Research article

Philosophical Analysis of Two Types of Legal Responsibility

Article authors
  1. Maciej Juzaszek

Analiza filozoficzna dwóch rodzajów odpowiedzialności prawnej

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 2(27)/2021, s. 16-25

English

Abstract

The paper presents some preliminary results of a philosophical analysis of the concept of legal responsibility, including its nature and types. It draws upon Anglo-American metaethical discussions of moral responsibility, which have abounded in philosophy after Peter F. Strawson’s landmark paper Freedom and Resentment. The author reconstructs two views on the nature of moral responsibility, the Strawsonian view and the ledger view (coming from Michael J. Zimmerman) and applies them to the concept of legal responsibility. The result is a distinction between two types of legal responsibility: attributability and accountability, which are characterized in the paper, which is an introduction to further research on legal responsibility (or liability) and its conditions.

Keywords

  • legal responsibility
  • legal liability
  • attributability
  • accountability
  • reactive attitudes
Full text PDF How to cite

References

21 reference entries

References

  1. Clarke, R., Clarke, R.K., McKenna, M., Smith, A.M. (eds.). (2015). The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

  2. Cuypers, S.E. (2019). The Strawsonian and Ledger Conception of Moral Responsibility. Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 68(171), 231-249.

  3. Enoch, D., Marmor, A. (2007). The case against moral luck. Law and Philosophy 26, 405-436.

  4. Fischer, J.M., Ravizza, M. (2000). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press.

  5. Hage, J. (2014). Conceptual tools for legislators Part 2: Pathways through the world of law. The Theory and Practice of Legislation 1, 278-304.

  6. Kane, R. (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  7. Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will, agency, and meaning in life. New York: Oxford University Press.

  8. Scanlon, T. (2000). What we owe to each other. Belknap Press.

  9. Shoemaker, D. (2015). Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford University Press.

  10. Shoemaker, D. (2017). Response-dependent responsibility; or, a funny thing that happened on the way to blame. The Philosophical Review 126, 481–527.

  11. Smiley, M. (2014). Future-looking collective responsibility: a preliminary analysis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38, 1-11.

  12. Smith, A.M. (2007). On being responsible and holding responsible. The Journal of Ethics 11, 465-484.

  13. Smith, A.M. (2015). Responsibility as answerability. Inquiry 58, 99-126.

  14. Strawson, P.F. (1974). Freedom and resentment, and other essays. Egmont Books.

  15. Todd, P. (2016). Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the “Order of Explanation”: An Intervention. Ethics 127, 208-240.

  16. Wallace, R.J. (1994). Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  17. Watson, G. (2014). Peter Strawson on responsibility and sociality. In D. Shoemaker, N. Tognazzini (eds.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 2 (pp. 15-32). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  18. Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck: philosophical papers 1973-1980. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

  19. Zimmerman, M.J. (1988). An essay on moral responsibility. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

  20. Zimmerman, M.J. (2006). Moral luck: A partial map. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, 585-608.

  21. Zimmerman, M.J. (2015). Varieties of Moral Responsibility. In R. Clarke, M. McKenna, A.M. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays (pp. 48). New York: Oxford University Press.

Publication information

Author and affiliation

Maciej Juzaszek

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Issue data

Issue nr 2(27)/2021

Pages
16-25
Published

How to cite

Bibliographic description and verified export formats.

Format AFPiFS

M. Juzaszek, Philosophical Analysis of Two Types of Legal Responsibility, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 2(27)/2021, s. 16–25, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2021.2.16