Archiwum Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii SpołecznejJournal of the Polish Section of IVR ISSN 2082-3304Logo of the Polish Section of IVRPolish Section of IVR ↗

Research article

Legal Realism and Functional Kinds: Michael Moore’s Metaphysically Reductionist Naturalism

Article authors
  1. Torben Spaak

Realizm prawniczy i rodzaje funkcjonalne. Metafizycznie redukcjonistyczny naturalizm Michaela Moore’a

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 2(27)/2021, s. 83-107

DOI 10.36280/afpifs.2021.2.83 ↗
Issue
nr 2(27)/2021
Pages
83-107
Published
Article language
English

English

Abstract

Michael Moore defends an account of scientific, mental, moral, and legal properties, according to which there are not only natural kinds, but also moral and functional kinds; and he maintains, more specifically that: 1) distinctively legal phenomena, such as legal rights, precedent, malice, etc. are functional kinds, in the sense that they have a nature that consists in the function they fulfill in law, 2) the function of a functional kind is that effect, or those effects, of the functional kind that causally contribute more than does any of its other effects to the goal of the larger system within which it occurs, and 3) functional kinds can be reduced to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, 4) the relevant version of naturalism is metaphysically reductionist naturalism, and 5) functional kinds play an indispensable role in the explanation of human behaviour. I argue, however, 1) that the method for determining the function of a (purported) functional kind proposed by Moore is too indeterminate to be able to pin down the function. I also argue 2) that it turns out to be very difficult to identify the properties that are part of the indefinitely large disjunction of natural properties which, on Moore’s analysis, is identical to a functional kind, 3) that functional kinds cannot be part of the best explanation of human behaviour, because they lack nomological unity, and that they lack such unity because they are necessarily multiply realizable, and 4) that Moore will therefore have to give up: a) the view that functional kinds are identical to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, b) the view that functional kinds are part of the best explanation of human behaviour, or both (a and b). I also argue 5) that the idea of a functional kind should not play a central role in any theory of law or legal reasoning.

Keywords

  • functional kinds
  • naturalism
  • realism
  • conventionalism
  • causal theory of meaning
  • nihilism
  • skepticism
Full text PDF How to cite

References

45 reference entries

References

  1. Bashour, B., Muller H.D. (2014). Exploring the Post-Darwinian Naturalist Landscape.

  2. In B. Bashour, H.D. Muller (eds.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications (pp. 1-14). London and New York: Routledge.

  3. Brink, D. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  4. Davidson, D. (1980). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 3-19). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  5. De Caro, M., Macarthur, D. ( 2004). Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism. In M. De Caro, D. Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question (pp. 1-17). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

  6. Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’ s Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press.

  7. Dworkin, R. (1996). Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 87-139.

  8. Fish, S. (1980). Is There a Text in This Class? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  9. Fish, S. (1989). Doing What Comes Naturally. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

  10. Fodor, J. (1974). Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis). Synthese 28, 97–115.

  11. Fuller, L.L. (1969). The Morality of Law. Revised edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

  12. Goodhart, A.L. (1930). Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case. Yale Law Journal 30, 161-183.

  13. Grayling, A.C. (1997). An Introduction to Philosophical Logic (3rd ed.). London: Blackwell Publishing.

  14. Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  15. Hart, H.L.A. (1983). Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. In H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (pp. 49-87). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  16. Hart, H.L.A. (1994). The Concept of Law (2nd. ed.). P.A. Bulloch, J. Raz (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  17. Hayek, F.A. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge.

  18. Hobbes, T. (1991). Leviathan. R. Tuck (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  19. Horwich, P. (2014). Naturalism and the Linguistic Turn. In B. Bashour, H.D. Muller (eds.), Contemporary Philosopical Naturalism and Its Implications (pp. 37- 43). New York and London: pRotuledge.

  20. Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  21. Kim, J. (1998). Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

  22. Leiter, B. (2007). Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  23. Lowe, E.J. (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  24. MacCormick, N. (1993). Argumentation and Interpretation in Law. Ratio Juris 6, 16- 29.

  25. Moore, G.E. (1993). Principia Ethica (2nd. ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  26. Moore, M.S. (1982). Moral Reality. Wisconsin Law Review, 1061-1156.

  27. Moore, M.S. (1985). A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation. Southern California Law Review 58, 277-398.

  28. Moore, M.S. (1989). The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse? Stanford Law Review 41, 871-957.

  29. Moore, M.S. (1992). Law as a Functional Kind. In R.P. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory. Contemporary Essays (pp. 188-242). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  30. Moore, M.S. (2002). Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology. Law and Philosophy 21, 619-703.

  31. Otten, J. (1977). Reviving the Logical Connection Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 724-743.

  32. Post, J. (1999). Naturalism. In R. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed.), (pp. 596-597). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  33. Pufendorf, S. (2001). Om de mänskliga och medborgerliga plikterna enligt naturrätten. Med en introduktion av Kjell Å. Modéer (B. Bergh trans.). Stockholm: City University Press.

  34. Putnam, H. (2004). The Content and Appeal of “Naturalism.” In M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question (pp. 59-70).

  35. Radbruch, G. (1950). Legal Philosophy. In E.W. Patterson (ed.), The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (pp. 43-224). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

  36. Rosenberg, A. (2014). Disenchanted Naturalism. In B. Bashour, H.D. Muller (eds.), Contemporary Philosopical Naturalism and Its Implications (pp. 17-36). New York and London: Rotuledge.

  37. Simmonds, N.E. (2002). Central Issues in Jurisprudence (2nd. ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell.

  38. Spaak, T. (1994). The Concept of Legal Competence. An Essay in Conceptual Analysis. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers.

  39. Spaak, T. (2009). Explicating the Concept of Legal Competence. In J.C. Hage, D. von der Pfordten (eds.), Concepts in Law (pp. 74-78). Dordrecht: Springer.

  40. Spaak, T. (2014). A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona’ s Legal Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.

  41. Stone, J. (1959). The Ratio of the Decidendi. The Modern Law Review 22, 597-620.

  42. Stroud, B. (2004). The Charms of Naturalism. In M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question (pp. 21-35).

  43. Suppes, P. (1957). Introduction to Logic. Mineola, New York. Dover Publications.

  44. Wagner, S.J., R. Warner. (1993). Introduction. In S.J. Wagner, R. Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (pp. 1-21). Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

  45. von Wright, G.H. (1970). Explanation and Understanding. London: Rotuledge and Kegan Paul.

Publication information

Author and affiliation

Torben Spaak

Stockholm University

Issue data

Issue nr 2(27)/2021

Pages
83-107
Published
AccessOpen LicenceCC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ↗

How to cite

Bibliographic description and verified export formats.

Format AFPiFS

T. Spaak, Legal Realism and Functional Kinds: Michael Moore’s Metaphysically Reductionist Naturalism, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 2(27)/2021, s. 83–107, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2021.2.83

Export citation data