Research article
Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality
Rodzaje testów judicial review a zasada proporcjonalności
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 2(31)/2022, s. 54-69
English
Abstract
Judicial review in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court can take the form of one of three formulas for examining an act or action of an authority (strict scrutiny test, intermediate scrutiny test, or rational basis test). In the context of the constitutional review each of these tests requires an analysis, of three essential aspects: what kind of individual interest is limited, what form of public interest legitimation is required, and how the means and the purpose so indicated are related. A detailed analysis of these standards of proportion, jurisprudentially developed and evolutionarily tightened, in confrontation with the principle of proportionality used in European constitutions (and documents on international protection of human rights) allows to formulate theses about which standard is stronger, which one creates a barrier providing better protection of individual autonomy, and which is more resistant to ‘steps backwards’ in this respect.
Keywords
- judicial review (of constitutionality of statutes)
- principle of proportionality
- strict scrutiny test
- intermediate scrutiny test
- rational basis test
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Publication information
Issue data
Issue nr 2(31)/2022
- Pages
- 54-69
- Published
How to cite
Bibliographic description and verified export formats.
Format AFPiFS
M. Korycka-Zirk, Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 2(31)/2022, s. 54–69, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54
ACM
[1] Milena Korycka-Zirk. 2022. Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality. AFPiFS 2(31) (2022), 54–69. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54
ACS
(1) Korycka-Zirk, M. Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality. AFPiFS 2022, No. 2(31), 54–69. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
APA
Korycka-Zirk, M. (2022). Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2(31), 54–69. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54
ABNT
KORYCKA-ZIRK, Milena. Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, n. 2(31), p. 54–69, 2022.
Chicago
Korycka-Zirk, Milena. “Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 2(31) (2022): 54–69. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
Harvard
Korycka-Zirk, M. (2022) “Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2(31), pp. 54–69. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
IEEE
[1] M. Korycka-Zirk, “Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality,” AFPiFS, no. 2(31), pp. 54–69, 2022, doi: 10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
MLA
Korycka-Zirk, Milena. “Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 2(31), 2022, pp. 54–69, https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
Turabian
Korycka-Zirk, Milena. “Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality.” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 2(31) (2022): 54–69. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54.
Vancouver
1. Korycka-Zirk M. Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality. AFPiFS. 2022;2(31):54–69. doi:10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54
OSCOLA
Milena Korycka-Zirk, ‘Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality’ (2022) 2(31) AFPiFS 54 <https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.2.54>.