Research article
The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism
Koncepcja „natury rzeczy” w metodzie „konstrukcji prawniczej” Gustawa Radbrucha a założenia pozytywizmu prawniczego
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 4(29)/2021, s. 45-57
English
Abstract
In his work titled Natur der Sache als juristishe Denkform , Gustav Radbruch develops his account of the nature of things as an objective essence of social reality, which serves as a foundation for the construction of legal institutions. The main objective of this paper is to refute two serious objections against the account, namely, the alleged contradiction between the account of the nature of things and the 1) assumption of relativism of values as well as the 2) assumption of the ontological is-ought dichotomy. To show that Radbruch’s account is consistent with those two assumptions of legal positivism, firstly, I invoke the conceptual distinction between ontological and epistemological objectivity. Secondly, I specify the understanding of the term ’nature‘ not as implying natural origin, but rather an object’s having an essence in ontological terms. With those conceptual distinctions, it is possible to understand Radbruch’s theory as a version of essentialism towards social artifacts (those important form the legal point of view), which does not imply any iusnaturalistic commitments.
Keywords
- Gustav Radbruch
- Nature of Things
- Legal Construction
- Legal ontology
- Legal institution
- Law as Artifact
References
11 reference entries
References
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Dreier, R., Paulson, S.L. (1999). Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie Radbruchs.
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In R. Dreier, S.L. Paulson (eds.), Gustav Radbruch - Rechtsphilosophie (pp. 235-350). Heidelberg: C.F. Müller.
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Gizbert-Studnicki, T. (1981). Koncepcje „natury rzeczy” w zachodnioniemieckiej filozofii prawa. Etyka 19, 133-155.
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Kaufmann, A. (1982). Analogie und „Natur der Sache”. Heidelberg: R.v. Decker & C.F. Müller.
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Krzykalska, Z., Holocher, J. (2021). Argument z natury rzeczy. In M. Florczak- Wątor, A. Grabowski (eds.), Argumenty i rozumowania prawnicze w konstytucyjnym państwie prawa. Komentarz (pp. 661-674). Kraków: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka.
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Radbruch, G. (1923). Rechtsidee und Rechtsstoff. Eine Skizze. Archiv Für Rechts- Und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 17, 343–350.
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Radbruch, G. (1960). Die Natur der Sache als juristische Denkform. Darmstadt: Wisseschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
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Radbruch, G. (1999). Rechtsphilosophie. In R. Dreier, S.L. Paulson (eds.), Gustav Radbruch - Rechtsphilosophie. Heidelberg: C.F. Müller.
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Searle, J. R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
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Searle, J. R. (2006). Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles. Papers: Revista de Sociologia 80, 51-71.
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Zajadło, J. (2001). Formuła Radbrucha. Filozofia prawa na granicy pozytywizmu prawniczego i prawa natury. Gdańsk: Arche.
Publication information
Issue data
Issue nr 4(29)/2021
- Pages
- 45-57
- Published
How to cite
Bibliographic description and verified export formats.
Format AFPiFS
Z. Krzykalska, The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 4(29)/2021, s. 45–57, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45
ACM
[1] Zuzanna Krzykalska. 2021. The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism. AFPiFS 4(29) (2021), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45
ACS
(1) Krzykalska, Z. The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism. AFPiFS 2021, No. 4(29), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
APA
Krzykalska, Z. (2021). The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 4(29), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45
ABNT
KRZYKALSKA, Zuzanna. The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, n. 4(29), p. 45–57, 2021.
Chicago
Krzykalska, Zuzanna. “The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 4(29) (2021): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
Harvard
Krzykalska, Z. (2021) “The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 4(29), pp. 45–57. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
IEEE
[1] Z. Krzykalska, “The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism,” AFPiFS, no. 4(29), pp. 45–57, 2021, doi: 10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
MLA
Krzykalska, Zuzanna. “The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 4(29), 2021, pp. 45–57, https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
Turabian
Krzykalska, Zuzanna. “The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 4(29) (2021): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45.
Vancouver
1. Krzykalska Z. The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism. AFPiFS. 2021;4(29):45–57. doi:10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45
OSCOLA
Zuzanna Krzykalska, ‘The Account of the 'Nature of Things’ in Gustav Radbruch’s Method of 'Legal Construction’ in the Context of Assumptions of Legal Positivism’ (2021) 4(29) AFPiFS 45 <https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2021.4.45>.