Research article

Protection of Fundamental Rights as an Argument in the Dispute over the Legitimacy of Judicial Review. Selected Issues

Article authors
  1. Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Ochrona praw podstawowych jako argument w sporze o legitymizację sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa – zarys problematyki

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(30)/2022, s. 33-43

English

Abstract

The dynamic development of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws in the second half of the twentieth century is reflected in contemporary theories of judicial review. They go beyond the original axis of the dispute over the legitimacy of judicial review, which was shaped by the counter-majoritarian dilemma, and often become more nuanced. In addition to arguments related to the conceptions of institutional cooperation and accountability function of judicial review, rights-based theories of judicial review take on more and more importance. The aim of this article is to outline a wide range of issues related to the protection of fundamental rights, which protection is considered as an argument in the dispute over the legitimacy of constitutional courts. The study presents selected issues that influence the current discourse on judicial review, which include: types of such judicial review; types of arguments used in the analysed discourse; the link between fundamental rights and various concepts of democracy; and judicial review of legislative decisions concerning positive rights guarantees.

Keywords

  • constitutional courts
  • fundamental rights
  • democracy
  • positive rights
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References

37 reference entries

References

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Publication information

Author and affiliation

Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

Issue data

Issue nr 1(30)/2022

Pages
33-43
Published

How to cite

Bibliographic description and verified export formats.

Format AFPiFS

A. Kustra-Rogatka, Protection of Fundamental Rights as an Argument in the Dispute over the Legitimacy of Judicial Review. Selected Issues, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(30)/2022, s. 33–43, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2022.1.33