
Published
Article language
English

English

Abstract

Much in recent discussions on legal positivism suggests that the controversy surrounding the notion turns on the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. As a point of departure in distinguishing them, the separation principle is helpful. The separation principle counts as the contradictory of the morality principle, according to which there is “necessary overlap” between the law and morality. What the legal positivist’s denial of the morality principle comes to can be refined, we are told, by appealing to the distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. One can acquire a broader perspective by opening up the field in order to cover not only inclusive and exclusive legal positivism but also non-positivism, represented by the defence of the morality principle, that is the view that there is necessary overlap between the law and morality. Say what you will about inclusive versus exclusive legal positivism – some defend the distinction, others dismiss inclusive legal positivism as a non-starter. In any case, I want to argue that a far more fundamental distinction within the positivist camp lies elsewhere. The distinction I have in mind is that between legal positivism qua naturalism (J. Austin) and legal positivism without naturalism (H. Kelsen). For reasons institutional in nature, legal positivism has largely been discussed in a vacuum, there is a standing presumption to the effect that there are ties between legal positivism and ‘positivism writ large’ in the greater philosophical tradition – or, as it would be put in present-day philosophical circles, ties between legal positivism and naturalism.

Keywords

  • legal positivism
  • Hans Kelsen
  • The Separation Thesis
  • naturalism
  • normativism
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References

64 reference entries

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Publication information

Author and affiliation

Stanley L. Paulson

Uniwersytet Waszyngtona w St. Louis

Issue data

Issue nr 2(5)/2012

Pages
20-35
Published
AccessOtwarty LicenceCC BY 4.0 ↗

How to cite

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S. L. Paulson, The Very Idea of Legal Positivism, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 2(5)/2012, s. 20–35, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2012.2.20

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